Life at Mossad Headquarters – A Discussion with Former Mossad Officer Michael Ross

michaelross31 Life at Mossad Headquarters A Discussion with Former Mossad Officer Michael Ross

Michael Ross was born in Canada and served as a soldier in a combat unit of the Israel Defence Forces prior to being recruited as a “combatant,” (a term designating a deep-cover operative tasked with working in hostile milieus) in Israel’s legendary secret intelligence service, the Mossad. In his 13 year career with the Mossad, Ross was also a case officer in Africa and South East Asia for three years, and was the Mossad’s counterterrorism liaison officer to the CIA and FBI for two-and-a-half years. Ross is a published writer and commentator on Near Eastern affairs, intelligence and terrorism. He is the author of The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists. You can follow him on Twitter.

John Little: There are a few intelligence agencies with high profile headquarters and the CIA leads the pack in that regard. Mossad facilities have a much lower profile (outside of Israel at least). Can you talk a bit about the size and scope of the Mossad’s headquarters – and the environment?

Michael Ross: I am prohibited from disclosing the Mossad’s HQ actual location but it is convenient and well-situated to meet the needs of the organization. It has a very modern (but highly secure) university campus feel about it and the grounds and gardens are quite beautifully maintained. It is a sanctuary from the greater hustle and bustle of Israel. There are even works of sculpture by some renowned artists that adorn the landscape. It is quite self-contained with indoor shooting ranges, meat and dairy dining rooms (the Mossad is “kosher”), fully equipped fitness center and an outstanding gymnasium (where I used to play inter-mural basketball).

It’s not large given the small size of the organization but it is a busy place. The parking lots start filling up early and the lights are always burning at all hours somewhere in the complex. As with any top tier intelligence service with a global footprint, It never actually goes to sleep.

Also like other services, the really interesting activity is conducted off campus where specialized units are maintained in out-stations. The Mossad is very strict about compartmentation so operational personnel do not interact with the HQ component on the main campus. I was in the Mossad for about 7-8 years before I ever set foot in the main HQ campus.

John Little: So it sounds very different from many other agencies that rotate officers in and out of HQ assignments then?

Michael Ross: Very, we have no cubicles and people can, and often do, spend their entire careers overseas until retirement. Some come back to HQ after many years overseas to take up senior management roles. There is also a population of operational personnel that live in Israel but travel to assignments all over the globe on a regular basis and for many years.

John Little: Overall, how did you feel about your interaction with HQ when in the field? Complaints about disconnects and micromanagement are common in intelligence literature. Is life in the Mossad any different?

Michael Ross: One of the great axioms of secret intelligence services is the sniping that goes on back and forth between HQ and the field and the Mossad is not immune to this side of HQ-field unit interaction. Given our flatter bureaucracy and overall size (and compartmentation) there is probably much less of it but it does exist. We have also made significant headway in divesting ourselves of the embassy station system. This makes for a more fluid (and less hierarchical) management style less conducive to counter-productive turf wars.

When I was in the field we used to think that some HQ requests were unreasonable and did not take into account the reality of our working environment. When I was in HQ, I thought some of the people in the field were high-maintenance prima donnas, so it works both ways. One of my great lessons was that HQ always has the big picture in mind so I came to realize that my quibble with some strange tasking did not always take into account the fact that what I was doing was a piece of something much, much bigger.

Our organizational culture is based on our management layers being populated by people whose resumes contain many years of operational experience in the field. If you don’t go overseas, you don’t get promoted in the Mossad. This helps mitigate any HQ-field disconnect because the people giving you taskings and orders at HQ have been there, done that, and worn the t-shirt.

John Little: Was your time at headquarters a nice change of pace or a shock to the system? I can imagine the office politics and rigidity being a bit off-putting after someone has spent many years in the field.

Michael Ross: It was actually an environment that I never really embraced nor felt comfortable with. Suddenly there were all these protocols and yes, a certain degree of rigidity to the proceedings. I was also an unknown because I came from this highly compartmented existence (people serving in the Mossad who are not members of the unit have no idea what my former operational division, “Caesarea”, does in the field). One of the hardest parts of being in HQ however, was the reduction in pay given that being in the field includes all kinda of extra allowances.

So I suddenly show up and everyone pays you a much respect because you were a combatant in the flagship unit of the Mossad but they also say, “You have no clue how things work here, so you better get up to speed and quickly.”

I also realized that all my report writing, cable communication overseas, etc. were all now to be in Hebrew. Both Hebrew and English are official languages in the Mossad meaning you can use either one, but nobody is going to use English because nobody else does. I’m fluent in the language but having been under cover for several years, did everything I could to forget it. Now I’m in a milieu where the majority of people are highly educated native Israelis and the writing and communication standards are very high. When I was in the field, I did all my reporting in English (for obvious reasons).

