Robot swarm in the battlespace may not be as far off as many think. Sure, many obstacles remain but we’re advancing at an amazing pace. Imagine these weaponized – with just enough intelligence and payload to find and kill a human target within a mile or two. The effect on battlefield tactics will be profound but it may have an even greater impact on policy. Going to war is only going to get easier – as long as the robots are on your side.

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Infamy Speech

December 8, 1941

Yesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will live in infamy – the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam. Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces – with the unbounded determination of our people – we will gain the inevitable triumph – so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.”

Another air show photo that I took a couple of years ago. Here’s that gun in action.

Obama is sending 100 troops after Joseph Kony and his rebels:

In a letter to Congress, President Obama said, “On October 12, the initial team of U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda. During the next month, additional forces will deploy, including a second combat-equipped team and associated headquarters, communications, and logistics personnel. The total number of U.S. military personnel deploying for this mission is approximately 100. These forces will act as advisors to partner forces that have the goal of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior leadership of the LRA.”

Mr. Obama added, “Although the U.S. forces are combat-equipped, they will only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense. All appropriate precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their deployment.”

I just added a new monitor for the Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda, Congo, and Joseph Kony. Watch the stream at LRA.blogsofwar.com

There’s a fairly robust entry on the LRA over at Wikipedia.

Dr. Steven Metz is Chairman of the Regional Strategy Department, Co-Director of the Future of American Strategy Project, and research professor at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

Dr. Metz is the author of more than a hundred publications on future war, the emerging security environment, military strategy, defense policy, international relations and world politics. You can follow him on Twitter @steven_metz.

John Little: In Rethinking Insurgency you stated that America has to recognize three distinct insurgency settings:

• - A functioning government with at least some degree of legitimacy can be rescued by Foreign Internal Defense.
• - There is no functioning and legitimate government but a broad international and regional consensus supports the creation of a neo-trusteeship until systemic reengineering is completed. In such instances, the United States should provide military, economic, and political support as part of a multinational force operating under the authority of the UN.
• - There is no functioning and legitimate government and no international or regional consensus for the formation of a neo-trusteeship. In these cases, the United States should pursue containment of the conflict by support to regional states and, in conjunction with partners, help create humanitarian “safe zones” within the conflictive state.

Where would you place Afghanistan in this model? Is our current battlefield and political strategy (especially our relationship with regional players) in sync with this reality?

Dr. Steven Metz: The problem with the American conceptualization of insurgency and counterinsurgency is that it ignores the distinction between state strengthening and state or even nation building. Americans are pretty good at state strengthening, as demonstrated in El Salvador during the 1980s and 1990s. State building, though, is much harder.

Americans learned counterinsurgency largely from the French and British. But when those nations undertook state building, they did so as colonial powers. This gave them the ability and the motivation to pursue state or nation building even though it almost always takes decades of sustained effort.

Because the United States is not a colonial power and because the attention span of the American public and Congress is fairly limited, it has sought ways to speed up the state or nation building process. As Afghanistan shows today, this seldom works. I simply can’t conceive of the Afghan state, as currently configured, functioning and providing security without massive outside assistance for a very long time. And whether the United States and other Western nations will provide such assistance, particularly given the endemic corruption of the Afghan state and Pakistan’s unwillingness or inability to shut down the Taliban’s external sanctuary , is questionable. There’s also no chance of an effective multinational trusteeship for Afghanistan. That’s why I believe the only sustainable U.S. strategy is a low footprint one designed specifically to prevent an outright Taliban victory (which I think is very unlikely anyway) and to launch spoiling attacks should al Qaeda develop a power projection capability from within Afghanistan (which is also unlikely).

One other factor is important: while the United States and its allies seek the outright defeat of the Taliban and a democratic Afghanistan at peace, the vested interest of the Pakistani and Afghan governments is a sustained insurgency which is strong enough to keep outside aid flowing but not strong enough to overthrow them. Karzai and the Pakistani military and political elites must surely know that if the Taliban and al Qaeda were eradicated, the foreign aid flowing to them would diminish dramatically. This is a common dynamic in contemporary insurgencies: the state and the insurgents develop a sort of symbiotic relationship in which both benefit from the conflict.

Ultimately, then, ISAF is undertaking some very skilled operations in pursuit of a flawed national strategy. Early in the Iraq conflict General Petraeus was famously quoted as asking, “Tell me how this ends.” I think it is even more pressing to ask that for Afghanistan. Looking at all the factors, including economic and demographic ones, I simply cannot imagine a situation where the Karzai government defeats the Taliban, imposes stability over all of Afghanistan, and builds an economy capable of sustaining Afghanistan’s population growth (which is one of the highest on earth) and supporting a massive security force (or finding other employment for the hundreds of thousands of members of the police and army).

