It might seem odd that someone who worked at the CIA would offer up an opinion piece not related to Osama Bin Laden, on this, the 2nd anniversary of his ending. I actually think that now is the perfect day to talk about more important issues. I can think of no more important issue than the repatriotisation of captive American citizens abroad. That objective is complete….Levinson isn’t.

Levinson

The receptionist had a bowl of mini Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups on her desk. I remember that much. The large conference room where the asset validation / recruitment pitch security reviews were held for the Iran Operations Division was located in the main Iran Operations Division (IOD) Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). It was through a short maze of cubes filled with an operational targeting group and support staff. At the top of a raised section of the SCIF were a row of offices, and a few large sections of ceiling high glass that made up one wall of the conference room. Like most of the conference rooms I had been in at the Agency (and come to think of it, the other government jobs I’ve had) this one was mostly crammed full of a much too large conference table surrounded by an unwieldy amount of swivel chairs. To make matters worse, the outer edges of the room were encased with more chairs for overflow. It gave you a good sense of what goldfish must wake up to every day. Minus the reception desk with candy, and no I didn’t eat any.

I didn’t have access to this wing yet, having just moved to IOD, even though it had been over a month. I was in a SCIF across the hall and found this all out while on my way to the late morning meeting. Moments before I had grabbed my files and notes, headed out the SCIF I was in, and across the hall to the main door.

Beep

My blue badge just coughed at me; the obvious clunking of the magnetic lock suspiciously missing from my attempt at getting into my meetings. Nothing but silence, so I tried again.

Beep

Nope, not a fluke, I couldn’t get in. Just then the door burst open and a few people walked out, most likely on the way for a mid morning Starbucks break down the hall. In I went; ‘tail gating’ my way into the SCIF.

My first stop was down a long row of cubes straight ahead of me. My first office-mate from initial training was working as a Targeter somewhere along these rows. I had been bugging her for a few weeks to meet up and talk shop about IOD. She’d been there longer than me, and I wanted info on the Division. She’s also extremely focused and not surprisingly kept putting off meeting because she’d had too much she wanted to get done. Also no surprise, her cube was empty as she was in another meeting. Oh well, off to the conference room I went.

I was the second Staff Operations Officer (SOO) presenting a case at that mornings meeting. As this was my first, I was a little nervous. I knew the case, but felt like I had a vested interest given my previous line of work. These meetings were used to present potential agents, or HUMINT sources, for further development, recruitment, some sort of operation, handling issue or termination in a peer review setting. The peers in this case were more senior officers from the given division or operation group, as well as referents from the Counter Intelligence Center, Office of Security, the appropriate Directorate of Science and Technology officer and the ever present legal representative. The meetings were a clinical affair, at least based on my experience. I had written up my briefing packet and had pretty much gotten is signed off by the relevant officers already the day before via email. I figured this would be a formality.

I started my Federal career as a Special Agent with what was the US Customs Service / Immigration and Naturalization Service Post 9/11 Bush era mash-up formerly known as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (now Homeland Security Investigations). After a half decade of working a spectrum of customs and immigration cases I decided I needed a change and went through recruitment and hiring for the National Clandestine Service at the CIA. During that time, on March 9th, 2007 retired FBI Special Agent Robert Levinson was kidnapped while working a post retirement private sector investigations job that took him to Kish Island, a resort spot and free trade zone in the Persian Gulf, in Iran.

I have never been a traditional “cop” type of investigator. Though I respect and honor the “thin blue line”, I think I’ve always done a pretty good job at maintaining my old friendships and not being “that guy” who looks like a cop and only hangs out with other cops. That said, I did and do take law enforcement very seriously and one thing that has always been a constant for me is looking out for my brothers and sisters on the job. I never knew Robert Levinson, and wasn’t a Bureau agent (worked with plenty), this event really made me take notice however. A part of me filed it away and though I probably wasn’t fully conscious of it at the time, I assumed that the Bureau would do right by their former agent and move heaven and earth to get him back.

Now over two years later, everyone is filing into the IOD conference room, and Robert Levinson is fresh on my mind. I had been working the desk of my particular IOD branch for a number of months and felt good to be finally making some headway on a developmental asset, especially when that asset was saying they had information about Robert Levinson. I’d like to think that anyone sitting on the desk at that time would have been interested like me, but most likely it was my previous Special Agent background that made me push the officer in the field on this case.