Luckily, I was placed in a staff officers course right after entering HQ. It’s an advanced course that people wait years to get on and I was able to jump the queue because of my time in the field. Combatants achieve rank at an accelerated pace over their peers in other operational and support divisions and so I entered HQ with the equivalent military rank of Major and left as a branch head at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel (the ranking is military equivalent as our salaries, benefits, and pension are indexed against the IDF).

It was a real education and I was able to work with some terrific people in the CIA and FBI but after 2.5 years, I could not wait to get back into the field as soon as possible. I don’t have a personality type that thrives in an overly structured environment. I also found the politics of working with the vast and Byzantine U.S. intelligence community frustrating. In retrospect I was probably better suited to working a liaison role with a country whose intelligence service has no diplomatic relations with Israel.

John Little: Were your options limited to domestic postings or liaison roles at that phase of your career? It sounds like, generally speaking, once you are called back to headquarters your operational work is done.

Michael Ross: Typically if you come from one operational division’s field component, you return to its HQ counterpart but I did something different and tossed myself into the deep end by joining a division that didn’t know me at all: The Liaison and Special Political Operations Division known as “Tevel” which is Hebrew for “World”. While liaison work seems cushy, it’s not at all and almost all my colleagues were former case officers or combatants. One of my colleagues was a deep cover combatant for many years and took part in the operation to assassinate Abu Jihad in Tunisia.

Some of my colleagues joined the HUMINT division so coming in from the field doesn’t necessarily ground you in any way. You can go back to a posting in the field almost immediately if you want.

The truth of the matter is that HQ doesn’t need more people to fill roles at the office. Support people can be hired fairly easily. What the Mossad always has in short supply are officers that can be deployed in the field under foreign cover. If you come from an operational background, there are always opportunities to go back out until you return take up a management role at HQ or retire.

John Little: So what was a typical day like for you at headquarters? Was it a constant grind of 16 hour days and layers of bureaucracy to navigate or different?

Michael Ross: It started with 05:30 wake-up to beat traffic and a 45 minute commute to the office where I’d hopefully score decent parking.

Days at work in the office started by reading cable traffic from our Washington station (always entertaining) and meetings both internally and with our liaison partners from either the local CIA station or FBI Legatt (but never at the same time!).

As the CT liaison officer to the U.S. IC, I was constantly exchanging material and data on terrorists and their targets with both agencies, but a huge part of my job was dealing with attack alerts. Israel and the U.S. are main focal points of every potential terror attack on one of our many missions, schools, and military installations worldwide. A source report of an impending attack on a U.S. target would have me coordinating the transfer of said warning to my U.S. counterpart together with our CT division and the division responsible for the source of the warning. I’d call the CIA station on the “STU” (secure telephone unit) connecting the station with Mossad HQ. Together, we’d make sure that all the relevant security functions knew about the warning, it’s viability, and any other relevant intelligence. It was a fast-paced, dynamic position where delay could cost lives. I greatly enjoyed working with my American counterparts and I think it was mutual. Beyond terror attack alerts, we worked on joint operations, exchanged delegations on many mutual subjects and basically kept the relationship on track. I especially remember the period where the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked. Not only was I involved in helping the U.S. immediately after the attacks, I represented the Mossad as part of the CIA team that captured some of the main players in Baku in 1998 (based on our intelligence provided to the CIA). That was a “full circle” moment when I realized how important and powerful liaison relationships can be between two top tier services working together.

I normally worked a 12-14 hour day, but if the terrorist attack threats were coming thick and fast (either sourced by us or from CIA sources) I’d be dealing with them at all hours. It’s ironic, but when I was living under deep cover, I got way more sleep than I did when I was working in HQ. After doing this job, was it any wonder I couldn’t wait to get back to the field?

So You Want to Work for the CIA/Mossad?

Former Mossad officer Michael Ross and I were comparing notes on the unusual messages and emails that come our way and, not surprisingly, we both deal with some similar characters. Setting aside the absolute nutters for a moment we’d like to address those sometimes young, sometimes naive, but often well intentioned people who contact us about jobs in the US/Israeli intelligence communities. Let me start by saying that if you fantasize about a career as a super spy and your first step on that journey is contacting either one of us through a direct message on Twitter (or the contact form on Blogs of War) you are not off to a promising start! No worries, though. we’re here to shore up your security practices a bit and hopefully point you in the right direction.

John Little: It seems rather obvious but contacting a stranger on the Internet, especially one not connected to the intelligence community, in an attempt to launch a spying career exposes potential applicants to quite a bit of risk doesn’t it? I usually point people in the direction of an official recruiting site such as http://www.intelligence.gov/careers-in-intelligence/ or http://www.intelligence.gov/careers-in-intelligence/types-of-opportunities/for-students.html if they express interest but I have often been troubled by how much they reveal in their direct messages or emails. How do you deal with people who, misguided or not, want to join the Mossad? As a Canadian citizen that is a sensitive topic is it not?