John Little: It feels like we’re bailing water in Afghanistan while ignoring the source of the leak – Pakistan. Is it really that difficult to recalibrate our relationship with Pakistan? Could we create a framework where Pakistan is held responsible for the taking the lead on ensuring something like stability in Afghanistan while tying US aid (and the size of our footprint in the region) to their performance? If that is deemed impossible, and we declare that Pakistan is an unfit partner in regional security efforts, wouldn’t that point to the futility of COIN in Afghanistan anyway?

Dr. Steven Metz: The Pakistani government and security forces have become absolute masters at manipulating the United States. I can’t blame them for it–statecraft is a rough and tumble game. But I blame Americans for allowing themselves to be manipulated.

This demonstrates one of the key dilemmas of American involvement in counterinsurgency support. This has two dimensions. First, the more committed Washington is to a partner or ally, the less leverage it has. Second, American policymakers have to play up the stakes in a conflict in order to gain and sustain support from the public and Congress, and that makes it politically difficult to extricate the United States from the conflict.

Historically, U.S. has had leverage over a partner or ally only when the threat to disengage was credible. In a de facto “good cop/bad cop? way, the Reagan administration was able to express its commitment to El Salvador while making sure the Salvadoran elite and military understood that if it did not rein in the right wing death squads, undertake democracy, and improve its military, the U.S. Congress was likely to cut off aid. This message got through and the Salvadorans undertook the necessary reform.

At the present time , it appears that the Pakistani elite simply does not believe that the U.S. will disengage, at least not for some time. Therefore it is able to play both sides of the game by taking action against extremists that threaten it directly but casting a blind eye or, perhaps, even offering support to extremists who only target Americans or the Karzai government.

Every insurgency that succeeded over the past hundred years faced either an incompetent government (Cuba, China) or had external sanctuary. External sanctuary does not determine success on the part of insurgents, but it is a vital component of success. It is a necessary but not sufficient element of insurgent victory. Given this, I personally favor a much harder line toward Pakistan. The United States should ask the Pakistanis to explain their strategy for eradicating the extremist strongholds, including the time line and the amount of American support necessary. If this seems feasible, Washington should make clear that failure to execute the strategy will result in a diminution or cut off of assistance. The United States has to be willing to write off Pakistan.

Now, I realize that the Pakistani elite and public would scream about this. Their goal is assistance without conditions. Again, I can’t blame them for that, but I can blame America for playing along. The best that can be done is to keep the conditions quiet. And I know that the Pakistanis would claim that without U.S. support, extremists will take over their nation and gain control of its nuclear weapons. That is a tremendous risk but I don’t think that it justifies unconditional and escalating assistance. We simply must have ways to gain control of or neutralize the nuclear weapons should Pakistan descend into chaos.

The problem then becomes sustaining support for such a strategy from the American public and Congress. A policymaker who expressed unqualified support for Pakistan and then later withdrew the support would be excoriated by his or her political opponents. Yet the only alternative seems to be pouring endless money into Pakistan with little influence over how it is spent.

Clearly the United States and its allies would have a difficult time sustaining the current counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan without transit through Pakistan. So if America felt that it had no other option than to end support for Pakistan, it would have to revamp the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. But, I believe, it would still be possible to prevent an outright Taliban victory with a much smaller U.S. footprint in Afghanistan.

John Little: Is all the effort poured into COIN Afghanistan in vain if the Pakistan problem isn’t solved or if, as many observers feel, gets even worse? The security, military, and political challenges generated by a disintegrating Pakistan would seem to dwarf any threat posed by Afghanistan.

Dr. Steven Metz: I think the effort and resources poured into both Afghanistan and Pakistan are out of proportion to the strategic benefits–the added security–gained by it. The whole strategy is intended to counter al Qaeda. But there is no evidence that al Qaeda needs formal sanctuary in Afghanistan or Pakistan. If it needs sanctuary at all, that can be almost anywhere in the Islamic world. So even if the current strategy in Afghanistan succeeds, the costs will greatly outweigh the strategic benefits.

The question, then, is why is the United States expending so much effort, money, and blood to gain so little additional security? I think that during the Cold War and post-Cold War period, the U.S. was so dominant in military and economic terms, that it lost sight of the fact that strategy must consider efficiency as well as effectiveness. It was like a shopping spree with a rich sports figure or entertainer who based their purchases strictly on whether they wanted something with no regard for price. The U.S. wanted to weaken Islamic extremism so it pursued strategies designed to do that without considering whether the additional security gained was in proportion to the strategic costs. I’m afraid that mentality is about to crash on the rocks of Iraq and Afghanistan.

But on the issue of a disintegrating Pakistan. There is no question that would be a immense disaster in many ways. Yet Pakistan has been teetering on the precipice of disintegration for its entire history but has somehow held together. I really believe that it is more resilient than Americans give it credit for. A more likely problem is the emergence of an Islamist government in Pakistan, possibly through the democratic process. While that would certainly be damaging to U.S. policy, I don’t think it would automatically be disastrous. I find the assertion that any Islamist regime will provide nuclear weapons to terrorists absurd. The United States should have a stated policy that if terrorists use nuclear weapons and the source of them can be identified (which is likely), it will be treated exactly the same as a direct nuclear strike from the source country.