The officer in question was a bit of an oddity. Not only was he based in National Resources; he was also a Staff Operations Officer (SOO) like myself. This meant he had been a SOO for a while before heading to Ops Certification at the Farm, so he could then officially recruit his own agents. This was also one of his first developmental assets, so it was our own special “big deal”, not that any of the more seasoned officers around seemed to care.

National Resources (NR) seems to be one of those misunderstood offices within the NCS. A few previous CIA officers, Henry Crumpton and “Ishmael Jones” for example, have detailed a bit about NR in their recent books. I had exposure to NR while working for the agency formerly known as ICE (or HSI as its called now), and later worked in NR for a time once inside the CIA. I find that most people I speak with see some kind of nefarious purpose for having what are supposed to be overseas “Spies” working within the United States. For clarity sake, NR is charged with a few very important functions that make operating within the US essential and beneficial to the Agency and our nations citizens.

NR officers handle communications and debriefings with US citizens who willingly cooperate with the Agency. These would be people traveling to countries of interest, or working with specific people of interest to the Agency. There are some other mechanisms here I won’t detail, but they pertain to agreements with companies in the US for similar activities.

Officers from NR also work to spot, assess, develop and recruit foreign individuals who are traveling inside the US. These might be people who live within the US continually with some form of permanent immigration status (green card, etc) or with a visa. Their access may involve them traveling back to their country of origin and then returning to the US. At that point they’d be met and debriefed by the NR officer. The scenarios vary quite a bit, but most NR spots are quite busy, and I’ve assisted in some very interesting recruitments based on NR cases. One such recruitment was facilitated by utilizing my previous years working immigration cases as a Special Agent with ICE to dig through hundreds of files in a targeting assignment to find a good lead for an officer to approach. In the end, the officer used my targeting package to successfully recruit and run this individual. I only know all this because my supervisor in that office was nice enough to keep me updated on the cases after I moved to DS&T.

My specific case on this day centered on an individual within the Iranian security apparatus. As things panned out they claimed to have access to a wide variety of information, some of which was related to Kish Island activities as well as the kidnapping of Robert Levinson. His motivation was purely financial, and our hope was to get some kind of good validating info about his access from an upcoming meeting. I felt the review was a moot point, so when it was my turn I quickly presented the case and led with what I thought was the most crucial bit of information we wanted to know more about: Levinson.

“I don’t want to hear fucking Kish Island mentioned again!”

It was blurted out with such a bureaucratically laced snide plop that I was caught a bit off guard. Factor in that it was one of the Deputy Chiefs of Operations for IOD who threw it down at me in the middle of my brief, well, let’s just say I wasn’t used to being talked to that way. I took a quick breath, sat on the comment for a second, suppressing my initially reaction that I won’t detail here, and then continued explaining why I thought the issue was important.

He wasn’t having any of it. He said he didn’t care to hear more, and that he had been led to believe there was more to this potential asset than anything to do with Kish Island. I quickly made my case and roped in one of the referents that had given me the unofficial sign off to present the case that morning. The Deputy Chief then seemed to sputter out, as if it had been some sort of compulsory obligation, not unlike the Brooks Brothers he was sporting that day. The operation was given an initial approval, so basically the officer could meet the potential asset and potentially recruit them. It all seemed really a strange and unnecessary way of recruiting people. When I’ve worked confidential informants in the past, well, I had done it differently, but I don’t own a nice suit, so what do I know?

Now, at this point I should say that I really wish I had some miraculous breakthrough with the Levinson case. It’s obvious that I did not, and had no other real part in this. I don’t know much of what happened after I rotated out of the office for a training course. After my certification course I jumped Directorates and moved to the Directorate of Science and Technology. I didn’t get any other updates from that office. This was, and absolutely still is, common for officers moving around to different offices in their careers at the Agency. As much as Agency HRS folks like to talk about “Hall Files” (your reputation at the Agency, as whispered in the halls), I found out early that just about every officer is as good as their most current assignment or operation. You might have things keep you in the spotlight throughout your career, but as soon as your flame goes dim, the giant information pit that is the Agency swallows you up. Much like Iran swallowed up Robert Levinson.