Michael Ross: I receive innocent queries from people on a fairly regular basis enquiring how they can join the Mossad. In fact, I recently corresponded with a well-meaning person who informed me that their renowned skate-boarding prowess allowed them to travel to all manner of exotic locales. You have to admit that a skateboarder appearing at the gates of Fordow would certainly be the most original approach the Iranians had ever encountered however, gaining access to a target by skateboard is the least important of things to consider when setting out on the career path of professional espionage. I think people who want to be spies should set out by exercising some initiative in finding out what they can through open sources first before furtively approaching me on Twitter or via an email.

My first question when someone approaches me is what is their citizenship? If they are an Israeli citizen then I have no problem directing them to the Mossad’s website at: http://www.mossad.gov.il/Eng/AboutUs.aspx. If they are citizens of other countries, I politely advise them that it’s not a good idea to offer one’s services to another country’s intelligence service regardless how closely the countries are allied – unless you are in fact – a citizen of that country. If the person approaching me is a U.S. citizen, I direct them to the plethora of intelligence agencies that are available to the American citizen. U.S. citizens are spoiled for choice in this realm.

I think people have been conditioned by Hollywood to believe that spies can be stateless soldiers of fortune and so long as they’re fighting terrorists, details about nationality and allegiance are not that important in the scheme of things. I have to often explain that while we share many worthy goals, intelligence services pursue differing agendas that are driven by national security priorities specific to their government. For a long period of time, the Mossad had a very difficult time convincing the British SIS that Hezbollah was more than just a localized threat to Israel. Likewise when on rare occasion they approached us concerning a matter involving IRA terrorist activity. Turkey couldn’t understand why the PKK wasn’t top of the counter-terrorism agenda for everyone else. You can see through these examples that while we’re all countering terrorism, national security priorities do not always align 100% between allies.

In my own case, I lived for a long time in Israel, served in the IDF, became fluent in Hebrew, and spent some years going native before I was even considered for recruitment. While national security priorities differed between Canada and Israel, I never once felt that I was straying into a grey zone that would put me in a moral conflict with my Canadian citizenship.

I encourage people interested in pursuing a career in the intelligence milieu to do their homework. Official websites offer a great deal of useful information about how to apply and what criteria they are specifically looking for in a potential candidate. If you approach me without doing all that initial research, I’ll tell you that by first coming to me, the message you’re sending is that you’re probably not cut out for this business.

John Little: And what would you say to those aspiring CIA/Mossad officers about their communication and personal security practices in that period leading up to potential employment? It’s never too early to practice discretion is it?

Michael Ross: Well, first of all, if you write me asking how to join the Mossad and your IP address shows you live in Dahieh, then you’re either suicidal or think I’m asleep at the wheel. Either way, people should be aware that computers are the most insecure devices ever conceived by man and users should bear that in mind when using electronic communication.

For anyone interested in joining an intelligence service – regardless of which – it’s best to do the research and then keep your intentions to yourself. One thing that is highly valued in a candidate for recruitment is an innate sense of discretion. During the course of your being assessed as a candidate to work for an intelligence service, questions will be asked about with whom you’ve been communicating your intentions. When it comes out (and it will) that you’ve been emailing far and wide, it’s going to indicate to your perspective employer that you’re clearly not the right stuff.

As for social media, having pictures of yourself engaged in any type of indiscreet activity or participating in online behavior that can be translated as even mildly compromising, isn’t going to help your case. Let the sentiment behind the saying, “discretion is the better part of valour” be your guide.

Other Discussions with Michael Ross
A Gentle Reminder About Security and Social Media for Security Cleared Professionals

A Gentle Reminder About Security and Social Media for Security Cleared Professionals

Social Media use by security cleared professional creates obvious risks that are mostly well managed by the thousands of professionals who use it day in and day out. And we are thrilled that you do so. Twitter gives national security and international relations geeks unbelievable access to great minds and inside players across the globe. However, there are a number of not-so-obvious dangers lurking just out of sight to most people. They dutifully avoid releasing personally identifiable and classified information but their networks, communication style, and other subtle factors can paint a robust profile when viewed by a careful observer. I recently discussed this with former Mossad officer Michael Ross and it is our hope that this discussion will prompt many of you to look at your networks and communication patterns through a different lens.

John Little: There were online communities when you were active but I assume they weren’t pervasive enough to require much thought except in very specific cases. Now virtually everyone in the developed world, and many beyond, has a social presence online. Have you thought much about the impact that social media is having on intelligence? The upside from a mass collection / data mining perspective is pretty obvious but it is also presents intelligence professionals with a unique operating environment in its own right doesn’t it?