Of course an Islamist government would be more hospitable to a Taliban or al Qaeda presence. But I’m not sure that would be markedly different than the current state of affairs. The emergence of an Islamist government, though, could increase pressure on Karzai to bring the Taliban into his government. We don’t know whether a coalition government that included the Taliban would provide sanctuary for al Qaeda. I suspect not. I think the Taliban’s relationship with al Qaeda pre-September 11 was based on ignorance. It was simply not aware of the immense costs of harboring al Qaeda. Now it is. Hence I don’t think it would make that mistake again. The Taliban’s leaders are not stupid.

Another Pakistan scenario, though, might be “semi-disintegration” where Islamabad loses even the pretense of control over some regions. That would not be much different than today where the central government has little or no influence in the tribal areas and even parts of Karachi. So long as the government controls Punjab, though, Pakistan can teeter along.

John Little: There’s no real indication that our political class is going to step up and deliver bold leadership and no sign that US military wants to do anything but charge full speed ahead with COIN. So where do you think this takes us in the next three to five years and what will be the impact on the US military?

Dr. Steven Metz: I don’t think that it’s accurate to say that the military is convinced that counterinsurgency will be its primary mission in coming years. The Navy and Air Force certainly don’t, and even with the Army there is debate and discussion. As a new Chief of Staff takes over the Army, I suspect there will be a re-evaluation of the notions of “the long war.”

I also believe that the American public and its elected leaders will revisit the notion of making counterinsurgency the central element of U.S. strategy. Certainly counterterrorism will remain important. But the important point is that counterinsurgency in unstable regions may be an effective method of counterterrorism, it is the most inefficient means conceivable. Given the U.S.’ lingering economic crisis and budget deficits, this is going to become a pressing concern.

There is no doubt that the United States, including the military, will remain involved in strengthening states facing internal conflict–what the military calls Foreign Internal Defense. The U.S. is actually pretty good at it, and it doesn’t require a massive American military presence.

I think it would also be useful if the United States had a “whole of government” surge capacity for stabilization. This would allow pre-empting insurgencies rather than allowing them to metastasize, then surging. Insurgency is like cancer–the earlier the treatment, the greater the chances of success and the less damage to the system. Imagine if the U.S. had been able to make the effort that it made in Iraq in 2007–to include both military and non-military actions–in the summer of 2003. There is a pretty good chance the insurgency there would have been stillborn.

The challenge, though, is that having the ability to rapidly surge stabilization efforts means that there has to be a lot of capacity sitting around unused when there is no crisis underway. That’s why I think such a whole of government stabilization surge capacity should also be multinational. It should be fully in place, supplied, trained and educated–ready to go in a matter of weeks. Creating this would be an immense challenge but, I think, the options are either protracted disasters like Iraq and Afghanistan, or simply avoiding involvement and allowing conflicts to burn themselves out at great human and strategic cost.

So what will the next three to five years bring for the U.S. military? Assuming that the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan diminishes significantly, I expect a shift away from a counterinsurgency-centric force and strategy back to a more balanced one. This is likely to entail returning the land forces to 2003 levels. Critics contend that would leave the United States unprepared for another Iraq and Afghanistan. Given that American involvement in both of those places began with massive strategic blunders, that might not be a bad thing.

John Little: There doesn’t appear to be much appetite, or bandwidth, for traditional multinational COIN efforts now or on the horizon. Aren’t future conflicts more likely to look like Yemen or Somalia than Iraq or Afghanistan? Models that reduce or eliminate our visible footprint, allow maximum flexibility, and facilitate third party humanitarian efforts would appear to be attainable and more efficient going forward.

Dr. Steve Metz: The model most often discussed for the United States is the Philippines: quiet, low footprint assistance to help a state improve its capabilities. Of course, this goes back to my point about the difference between state support and state assistance. This model works very well, but only when there a relatively effective state in existence. And even then it bumps against the problem that states may not desire the outright defeat of the insurgents, but rather keeping them at a controllable or tolerable level.

The notion of humanitarian assistance is different and vexing. One of the most depressing phenomena in recent conflict is that parties to them–insurgents or militias of various types–recognize that the civilized world is repulsed by humanitarian disasters and use that to extort resources. Food becomes a weapon.

Humanitarian intervention can work. While there is this image of the U.N. and American involvement in Somalia in the 1990s as a massive failure, the fact is that tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Somalis were saved from famine. The dilemma is that humanitarian assistance is much easier than rectifying the things that caused a humanitarian crisis in the first place. I suspect that the United States, Europe, and other nations will remain prepared for short term intervention in the face of genocide or humanitarian disaster, but it will be more of a “stem the crisis and leave” sort of thing, hoping that NGOs can deal with the deeper causes. The problem with that, of course, is that the ability of NGOs to resolve deep problems is limited in the face of violence.

Perhaps a new model to replace the current, Cold War conceptualization of counterinsurgency with its emphasis on the national government is for multinational military forces to simply provide security for NGOs, and NGOs to concentrate on local economies and governance rather than the national level ones.