I have spoken with a former colleague and friend of Levinson, as well as exchanged messages with members of his family. I’m no expert on the man, by any stretch, but its clear that he is highly respected by his friends and loved by his family. In January of this year the Levinson family started a White House online petition that requested the government focus their energy on finding and freeing Levinson. The shocking result was that way more people turned out in favor of the creation of a “Death Star”

I found out more recently that several offices did get spotty information about Levinson during my time at the Agency. It seems like those cases and experiences were kind of like mine. Some initial interest, then nothing. Not like an effort not to do anything about Levinson, more a general uncertainty or inaction with regards to the information that was coming in. For instance, one officer I spoke with had been asked to review a video that was believed to be of Levinson while working in another IOD office. There was no follow up that he knew of, however.

I started out writing this piece before March of 2013, hoping to have this completed in time with Robert Levinson’s 7th anniversary in captivity. That obviously did not happen. I noticed that several organizations made statements about Levinson’s plight, including various former and current FBI Special Agent Associations, to include a moment of silence marking the dubious anniversary. While the attention and respect for their own is to be respected and honored, I can’t help but wonder what exactly has changed?

Robert Levinson is not the only American in captivity, not even the only being held by Iran. How many other anniversaries have gone by without much notice? How many other junior intelligence officers have pitched access agents who are said to have knowledge of Americans being held overseas? Were those cases given more attention by management?

Now that I am out of that direct stream of knowledge, I really could not even guess. As a country we seem to have a very short memory when it comes to critical events, so I would not be surprised if the Robert Levinson’s captivity, and that of former US Marine Amir Hekmati or pastor Saeed Abedini are not garnering the kind of attention that should really be given to those of our citizens being held captive by another nation.

Popular culture has educated people with the common US Military motto of “No Man Left Behind”. Though not always a reality, the spirit of the motto is something we could all do better at.

This is the point where I reach back to new officer training at the Agency and try to tie in history with the present day. As part of new officer training we all were encouraged to read “The Book of Honor” by Ted Gupp. His book details a number of the fallen Agency officers that have stars appearing on the Wall of Honor in the Original Headquarters Building (OHB) , and appear in the Book of Honor at the base of the wall. I bring this up because I think its very relevant to this discussion of our citizens in captivity around the globe.

I also bring it up because I just recently listened to the audiobook (I drive a lot for my current job and listen to quite a few audiobooks). Upon hearing these stories again, all the while thinking of Robert Levinson’s case, I see a definite pattern emerge. While the “Book of Honor” details CIA officers who perished in the line of duty, the lack of positive action, or downright inaction of our most senior officials in doing everything possible within their power to help US Citizens in harms way or captivity is shocking. If you are not familiar with these people I urge you to read or listen to Ted Gupp’s excellent book. In it you will learn about the likes of legendary Hugh Francis Redmond who spent 19 years as a captive in China, or John J. Merriman who though not a captive, was seemingly denied much needed medical aid after a plane crash in the Congo in 1964.

It seems to me as if government officials don’t care about what happens to Levinson. My feeling is that the issue is so far out of hand, that unless a direct and easy solution presents itself, the predominant risk adverse nature of our current intelligence apparatus will drag its feet until that “sure thing” comes along. This I believe needs to change. We as citizens should demand that our government takes immediate action to secure the release of our fellow citizens being held captive overseas. Its time to stand up and fight for people like Robert Levinson. We can choose to spend our precious time foaming about previously authorized interrogation programs, the stock market or movie stars, or we can take a stand for something more lasting and meaningful. People like Robert Levinson spent a career in service to our country. I don’t know his career trajectory, but it is safe to say from my first hand experience as a Special Agent, he gave more than he got to the citizens of this nation. He doesn’t deserve to sit locked up by a sworn enemy like the Iranian regime.

You might be asking yourself what you can do to help. If so, I’m glad to hear it. I’m not sure what good it actually does, but Internet access makes it very easy now to contact your representative. Why not check out http://www.house.gov/representatives/find/Twitter, retweet it. Then follow @HelpBobLevinson and show your support.

You can find that information on the Levinson family’s website as well as on the Wikipedia page devoted to him.

10. Ramadan Shallah: Leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. His low ranking is because he’s a weak terrorist leader but still has plenty of blood on his petite doll-like hands.

9. Samir Kuntar: Druze member of the PLF in Lebanon who murdered an Israeli policeman, Eliyahu Shahar, 31 year-old Danny Haran, and Haran’s 4-year-old daughter, Einat Haran, whom he killed with blunt force against a rock and for indirectly causing the death of two-year-old Yael Haran by suffocation, as her mother tried to quiet her crying while hiding from Kuntar. In November 2008, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad presented Kuntar with Syria’s highest medal.