Michael Ross: Social media and the possibilities for open source intelligence collection have expanded exponentially with the advent of all the various social media platforms available online. It also opens up a whole world of operational cover and networking possibilities that in the past involved a lot of leg-work when I was in harness.

Social media has both strong offensive and defensive elements in its makeup. For a “poacher” like myself, I can mine a considerable amount of data on a potential target for recruitment (including vulnerabilities or avenues for exploitation) long before I even come into any contact with the target. For my “gamekeeper” colleagues in the counterintelligence realm, it offers a number of possibilities in determining potential for attack and what the “poachers” are targeting.

Social media and the internet are a double-edged sword also because they are open to abuse by outfits like Stratfor that sell jargon, open-source information, and fabrication as a finished intelligence product for corporate and government consumers. The other edge of the sword is that people like myself and others can access social media and set the record straight.

The most interesting aspect for me however, is that I can interface with someone in say, Beirut and find out in real time what’s happening in the southern suburbs of that city while I sit at my table Laphroaig at elbow. Now that’s social media.

John Little: Let’s talk about the threat this poses in places like the U.S. where social media is ubiquitous. You recently tweeted “Okay, I’m a “former” member of FIS (foreign intelligence service), but I could have a field day collecting without leaving the comfort of my rainswept Vancouver residence.” and this really resonated with me because the same techniques I use to build my network for Blogs of War are also open to exploitation by hostile forces. I love the fact that I can build networks of subject matter experts but I find it troubling that so many of them are obviously attempting to keep a low profile while unknowingly revealing so much about themselves. You can learn a lot about someone through their social networks (who they follow, who follows them, who they retweet, and chat with) even if they assume that their identity is obscured. Twitter is ripe for exploitation isn’t it?

Michael Ross: Obviously my statement about the ability to use social media and the internet as a collection tool was in large part due to what Joshua Foust aptly termed, “L’affaire Petraeus”. First of all I was struck by attempts in certain quarters on social media to render the issue “out of bounds” through moralizing pseudo concern for Petraeus’ apparently dissolving marriage. Social media is just that; all the pleasant and unpleasant characteristics of human interaction and to suddenly think it should be immune to gossip or a forum only for the high-minded and moral is both naive and absurd.

A really excellent example of using Twitter and Facebook to collect important information, was Avi Mayer of the Jewish Agency for Israel recently outing Greta Berlin, the founder of the Free Gaza Movement, for tweeting that Zionists were responsible for the Nazi Holocaust and then trying to erase her electronic footprints. This is but one example of how social media can be a powerful collection and dissemination tool and why it should never be under-estimated.

For a foreign intelligence service seeking specific HUMINT targets to exploit, social media offers a plethora of opportunities for collectors to initially spot and assess targets for recruitment and this is all done in a passive context without even initiating any direct contact with the target. Whether it’s acknowledged or not, collection activity through social media is a form of HUMINT. With little effort, I can obtain photos, addresses, occupations, telephone numbers, workplace addresses, friends, associations etc., etc. all from the comfort of home. I could probably identify in my twitter feed at least a score of people whom I believe to have some form of security clearance and/or access to classified information of high value. How I choose to develop that relationship (which I do not by the way!) for potential recruitment and handling is made easier by having had access to so much readily available information through the simple construct of social interaction. This is also very much a two way street; for counter-intelligence people (CI), this also provides them with information on what I as a collector am interested in targeting. I know on one occasion for certain that I was having my own tires kicked by a representative of a country that is semi-hostile to Israel and U.S. (and I have to say, the approach was far more subtle than I would have thought given the country in question).

What is your Twitter feed or Facebook page if not a network? In the old days of spying it used to take years to develop networks that can be cobbled together in a very short time. I returned to Twitter about three weeks to a month ago and I have approximately 700 people from all kinds of backgrounds following me; law-enforcement, special operations, intelligence, military, academia, private sector, journalism that I now have immediate access to on an almost 24/7 basis.

I’m on record as stating that the U.S. is too liberal in providing security clearances. 854,000 plus employees now hold top-secret security clearances, an example of the astonishing growth in the intelligence bureaucracy since 2001. In my liaison capacity with the CIA, a case officer from the Tel Aviv station appeared at a meeting with a contractor from Lockheed-Martin in tow. Seeing my look of astonishment, my CIA colleague explained that he had a top secret clearance. I replied to my colleague, “not with us he doesn’t” and cut the meeting short. This is the core of the problem; too many clearances, improper compartmentation, and too much reliance on self-regulation. Security, like an unprotected coastline, is subject to erosion.

John Little: So we know this is a mess because we both parse this information on a hourly basis as we’re building our networks of subject matter experts. I am always looking at new accounts with a critical eye because I’m looking to track the most knowledgeable people possible. Are they really a SEAL? Really former Mossad (no offense Michael)? Are they who they say they are or are they someone interesting despite their low profile? There are those who appropriately obscure every piece of personal identification but their lingo, quality of their feed, and network says volumes about their role or access. I track hundreds of low-profile accounts like that and they’re some of my best sources of information.