Video via Alert5 (blog | twitter) who, along with Kursed, is doing a great job keeping up with J-20 developments.

As I’ve said on Twitter, the viral campaign for this jet is more impressive than the jet itself. Conducting the first flight with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in-country is icing on the cake for the Chinese even if coincidental.

China has officially gone stealth.

The Communist country confirmed reports it has conducted a test flight of a stealth fighter jet, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said on Tuesday.

The news comes after a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, who Gates said told him of the J-20′s maiden flight.

Check this earlier post for my take on the J-20.

Guest Post: Regional Command South Public Affairs and Sgt. Jerry Wilson, TF Dragoon/CTZ Public Affairs

ZABUL, Afghanistan- Soldiers from the 2ndStryker Cavalry Regiment working alongside their Afghan National Police partners at the Police Training Center in Qalat started the New Year right Monday, Jan 3 by graduating a class of 134 new recruits. Class 1101 had the distinction of not only being the first class of 2011, but also the first class to include volunteers from the Commerce Stability Program and five female recruits.

The CSP is a village-level security program similar to a neighborhood watch. The program hires men from each village and pays them to man observation posts alongside ANP officers. In addition to the CSP, class 1101 also included the first female candidates to be inducted within the Zabul Province.

Five courageous women stepped up and despite fear of retribution toward their families and vowed to support and defend their homes. Due to the predominately male environment at the PTC and the lack of the women instructors, the female recruits were unable to engage in many of the practical exercises with the men. To compensate for this, the female recruits were given a more extensive overview of procedures during their classroom training.

Dragoons conduct a six-week long training course where students were taught techniques and law enforcement skills that will help them in their mission to provide security and stability to the citizens of Zabul Province. The training is separated into classroom and hands on exercises. Instructors teach basic skills like weapons handling, weapons maintenance and first aid. In addition, recruits were also taught room clearing, traffic control point operations and team leading procedures.

“They went through the basic classroom training such as first aid, the constitution, tactics and techniques, checkpoint operations and security operations,” said Capt. Vinh Bui, the Provincial Logistical Advisor for PTC. “They also went to the range and qualified with both rifle and pistol.”

“The intent is for them to have a basic understanding as police officers,” Bui explained, “what they need to know, in order to influence the locals as well as be effective members of the force.”

Graduation Day: A female ANP officer receives her diploma upon completion of the basic
Police training course . (Photo by Sgt. Jerry Wilson)

Bui stated that graduating these women from the program is a great step towards progress in Zabul and they will face many restrictions due to the current cultural standards.

“Because they are female,” Bui said, “there will always be a fear of retribution towards their families so they will always be covered up.” Bui stated that wearing the full traditional burka, female officers will not be as intimidating as their male counterparts wearing their body armor and weapons.

Bui did state they will face many challenges in their careers, these five officers have essentially contributed towards a mile-stone in progress resulting in a more stable secure and diverse Afghanistan.

“They give females a voice within the ANP,” Bui said. “They make it more diverse and well- rounded.”

As predicted, and promised, better quality video is already available and posted here. I’m sure that within a few weeks we’ll have HD chase plane footage set to a Metallica soundtrack. When it drops, I’ll post it here.

Thanks again to Kursed for the tip.

The quality is quite bad. Really, you’d think someone bothering with all this could manage to hold a camera steady for 30 seconds but…

I expect more video (of higher quality) will be available in the coming days and I’ll share as it becomes available. For now this still photo offers the best proof that testing is underway.

Thanks to Kursed for the tip.

Guest post and photos by Army Spc. Jennifer Spradlin, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

MULTI NATIONAL BASE TARIN KOT, Afghanistan – For many Soldiers, the iconic sound of helicopters in flight, a kind of background soundtrack to their lives, is synonymous with being deployed.

During the last nine months at Multi National Base Tarin Kot, Afghanistan, Spc. Jessica Newton has remained a fixture on the flight line as an armament specialist with D Company, Task Force No Mercy. The daily opportunity to work with helicopters has only increased her respect and interest in the aircraft.

“I enjoy mechanics and the way things work. The fact that we can make something out of nothing,” said Newton, an Orange Park, Fla., native. “When I joined the Army, I knew I wanted to work with rotary wing aircraft. I wanted to be a part of aviation.”

The TF No Mercy flight line is a lesson in controlled chaos, involving a continuous cycle of Soldiers, helicopters, missions and repairs. Even when parked and silent, the aerodynamic design of the AH-64D Apache Longbow gives off the impression of motion. The Apache helicopter is the Army’s premier attack helicopter, equipped with Hellfire missiles, 2.75 inch rockets and a 30-mm machine gun. It is the ultimate ally to ground forces.

As an armament technician, Newton is responsible for a variety of maintenance related tasks on the Apache helicopter to include: loading and unloading aircraft ammunitions, aircraft communications, aircraft sighting systems, and aircraft electrical wiring.