8. Mahmoud al-Zahar: Founding father of HAMAS and considered a hard line hawk, even by HAMAS’ standards

7. Mohammed Deif: Commander of HAMAS’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. That’s reason enough.

6. Ali Moussa al-Daduq: Senior Hezbollah advisor captured in Iraq while acting on Iran’s behalf and responsible for the killing of U.S. military personnel in southern Iraq.

5. Ahmed Abu Khattala: Leader of the Benghazi-based Ansar al-Sharia group closely involved in the September 11 assault that killed four Americans including ambassador Christopher Stevens.

4. Hassan Nasrallah: “Secretary-General” of Hezbollah.

3. Hamid Arabnejad: Managing-Director of Mahan Air, the Iranian regime’s airline tasked with ferrying weapons/explosives, IRGC-QF personnel, and mayhem all over the world.

2. Qassam Soleimani: Head of Iran’s IRGC-QF. That’s more than enough reason.

1. Bashar al-Assad: How many lives could have been saved by rubbing out this man Christopher Hitchens once famously dubbed, “The human toothbrush”. Sic Semper Tyrannus.

Michael Ross was born in Canada and served as a soldier in a combat unit of the Israel Defence Forces prior to being recruited as a “combatant,” (a term designating a deep-cover operative tasked with working in hostile milieus) in Israel’s legendary secret intelligence service, the Mossad. In his 13 year career with the Mossad, Ross was also a case officer in Africa and South East Asia for three years, and was the Mossad’s counterterrorism liaison officer to the CIA and FBI for two-and-a-half years. Ross is a published writer and commentator on Near Eastern affairs, intelligence and terrorism. He is the author of The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists. You can follow him on Twitter.

Strange, I didn’t hear any death to America chants in videos from Tehran, mostly a lot of anger at Iranian gov… foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/…

— Sam Cutler (@youbsanctioned) October 5, 2012

Maybe I’m getting soft but I’d rather freedom fighters not execute hostages even when they might actually deserve it:

A brigade from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) known as the Bar’a released a video aired on Al-Arabiya in which they warned they would execute an Iranian prisoner “for each martyr who is killed.”

The militia group kidnapped 48 Iranians at the beginning of August, claiming that they were members of the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guards. However, the Iranian government says they are pilgrims on their way to visit a shrine in southeast Damascus and has appealed to Qatar and Turkey to help free the hostages.

Iran admitted in September that it had posted members of the Guard in Syria, working as “high-level advisors.”

The RT piece claims that this is the first time that the FSA has threatened to execute hostages but these threats have been issued before. I also have no doubt that similar threats will be issued, and acted upon, again and again before this conflict is over.

Honestly, I’m less worried about the fate of these Iranians than I am about Syria’s ability to transition past Assad and into stability. If Syria’s future holds anything it is more inhumanity, more division, and less rationality. It’s red on red on red on red on red violence infused with the usual suffering innocents and a sprinkling of honest well-intentioned participants. As for the well-intentioned, they remain disastrously fractured, and signs of hope are too sparse to generate optimism:

…survival has taken clear precedence over organizing for self-rule. Absence of leadership gives way to pronounced divisions among various factions—at the local levels—and civilians face enormous challenges in creating a governing body that will effectively enforce a local peace.

I found the sustainability of these newly-found freedoms questionable. A litany of issues plague the FSA and even the most developed of local self-ruled towns: rising sectarian tension, infighting, lack of leadership, and a dearth of resources. Simply put, the militias in these areas are inadequately armed—especially against the regime’s increasing air attacks. Of more than half a dozen members of the youth organization I had a chance to talk with, the main complaint was always the same: lack of logistical help from the outside.

My conversations, interviews, and observations in two weeks on the ground have reinforced my opinion that the quest for self-rule is well-rooted and real. But while the international community wants to see a better Syria in a post-Assad period, the present form of Syria’s conflict poisons the possibility of a quick transition to a constellation of self-ruling structures in the capillary towns. The small steps that have been taken thus far fall short of ensuring long-term success…

Progress, if you can call it that, has been terribly slow. It seems that the present is also the future. Only dramatic intervention will change the equation and, even then, success (by any party’s definition) may remain elusive. That’s not an argument for intervention but rather an acknowledgment that free Syrian unity and leadership are likely to remain missing in action.