Not using your real name and photo is not enough. I can Google your Twitter ID and potentially track it back to other social networks or forums where you might have revealed even more personal information. And who you choose to follow can reveal much about you. Are the first few people people you followed family members? Fellow employees? Professional contacts? You may have kept your personal information under wraps but have they? Beyond that there’s the simple back and forth conversations, inside jokes, and retweets that may be incredibly revealing to a careful observer.

The techniques I describe here require no resources, special tools, or technical knowledge. We’re just scratching the surface but a hostile organization is likely using applications similar to Maltego (http://paterva.com/web6/) or much more powerful proprietary tools that can take this network mapping to a completely different level. Is there any hope that countries with enormous security and intelligence infrastructures will be able to get their hands around this problem or is it just a losing battle?

Michael Ross: It is a losing battle insomuch as people with security clearances or access to sensitive material are entrusted with self-regulation. Some of this demographic will be vigilant and careful not to make themselves vulnerable to attack and others will forget that the internet is a very unsafe environment for those wishing to keep secrets. Some of the people who follow me on Twitter are particularly careful to obscure their footprint; but then that only makes me curious as to why they are being so careful in the first place. If the object of social media is to engage in some form of interaction with other like-minded persons on the internet, then why go to all the trouble to “hide in plain sight”? You have no photo, profile or location, a locked account, no followers and you’re following several hundred or even thousand accounts of a national security bent. That in itself is interesting and raises antennae.

When I was in training and we were required to collect intelligence on a person, place or thing, the first place we always started with was open source material. My instructor likened it to trying to meet a girl you are really interested in. You don’t just walk up to someone you don’t know and start asking them personal questions. You ask around first. Is she single?; what’s she like?; who are her friends?; What do you have in common?; etc., etc. Likewise with a nuclear installation in Iran; you don’t just fly to Iran and start taking pictures outside the location because you’d soon find yourself in the fingernail factory for a few days followed by hanging from a crane shortly thereafter. You see what’s available through open sources first and that’s not just the nuclear site itself but cover points nearby that could facilitate a visit to the area and explain your presence to the environment without raising suspicion. It is also a superb device for building cover. There is so much collection that can be done before even considering getting on a plane. The real intelligence however, is not on the internet. For all it’s possibilities open source intelligence (OSINT) does not even scratch the surface of what is collected via the myriad of platforms available to a top tier intelligence service. What social media and the internet do provide however, are the means to spot, assess, and develop possibilities that will provide an opening or means for these collection platforms to do their work. As a HUMINT case officer, I still have to sit face-to-face with my potential source and convince the poor soul to betray his or her country or ideology (often at great risk to themselves) but getting to that person has potentially been made so much easier thanks to social media and the internet.

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Interview: Former Mossad Combatant Michael Ross

michaelross31 Interview: Former Mossad Combatant Michael Ross

Michael Ross was born in Canada and served as a soldier in a combat unit of the Israel Defence Forces prior to being recruited as a “combatant,” (a term designating a deep-cover operative tasked with working in hostile milieus) in Israel’s legendary secret intelligence service, the Mossad. In his 13 year career with the Mossad, Ross was also a case officer in Africa and South East Asia for three years, and was the Mossad’s counterterrorism liaison officer to the CIA and FBI for two-and-a-half years. Ross is a published writer and commentator on Near Eastern affairs, intelligence and terrorism. He is the author of The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists. You can follow him on Twitter.

John Little: You left the Mossad in October 2001. You have cited the isolation and personal sacrifices made (chiefly the impact on your family) during your intelligence career as motivators. With a decade behind you are you happy with your decision? What’s life like for you now?

Michael Ross: To be honest, there are times when I wish I was back in harness simply because it would have been a most interesting and dynamic period to be a spy but then, it wasn’t exactly dullsville during my tenure either as I was in the field when 9/11 occurred. Having said that, I think I was ready to move on to other things and return to Canada. I realized that my lifestyle in Israel didn’t always include meaningful interaction with others outside the profession – which I believe to be an essential element to maintaining good mental health in this business. It’s also important to add parenthetically that my marriage had faltered and while it would be easy to blame this on my work, there is no doubt that it played a contributing factor. My life now is very good although I wish I could see my sons more often. I certainly feel that I have much to contribute in an advisory, teaching or consultancy role given that I had such a unique and rich insider’s view of a part of the world – that for obvious reasons – has an increasing impact on our lives in the west whether we want it to or not.

John Little: The Israeli position is never a dull one is it? I know you moved on in the aftermath of 9/11 but what is your sense of how the Mossad was impacted by those events? The impact on the US intelligence community was, and continues to be, significant. Do you think the Mossad experienced similar expansion, structural changes, or cultural shifts?