In her late twenties, Newton said she tried working civilian jobs prior to joining the Army, but found them monotonous and unfulfilling. Newton knew she wanted to be a part of a team.

“With the Army, you have a drive that you are doing something for the people around you,” said Newton. “I know I am in Afghanistan, but being with my shop and my unit is like a home away from home. When you are down, they’ll drive you. They won’t let you fall back, and that’s awesome.”

Newton’s quiet, Southern drawl belies the fact that she is a determined, hard-worker, but the unit’s leadership notices her constant desire to learn and advance in her career field.

“I’ve worked with Newton for about a year now. She’s one of the quickest learners that we’ve had,” said Staff Sgt. Dean Hess, senior armament maintenance supervisor, D Co., TF No Mercy.
Hess previously deployed to Iraq and is on his second deployment to Afghanistan. He said each Soldier has different qualities and it is the role of a non-commissioned officer to bring out the best in them.

“One of the things I am looking for in a good Soldier is one who pays attention to their job and knows their job. With our job, every repair that we do on an aircraft, the pilots’ lives are at stake. Newton is very dependable,” said Hess, a Clearwater, Fla., native .

Newton said her ultimate goal was to apply for acceptance into the Warrant Officer Course in order to become a helicopter pilot, but until then, she is more than happy working with her hands and making sure everything is done right to make the mission happen.

“If we aren’t doing our job, [pilots] can’t do their job, and if they can’t do their job, they aren’t helping the Soldiers on the ground. That’s why it’s important that we are always striving to get better and learn more,” said Newton.

Forums, Twitter, and blogs are have been buzzing over this “new” Chinese jet for days. The quality of the jet is uncertain but props to the Chinese for excellent execution of a stealth marketing campaign – complete with the sort of grainy spy shots usually reserved for car launches.

I’ve rounded up some resources for those of you who want to keep tabs on this but first a couple of questions:

Raymond Pritchett believes that this news raises interesting (but likely to go unanswered) questions about our understanding of Chinese military development:

In less than one week we have:

1. Confirmation new PLAN aircraft carrier is under construction
2. PACOM confirming DF-21D is now at IOC.
3. 4/5 Generation Stealth technology demonstrators on the runway

All of which is either well ahead of projected schedules or was never before thought to exist, at least publicly? Perhaps it is time the Secretary of Defense answers a few tough questions, like why the DoD appears to be caught with their pants around their ankles when it comes to major PLA developments.

There’s plenty of OSINT on the J-20. It has been the subject of speculation on forums and blogs for years so it’s unlikely that anyone was caught off-guard by this one. Well, let’s hope not anyway. What do we know beyond OSINT? I’d like to know but that’s the unanswerable question. Still, the concern is valid and shared by many.

More important, perhaps, is the question of Chinese espionage. Debate over whether penetration of U.S. Defense contractors assisted China with the development of the J-20 seem almost unnecessary. Chinese determination, Russian engineering assistance and lazy American security practices are a pretty potent combination. China will continue to close gaps and will do so with increasing efficiency as long as this dynamic exists.

What about the military significance of this jet? As a near term military threat to the United States it doesn’t mean much. Deploying these as a viable platform on a large scale just isn’t in the cards and won’t be for quite some time. Building the airframe, even a fairly complex one, is only the first and easiest step. Additional hardware capabilities have to be developed, systems integration is highly complex, massive logistical issues have to be sorted out for production to occur on a large scale, and then there’s actual deployment. Let’s not forget that you need highly skilled personnel to support and man these things in battle.

There is no doubt that China is capable of closing the gap, even innovating, but by the time they get these issues sorted out (another 20-30 years or so at best) I expect the game will have changed considerably. That sort of dominance probably isn’t even the primary motivation at the moment as RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik points out:

Given its traditional policy of aircraft manufacturing, China will most likely create a functional analogue of foreign-made 5G planes that will cost 50% to 80% less than Russian and U.S. models. China will most likely sell the plane in Central Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia, as well as to the richest African countries.

The export models of the J-20 and the planes of that series made for the Chinese Air Force will have foreign, including Russian, equipment and weapons. Moreover, in the next 20 to 30 years China will have to continue to import modern aircraft technology. Despite the strides made by China’s aircraft designers in the last 20 years, China has only slightly narrowed the technological gap dividing it from the global leaders.

So the J-20 has nice lines, will integrate a lot of outdated hardware, and will be obtainable by any petty dictator with a few extra dollars in the bank. It’s looking more like a Volkswagen Jetta than a game changer.

As promised, here are a few resources:

Forum Threads:
AsiaWind
SinoDefenseForum
MilitaryPhotos.net
Defense Forum of India
The Aviation Forum
Tiexue.net

Blogs:
Top81 – Chinese Military Aviation (Scroll to the bottom for tech specs)
China Defense (possible cockpit mockup)
Information Dissemination
War is Boring
The DEW Line

Twitter:
The #J20 Hashtag
Kursed
TheDEWLine
Galrahn
and of course BlogsofWar

New rule: every time you enable or make excuses for Iran you should be lashed, one for every post-graduate degree you have.