This ThreatStream pulls live tweets about the complex itself and looks at related issues in the Iranian nuclear program from three angles:

• Parchin Facility: All tweets about the facility.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: A much wider net pulling in all discussion about any nuclear topics and Iran.
• IAEA: Any tweets related to the International Atomic Energy Agencies activities in Iran.

Click here to launch the ThreatStream or here to see the full list of available live national security streams.

A similar bomb explosion on Jan. 12, 2010, killed Tehran University professor Masoud Ali Mohammadi, a senior physics professor. He was killed when a bomb-rigged motorcycle exploded near his car as he was about to leave for work.

In November 2010, a pair of back-to-back bomb attacks in different parts of the capital killed one nuclear scientist and wounded another.

The slain scientist, Majid Shahriari, was a member of the nuclear engineering faculty at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran and cooperated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The wounded scientist, Fereidoun Abbasi, was almost immediately appointed head of Iran’s atomic agency.

And in July 2011, motorcycle-riding gunmen killed Darioush Rezaeinejad, an electronics student. Other reports identified him as a scientist involved in suspected Iranian attempts to make nuclear weapons.

Rezaeinejad allegedly participated in developing high-voltage switches, a key component in setting off the explosions needed to trigger a nuclear warhead.

Something to think about, especially for those constantly touting Iran’s theoretically fearsome international terror capabilities, is the obvious weakness underscored here. Someone has been dirt napping very important Iranians, on their own turf mind you, one after another. Iran has not been able to retaliate in any meaningful way and they also haven’t been able to protect these guys on their own territory. Perhaps they’re just quietly readying their fearsome array of two-stroke gas powered flying boats for an all out retaliatory assault…

Will these targeted killings slow down the Iranian nuclear program? That is highly unlikely this far in the game. However, they do send a powerful message, they definitely underscore the regime’s weaknesses, they eliminate some dangerous individuals, and they will hopefully discourage others from pursuing similar career paths. Just head over to Google, search on “Iranian scientist”, and look at the resulting images. Would you want that job?

Follow developments in Iran live with the Blogs of War Iran Monitor at http://iran.blogsofwar.com.

It’s difficult to predict how the case against him will now proceed. Mr Hekmati has a high profile and holds an American passport. A decision to go ahead with his execution may have an impact on tensions between Iran and the West – which have got worse in recent weeks.

Iranian officials said his cover was blown even before he had arrived in the country, because he had been spotted by Iranian agents at the US-run Bagram military air base in neighbouring Afghanistan.

On 18 December, Mr Hekmati was shown on Iranian state television allegedly confessing to being part of a plot to infiltrate Iran’s intelligence services for the CIA.

The appeal window is pretty small, 20 days, but it’s highly unlikely that the execution will proceed. Alive, Iran can use him for propaganda purposes or as a bargaining chip. Hekmati doesn’t strengthen their hand much but Iran is already in a terribly weak position. They’ll take any angle they can get. However, If they execute him little will be gained while tensions will go through the roof. So, I expect him to be just fine but in Iranian custody for quite some time.

Follow developments in Iran live with the Blogs of War Iran Monitor at http://iran.blogsofwar.com.

Apparently the tape was received by the family quite some time ago and is being released to, hopefully, move the investigation forward:

Asked about the timing of the tape’s release, an F.B.I. spokeswoman, Jacqueline Maguire, said in a statement: “The video was not previously released due to ongoing investigative initiatives. The investigation to locate Mr. Levinson continues, as the U.S. government continues to work to find him and bring him home safely.”

Earlier this year, Mr. Levinson’s family received another e-mail containing photographs of him wearing what looks like orange prison garb and with a full beard. The F.B.I. was able to trace the various e-mails back to Internet cafes in either Pakistan or Afghanistan but not back to the person or group that created them, said the people briefed on the inquiry.

Mr. Levinson was 59 when he went missing on Kish Island where he had gone to meet with an American fugitive known as Dawud Salahuddin. Mr. Salahuddin has lived in Iran since 1980 when he fled there after assassinating a former aide to the Shah of Iran outside his home near Washington. Mr. Levinson’s family and American officials have said that Mr. Levinson went to Iran to investigate cigarette smuggling for a private client.

I’ve created a monitor to stream tweets about this case. You can follow the live updates at http://levinson.blogsofwar.com.