Michael Ross: I was off and on in Mossad headquarters well after 9/11 and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. There were some fundamental changes primarily in the realm of counterterrorism (CT). The branch dedicated to al Qaida – which we called “Global Jihad” due to the amorphous patchwork confederation of Jihadist entities we were dealing with – increased significantly in manpower, resources, and scope. Traditionally, those of us at the sharp end of CT operations were regarded as the poor cousins of the intelligence world. Nobody considered terrorism to be anything more than a major nuisance and we were always reminded by our peers working counter-proliferation that terrorist entities did not constitute any strategic threat to national security in the manner that non-conventional weapons pose. Of course no clear thinking individual thinks that way anymore. In many ways however, the U.S. has been concentrating so much on al Qaida that it has been overlooking other terrorist threats. The Mossad appears to be the only intelligence service that is devoting any significant resources to Hizballah and their Iranian sponsors. It didn’t seem to alarm the U.S. very much that a senior Hizballah commander, Ali Mousa Daqduq, was caught helping Shi’ite militias target coalition forces in Iraq or that the Taliban are carrying Irainian-manufactured weapons.

John Little: And now Hizballah, along with everyone else in this struggle, is trying to cope with the scope, pace, and chaos of the Arab Spring. Despite the opportunity for positive change the landscape has rarely been this unstable and unpredictable. Do you have a sense for how the Mossad is prioritizing and adjusting? How do you think they and their partners in allied intelligence communities should be positioned in this environment?

Michael Ross: Hizballah has been on the ropes for a while now. While they claim that the 2006 war with Israel was a great victory, in the scheme of things, it had a very detrimental effect on this wholly-owned subsidiary of the Iranian regime. Nasrallah is in perpetual hiding and the arch-terrorist, Imad Mughniyeh, is dead leaving behind a significantly diminished operational capability. Hizballah is also in financial dire straits and has lost billions from its coffers (hence the increased criminal enterprises aimed at making money for the organization popping up around the world) but the greatest set-back has been the international pressure on Iran and the civil war in Syria. This has Hizballah very worried because they are not only losing a chief sponsor and logistical corridor in Syria, the Syrian regime has been shooting at Lebanese citizens across the border. For an organization whose raison d’etre is the ostensible defence of Lebanon from foreign threats, this has placed them in a very awkward position. You only have to imagine a scenario where the IDF shoots a Lebanese journalist across the border to grasp the situation. The Lebanese are very savvy and as the body count rises in Syria and the conflict spills over into Lebanon (and it will) with Hizballah supporting the Assad regime, it’s not going to bode well for Hizballah’s already tattered support in Lebanon.

I don’t envy the analysts in the Mossad or the CIA these days. The ground is shifting so quickly underneath their feet, it must be very hard to come up with a cogent analysis of what the future holds anywhere in the region. The Mossad has a clear advantage from a finger-on-the-pulse perspective as it lives in the neighborhood and there is a sense of urgency simply because what happens in Syria can quickly escalate to something on your immediate doorstep as it has with Turkey and Lebanon. Israel has maintained a very low profile throughout the so-called “Arab Spring” but that doesn’t mean it’s asleep and I think this is a very wise course of action. Now is the time for subtlety in Middle East diplomacy and intelligence services should be active partners in determining the best course of action for policymakers to take. It’s one of many reasons why I advocate a hands-off position vis-a-vis Syria.

John Little: There is obviously something to gain for Israel and its allies if Syria transitions to a more reasonable posture but can you foresee a scenario where regime change occurs without also triggering significant downstream violence and weapons proliferation issues? Israel arguably has the most to lose if Syria slips into chaos and chemical weapons fall into the wrong hands. From Israel’s perspective could the unintended consequences of intervention currently pose a bigger threat than Syria itself?

Michael Ross: Knowing the status of and providing options to secure Assad’s prodigious chemical weapons (and deployment systems) arsenal is a top priority for the Mossad and western intelligence services. I participated in an unsuccessful foiling operation against rogue Russian General Anatoly Kunsevich in the late 1990′s who was assisting Syria obtain nerve agents for their Scud missiles. Syria has been developing a non-conventional weapons capability for some time (and until the 2007 Israeli raid on al-Khibar, a nuclear weapons program).

It’s an axiom of the intelligence world to hope for the best but to prepare for the worst and this absolutely applies to Syria right now. First off, I’m not convinced that Assad won’t prevail and successfully crush the uprising. He may end up significantly weaker than he was, but still retain power over the majority of the country. The Allawite regime still enjoys Russian – and to a lesser degree – Chinese support so this civil war is far from over. In fact, right now I see it as a Middle eastern version of the Third Balkan War circa 1992-1995. It could still go in several directions for a long time.