Is that anti-intellectual? No…that’s anti-you. They don’t want to negotiate with us and never will. Period. There’s nothing to talk about.

Does that mean send Fifth Fleet and a bunch of AC-130s and B2s to level Iran? No. It means keep making scientists assume room temperature.

It means the head of the IRGCs drone program mysteriously disappearing from his balcony. And motorcycle-borne assassinations.

In sum, Iran doesn’t want an actual military faceoff and neither do we. Instead of negotiating endlessly, let’s be as ruthless as them.

Iran’s relationship with the United States, and Western world in general, has been defined by the assumption that they are untouchable. Analysts are quick to point out that intense Iranian nationalism is a barrier to any attempts at deconstruction/reconstruction of their political system. Invaders, even those with good intentions, are not welcome. Counterterrorism types are quick to point to Iran’s feared global network of terror facilitators and proxies who will respond to any conventional military attack with wave after wave of terrorist attacks on every corner of the globe. This is Iran’s version of mutually assured destruction and it has served them well.

Our own capabilities have served us well too. The Iranian political class does not want a what is assuredly an unsurvivable conventional war. Their strategy, executed quite well I think, has been to challenge the West on multiple fronts but pull back short of the line. If conventional war does come they fully expect it to come from the air and have prepared accordingly. This balance, if you can call it that, has worked because of an underlying assumption on the part of the Iranians. They believe that they can play dirty while the West is shackled by a number of self-imposed restraints and ultimately a (justifiable) fear of putting boots on the ground.

By identifying and targeting those who actively work to support Iran’s most evil intentions (nuclear scientists for example) we can send a different message: you are not safe. In fact, you are not safe anywhere. You are not safe when you travel and, more importantly, you are not safe in your own home. We will, if you persist, kill you during your morning commute. Do not sleep too soundly in that five star hotel because we just might smother your ass with a pillow.

Individual specificity is the future of war. It is brutal and ugly but it is less brutal and ugly than the alternative. By definition some tactics (the high casualty innocent civilian targeting terrorism favored by our enemies) are still off limits. In a war against individuals innocents are spared and justice is served. The illusion of safety for bad actors who support hostile regimes is shattered. Apply these tactics on a larger scale and over time, indefinitely, and these regimes will likely find it increasingly difficult to place intelligent people in supporting roles. The message to scientists, agents, oppressors, even “religious” leaders is clear: you are not just a small irrelevant cog in a larger machine, you are not lost in the crowd, YOU are the enemy and we will kill you.

There are definitely signs that this is happening, both in the struggle against Iran and in the greater war on terror. But is it happening on the scale needed to change some of these long standing assumptions? This is largely a covert effort (which it should be) so evaluation is difficult. Observers can only point to Iran’s behavior as an indicator. My gut feeling is that our capabilities in this area are increasing (just wait until we get indoor nano-scale lethal UASs) as is our comfort level with the approach but we’re not quite there. Iran continues to move aggressively froward on a dangerous track. Ironically, our greatest hope in preventing a devastating war is in taking off the gloves and getting dirty. We have to be “as ruthless as them”.

This Veterans Day, we take our inspiration from a traditional ‘Jody’, or military marching song. Thanks to the soldiers, veterans, children, and passersby who participated in the making of this video. To all our troops who serve and have served our country, Thank You!

The U.S. armed services are issuing internal messages to all personnel barring them from visiting the WikiLeaks website, which recently posted 77,000 classified diplomatic and military messages on the long war in Afghanistan.

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman confirmed Thursday for The Washington Times that all four services “have put out such messages” after The Times had obtained copies of Navy and Marine Corps messages banning troops from accessing WikiLeaks.

Mr. Whitman later told The Times that the Army and Air Force had not yet issued such statements.

I certainly wouldn’t want my IP address showing up in their logs if I had a security clearance.

Highlights of the Assumption of Command of U.S. Central Command by GEN James Mattis on 11 August 2010.

Lieutenant General William Lord, the United States Air Force’s Chief Information Officer, provides insight on the significant changes occurring in Air Force Cyberspace career fields. The video also summarizes the Air Force’s proud heritage of adapting to new missions brought on by technological change and its readiness to tackle future challenges. Learn more about SAF/CIO A6 at http://www.safxc.af.mil/

Wounded by an IED blast in Iraq, Maj. Pulido returned home facing tremendous physical and psychological challenges, including thoughts of suicide. What turned things around for him was reaching out for and accepting support from others, and focusing on helping service members and families in similar circumstances.

On a recent trip to the Martial Arts Center of Excellence (MACE) at Marine Corps Base Quantico, UFC fighters Forrest Griffin, Rashad Evans, Gabriel Gonzaga, Marcus Davis, and former Marine Brian Stann, along with UFC president Dana White, experienced some of the Marine Corps’ rigorous martial arts training.

These elite cage fighters learned that the physical and mental demands required of elite war fighters are only met by those dedicated enough to become part of the Few and the Proud.