If Assad loses and a strong faction of anti-western jihadists emerges as the dominant power in Syria, a potential scenario arises where a terrorist entity brandishing non-conventional weapons threatens Israel and the west. We have to monitor this situation very closely and especially the intervening foreign factions that could ultimately radicalize Syria. Syria still is a secular nation and its people not easily given to Islamic extremist urges, but we’ve all seen how quickly Islamism can take root when there is a power vacuum in the region. My hope is that the Syrian resistance relies on that strong secular base of support and a new Syria – divested of both Iran and Hezbollah – emerges with a more reasonable geopolitical posture.

John Little: Mossad officers are probably faced with a wider array of hostile operating environments than any other service. As a result they periodically catch some heat for their false-flag operations and cover methods. Some of that criticism has come from “unnamed sources” within the US intelligence community. In your experience do these types of issues ever impact the level of professional cooperation between the Mossad and the US intelligence community or is this background noise?

Michael Ross: There is no doubt that there is a vocal constituency of U.S. intelligence officials that for whatever reason, don’t like the Mossad. It’s been my experience however, that the loudest critics of the Mossad are the furthest from the bilateral intelligence dialogue and operational relationship. The Mossad is indifferent to these critics and it would be fair to say that some of these negative sentiments are reciprocated but at the working level and especially while in the pursuit of joint operational objectives, there is a warm and intimate relationship that is appreciated by both sides.

The negative grumbling really is nothing more than background noise. Mark Perry wrote a piece in Foreign Policy last January describing Mossad officers posing as CIA while in London as a means to recruit Iranian dissidents. The Mossad never uses U.S. cover because of a bilateral agreements and to be frank, U.S. cover is only marginally better than Israeli and to even consider a scenario where it would be conducted in London under the noses of one of the best security services in the world (MI5) is beyond ludicrous. The Mossad also doesn’t need U.S. cover to recruit and train its own cadre of Iranian dissidents. Suffice it to say, you can pretty much say and/or write whatever you want about the Mossad and it will go unchallenged and to be quite frank, as a service it could care less what a journalist or conveniently unnamed CIA official writes or says.

It’s worth noting that it’s the CIA that employs a press office and small army of communications professionals to keep its image untarnished. Imagine if all that money, time and effort were expended in putting case officers in the field to recruit foreign sources of intelligence? The Mossad is on the ground in places where Angels fear to tread and as a result has operational cover imperatives that other services either refuse to employ or take for granted. I find it somewhat ridiculous that competing intelligence services disingenuously make heavy weather out of the fact that the Mossad uses foreign cover to conduct its operations as if this is supposed to be out of bounds. Of course this never stopped any service from accepting the extremely valuable intelligence (obtained at high risk by Mossad combatants and case officers) and shared via the Mossad’s liaison division.

For an interesting insight into the CIA’s organizational culture, I highly recommend my friend Ishmael Jones’ book, “The Human Factor: Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture.” It’s quite an eye-opener.

John Little: While we’re discussing identity and operations – The reconstruction of the 2010 Mahmoud al-Mabhouh assassination highlights the surveillance capabilities increasingly deployed by private entities and local governments and the challenges those systems pose to covert activities. Are technological advances in surveillance, biometrics, and other forms of identity management outpacing tradecraft or are they creating as many opportunities as they are barriers?

Michael Ross: While I believe that there is more to the al-Mahbouh assassination than meets the public eye, there is no doubt that it was a wake-up call for anyone conducting covert operations in these sensitive milieus. Clearly there was a gross underestimation of the willingness of the authorities in Dubai to pursue this case. The overlooked and unreported irony in the whole story is that al-Mahbouh was traveling on alias identities, was known to the Dubai security services, and was conducting clandestine meetings with Iranian officials concerning advanced weapons systems for HAMAS. These activities apparently failed to arouse the interest of the Dubai authorities which in itself says a lot.

Biometrics and advanced surveillance/security systems pose real challenges for covert operations and will affect intelligence service’s overseas clandestine activity on just about every level. This is especially problematic now that European companies like Germany’s Trovicor and Italy’s SpA have been selling and implementing cutting edge hi-tech intelligence platforms aimed at providing rogue regimes with communications interception and monitoring capabilities. Much of this technology has been used in Syria and Iran against dissidents and it’s entirely possible that this technology was used by the regime in Syria to locate foreign journalists in Syria by locating their satellite phone signals. Once you have this geo-location technology, it’s a simple matter to transfer that information to an artillery battery or when spy-catching, to a team of Mukhbarat thugs.

Having said that, one of the Mossad’s great strengths is its incredible ability to innovate and adapt to new obstacles be they technological or otherwise and even more importantly, to engage in a lessons learned process and improve its capabilities. Dubai notwithstanding, the Mossad is also adept at tackling hurdles in advance of the emerging technology. I saw some inventions in the Mossad’s Science and Technology Division that would make anyone in the private sector go very green with envy.