Related:
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

Wikileaks is an especially powerful concept that resonates with the especially naive but this project subverts democratic institutions, ignores the rule of law, and exposes heroic sources to imprisonment, torture, even death. If Americans want greater transparency, or other policy changes, they have democratic processes at their disposal. Creating that change, through those processes, is the only legitimate way for Wikileaks supporters and free culture types to achieve their goals.

Apply these tools to people who have no absolutely voice, no recourse, no hope and you might have a leg to stand on but no rational person can argue that U.S. citizens fit that profile. As it stands now these people are enemies of this state, enemies of legitimate freedom, and enemies of democracy.

The Daily Mail covered the rollout:

Almost invisible to ground radar, it is designed to travel at high jet speeds and cover massive distances between continents.

The plane is built to carry out intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance on enemy territory using onboard sensors.

And it has been designed to carry a cache of weapons – including bombs and missiles -, giving it a potential long-range strike capability.

It can be controlled from anywhere in the world with satellite communications.

Experts say the cutting-edge design is at the forefront of world technology and as advanced as any US development.

BAE has a helpful FAQ here and video of the rollout.

In short, the dispute between President Truman and Gen. MacArthur was more substantive than what we saw between President Obama and Gen. McChrystal. During the Korean War, after the Chinese invaded Korea to force advancing United Nations troops away from its border, MacArthur agitated in public to attack the Chinese mainland. Truman refused to entertain the idea of a wider war, or the use of nuclear weapons. Contrast that heady dispute with a Rolling Stone article in which administration officials were insulted for not understanding the challenge facing the military: It doesn’t exactly measure up.

In fact, President Truman avoided firing MacArthur for a long time. The General was practically running for the White House from Korea. Truman suffered insults, backbiting and sneers from the revered general. During one meeting, MacArthur greeted his commander-in-chief with a handshake instead of a salute. Truman wisely ignored the slight. (Granted, the war was going well at that point and MacArthur was wildly popular in the U.S.) Truman acted only when MacArthur sent a letter to a congressman that questioned the president’s limited war strategy, which was read on the floor of the House of Representatives. That was impossible to ignore—and the world was watching.

True, McChrystal’s conduct is fairly tame compared to MacArthur’s but in both cases the world was watching. Hendrik Hertzberg makes an excellent point about the impact of McChrystal’s conduct in a wired world:

Just as important, frontline troops nowadays are also online troops. They are plugged in to the Internet, to Facebook, to blogs, to e-mail and Skype. They talk to each other in chat rooms with little or no supervision from the brass. It’s all instant and it’s all in their face. And that, I hasten to add, is not a bad thing. It’s a good thing. But it makes the morale of the troops that much more fragile, that much more apt to be affected by relative trivialities. The fact that General McChrystal, along with his “Team America” posse of adjutants, understood none of this was reason enough to send him packing. His “conduct” wasn’t just a disservice to his President; it was a disservice to the men and women under his command.

Peter Roff finds another interesting contrast in the men who fired their generals:

Let’s stipulate, using what some see as the obvious example, that McChrystal is no Douglas MacArthur. True enough, but Obama is no Harry Truman, who was a vigorous and effective commander-in-chief during the earliest days of the Cold War. Obama’s feckless leadership in the war on terror bespeaks a leader who does not want or know how to win the fight we are in. It is notable, for example, that it took nearly 10 months for Obama and McChrystal to meet face-to-face–via a video uplink–after the general called for a significant infusion of troops into Afghanistan. It only took about 10 hours for a meeting to occur once McChrystal’s comments leaked out.

The White House has asked the Pentagon to make a list of possible replacements for Gen. Stanley McChrystal because President Barack Obama wants to be ready if he decides to fire the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, a senior administration official told CNN Wednesday.

McChrystal is unlikely to survive the fallout from remarks he made about colleagues in a magazine profile to be published Friday, a Pentagon source who has ongoing contacts with the general told CNN earlier.

Few expect him to walk away from this meeting with his job despite a heroic record of service. Eliot A. Cohen wraps it up pretty well in Why McChrystal Has to Go:

Gen. McChrystal’s just-published interview in Rolling Stone magazine is an appalling violation of norms of civilian-military relations. To read it is to wince, repeatedly—at the mockery of the vice president and the president’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, at the sniping directed toward the U.S. ambassador, at a member of his staff who, when asked whom the general was having dinner with in Paris said, “Some French minister. It’s so [expletive deleted] gay.” The quotes from Gen. McChrystal’s underlings bespeak a staff so clueless, swaggering and out of control that a wholesale purge looks to be indicated.