John Little: There were online communities when you were active but I assume they weren’t pervasive enough to require much thought except in very specific cases. Now virtually everyone in the developed world, and many beyond, has a social presence online. Have you thought much about the impact that social media is having on intelligence? The upside from a mass collection / data mining perspective is pretty obvious but it is also presents intelligence professionals with a unique operating environment in its own right doesn’t it?

Michael Ross: Social media and the possibilities for open source intelligence collection have expanded exponentially with the advent of all the various social media platforms available online. It also opens up a whole world of operational cover and networking possibilities that in the past involved a lot of leg-work when I was in harness.

Social media has both strong offensive and defensive elements in its makeup. For a “poacher” like myself, I can mine a considerable amount of data on a potential target for recruitment (including vulnerabilities or avenues for exploitation) long before I even come into any contact with the target. For my “gamekeeper” colleagues in the counterintelligence realm, it offers a number of possibilities in determining potential for attack and what the “poachers” are targeting.

Social media and the internet are a double-edged sword also because they are open to abuse by outfits like Stratfor that sell jargon, open-source information, and fabrication as a finished intelligence product for corporate and government consumers. The other edge of the sword is that people like myself and others can access social media and set the record straight.

The most interesting aspect for me however, is that I can interface with someone in say, Beirut and find out in real time what’s happening in the southern suburbs of that city while I sit at my table Laphroaig at elbow. Now that’s social media.

John Little: The Mossad brand is a powerful force multiplier. It is a relatively small force but its enemies see it lurking everywhere. It has maintained this fearsome image though its share of embarrassing episodes and high profile failures. The organization seems to shrug off mistakes and boldly plow forward. How does the Mossad deal with failure and how much brand self-awareness is there in the senior leadership’s decision making processes? Is there tension between the need to work covertly while still making their presence felt or reinforcing their public image?

Michael Ross: The Mossad brand is very powerful and I have to admit that I am quite surprised by this simply because to me it’s comprised of a small number of human faces that I worked with. Admittedly these are very talented and dedicated people, but people all the same.

Outsiders tend to disproportionately concentrate on the sensationalized subject of assassinations. This comprises probably 0.01% of the Mossad’s activities as an intelligence service. When you put it into perspective, the majority of the Mossad’s time is spent determining and analyzing the intentions of Israel’s enemies using the full suite of collection platforms available – much in the same way as the CIA or MI6. I think people would be surprised by the similarities between top tier intelligence services at the operational level. Much of the tradecraft is similar among these services and it’s a little-known fact but the Mossad was actually based on post-war MI6. If I was to single out the one aspect of the Mossad that remains misunderstood by the public, the media, and other intelligence services, it’s that the Mossad is operating like the OSS or MI6 during the Second World War. Sometimes my colleagues in Washington DC tend to think of Tehran, Damascus, Amman, Cairo and Beirut as distant exotic locales reached after a long jet-lag inducing flight. For the Mossad, they’re next door neighbors in a very unstable and threatening neighbourhhood.

When you are a very active intelligence service operating 24/7 365 days a year then mistakes are going to happen. Some of them have been significant mistakes but the Mossad is a learning organization with a culture of integrating lessons learned. At the completion of every operation, regardless of size and scope, there are sessions where everyone sits down and asks, “How we could we have done that better?” It’s not a punitive process but rather a necessary element to maintaining the upper hand through continual improvement. The Mossad makes mistakes but you never hear of the incredible successes – and they are legion.

The Mossad does not think about or concern itself with image. It never enters into the equation. We know we have a fierce reputation but nobody really thinks or talks about it. The fearsome reputation has been an unintentional consequence of the Mossad simply getting the job done.

John Little: You titled your book “The Volunteer”. What advice do would you give to other volunteers following in your footsteps at the Mossad or other intelligence services? They’re choosing a difficult path aren’t they?

Michael Ross: I don’t think my particular path of recruitment could easily be re-created or is in anyway typical but then I believe that in the Mossad’s case, no two recruitments are ever alike. I know the CIA likes to troll the Ivy League schools but the Mossad is looking for qualities that don’t exclusively involve academic scholarship. I didn’t get to university until later in my career. If you are smart, can think on your feet, cope with uncertainty, and above all maintain a sense of humor in all situations, then you have the prerequisites.Some of the funniest people I know are spies because like good comedians, they have a nose for the absurd and are very keen observers of human nature. Mossad selection is very rigorous but anyone interested should go to their website. Likewise for the CIA and MI6. My only advice is that being a spy is anything but glamorous. A lot of it involves meetings in dingy hotels in third world hell-holes trying to convince some person – often afflicted with only a passing acquaintance with personal hygiene -that they should sell their country’s secrets. Honestly, does it get any more fun than that?