That he and his staff would think and say these things – privately – is not the least bit surprising. However, allowing this behavior to occur over an extended period of time in the presence of a journalist is actually pretty shocking. It’s also a bit surprising that McChrystal expressed no concern or regret to Rolling Stone after his pre-publication review of the piece. Perhaps he saw it coming and was resigned to his fate. It’s impossible to know what the general was thinking (at least until the book comes out) but I think Joe Klein probably has it right:

This is an extraordinary man, with the perfect skill set necessary for the mission in Afghanistan: a thorough knowledge of counterinsurgency and deep experience in special operations. But there is another side to McChrystal: he is so focused on his real job that he hasn’t spent sufficient time learning how to play the public relations game. He speaks his mind; in private conversations, I’ve found, he is incapable of fudging the truth. This leads to a certain myopia, an innocence regarding the not-so-brave new world of the media. He spoke his mind during a question and answer session in London last autumn, expressing his skepticism about Vice President Biden’s preference for a smaller force in Afghanistan, with a heavy emphasis on special operations. And now he has been caught by a Rolling Stone reporter, speaking his mind on a number of subjects.

Of course, there is a significant difference between speaking one’s mind and insubordination and McChrystal and his staff have strayed – well, charged – into the latter. The resulting fallout will have an impact far beyond the personalities involved and may be one of the defining moments of this war.

Here you will find news, commentary, and reflection on important events throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility, from Egypt in the West to Pakistan in the East, and from Kazakhstan in the North to Yemen and the waters off Somalia to the South. Of course, we will also provide extensive coverage of our ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the work of our troopers deployed overseas.

As CENTCOM Commander, I look forward to lending my thoughts and perspective to the discussion on events in this vital region. I also look forward to reading contributions from leaders in the field, subject matter experts, regional scholars, and troopers. If you are reading this, consider yourself a member of CENTCOM’s online family. This blog is for you, and we hope you will take a moment to join the conversation.

We look forward to hearing from you.

The blog is a good thing but it is very poorly integrated with centcom.mil. It’s also kind of surprising that they chose to launch it nearly devoid of content. The initial post by the general was posted on the 16th and it’s the only content on the site. I would have suggested launching with a full range of categories and content (20-30 posts at least) to give people a feel for what the editorial team has to offer – and a reason to come back. The first impression here is – well, there isn’t one.

It would appear that they have the tools but the strategy is lacking. I hope more content is around the corner but my experience is that blogs that launch poorly tend to fade quickly.

Two soldiers talk about war injuries and how they beat the odds to serve together again in Afghanistan. SFC Matthew Chlosta brings us the story from Kabul.

“The Coast Guard came and shut them down,” Jindal said. “You got men on the barges in the oil, and they have been told by the Coast Guard, ‘Cease and desist. Stop sucking up that oil.’”

A Coast Guard representative told ABC News today that it shares the same goal as the governor.

“We are all in this together. The enemy is the oil,” said Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Dan Lauer.

But the Coast Guard ordered the stoppage because of reasons that Jindal found frustrating. The Coast Guard needed to confirm that there were fire extinguishers and life vests on board, and then it had trouble contacting the people who built the barges.

Gov. Bobby Jindal could lead the response in Louisiana effectively (he’d certainly keep this sort of stupidity to a minimum) but I can’t imagine that the Obama administration is eager to do anything that would boost an already rising republican star.

Reaction

The Corner
I have to wonder, when Churchill was evacuating the Brits and French from Dunkirk, did he let the Royal Navy stop ships so they could make sure there were enough fire extinguishers?

The Moderate Voice
We have been told the the oil spill is the greatest catastrophe in American history. We have been told this is equivalent to Chernobyl, and that the livelihoods of millions depends on rapid action using all available resources. No less than the President of the United States told us that this was war, and that we would do “whatever it takes”. Apparently, none of this means that barges that suck up the oil will be allowed to operate without Coast Guard verification of the correct number of life jackets and fire extinguishers on board.

Grim’s Hall
The Federal government is asserting veto power over state actions; it is reading that power in the broadest possible way, even in emergency situations. It’s unresponsive to the needs of the people of the state; but every piddling regulation (“How many fire extinguishers do you have on that oil-sucking barge?”) is put ahead of doing something about the emergency at hand.

Outside the Beltway
I’m not against martime safety, of course, but it strikes me as more than a little absurd that the Coast Guard it worry about life vests and fire extinguishers while the Governor of Louisiana is worrying about stopping the oil from entering the Louisiana marshes.

Protein Wisdom
Well, you see, Gov Jindal, the White House has a big problem with you. You’re a Republican.

Right Wing News
Consider the BP spill: the Coast Guard has shut down oil sucking barges. Who ordered that? Based on the way this regime does business, you know it had to come from someone within. No CG commander would even consider stopping the barges and face the public wrath.

Members of the pop-punk band discuss their music, new album and their support for the troops.

“This is not some kind of a production program, or something, where you are going to meet these particular objectives this week and next week,” he said. “This is a process. We think we have the right assets. We have the right strategy. We have the right leadership. And most of our allies and partners share our view that things are heading in the right direction and that we will be able to show clear progress and that we are on the right track by the end of this year.”

Of course everyone, politicians included, knows that wars aren’t fought on strict timelines or project managed down to the hour and that setbacks occur but political motivations, not reality, will continue to heavily influence the narrative anyway.