A senior commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) revealed exclusive images of the next generation Bavar 3 Stealth Flying Boat this afternoon. The craft will apparently heavily leverage technology found in the recently captured American drone.

“Yes, we have exploited some aspects of the barbaric regime’s technology that we found in the RQ-170 Sentinel stealth aircraft. However, we found the craft inferior in many ways and have applied our superior technology to improve its capabilities.” the command said. “For example, The RQ-170 is not a boat. We have remedied this by adding stealth pontoons made of fiberglass rather than aluminum. We have also replaced the engine, which our engineers could not start, with a more reliable TAKSAZ 125cc motor.”

Perhaps the most striking difference is the addition of a pilot. According to the commander “The backwards regime is forced to use so-called drones because their pilots are afraid to take to the air. Also, many of them are too fat. Iran does not have such a problem thus the Bavar 3 will be deployed in swarms which are beyond counting by crusading forces. There are no countermeasureres!”

This, like most Iranian press reports, is a completely fabricated exclusive.

After about two hours, police seemed to be back in control of the building. Live TV footage showed riot police removing protesters.

Security forces fired tear gas, the semi-official Fars news agency reported. It said some protesters and police had been injured in the clash.

However, later reports said some protesters were still in the embassy. The governor of Tehran and the city’s head of security have entered the building to try to persuade them to leave, the BBC has learned.

An unconfirmed report from the official Irna news agency said a separate group of protesters had broken into another British embassy compound in the north of the city and seized “classified documents”.

I’ve been thinking about how Iran will react to its increasing isolation so the timing of this is interesting. This is especially relevant as we close in on Syria. There is plenty of room for debate about whether a preemptive strike on Iran would make sense but removing Syria from the equation certainly helps manage the uncertainty that would follow. Whatever the intent, the end result is a very isolated and weakened, Iran. Syria aside, Iran is still feeling intense pressure from many different angles at the moment – a lot of them internal.

The embassy storming is also a clear sign of deepening political infighting within Iran’s ruling hardline elites with the conservative-led parliament attempting to force the hand of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and expel the British ambassador.

So expect more of this. I suspect it the situation in Iran will continue to grow more unstable as sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and covert actions continue. Of course, the desired outcome is that all of this will eventually trigger that revolution that Iran has been on the edge of (allegedly) for about a decade now. There are a number of ways this could play out short of shock and awe, in fact that’s the lease desirable option, but all of them will trigger brutal and unpredictable responses in Iran. Iranian hardliners will not slip quietly into the night.

Recommended on Twitter: @UANI – Against Nuclear Iran is a non-partisan, broad-based coalition united to prevent Iran from fulfilling its ambition to become a regional super-power possessing nuclear weapons.

Follow developments in Iran live with the Blogs of War Iran Monitor at http://iran.blogsofwar.com.

Regarding possible military dimensions:

43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

Page 8 Section G.43

On the evidence:

“As indicated in paragraph 6 above, among the information available to the Agency is the alleged studies documentation: a large volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, view graphs from presentations, videos and engineering drawings), amounting to over a thousand pages. The information reflected in that documentation is of a technically complex and interconnected nature, showing research, development and testing activities over time. It also contains working level correspondence consistent with the day to day implementation of a formal programme.”

Annex Page 4 Section B.12

On Iran’s lack of cooperation:

“Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected in the alleged studies documentation. However, many of the answers given by Iran to questions posed by the Agency in connection with efforts to resolve the Agency’s concerns have been imprecise and/or incomplete, and the information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory. This, combined with events such as the dismantling of the Lavisan-Shian site in late 2003/early 2004 (see paragraph 19 below), and a pattern of late or after the fact acknowledgement of the existence of previously undeclared parts of Iran’s nuclear programme, have tended to increase the Agency’s concerns, rather than dispel them.”

Annex Page 4 Section B.15

On missile integration

“The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111. From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing
payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.”

Annex Page 11 Section C.11.59

From the summary:

“The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be
ongoing.”

Page 10 Section K.53

You can download the full IAEA report from ISIS.

Recommended on Twitter: @IAEAorg. Official accout of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The alleged plot – directly from the department of Justice:

“The criminal complaint alleges that, from the spring of 2011 to October 2011, Arbabsiar and his Iran-based co-conspirators, including Shakuri of the Qods Force, have been plotting the murder of the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Arbabsiar allegedly met on a number of occasions in Mexico with a DEA confidential source (CS-1) who has posed as an associate of a violent international drug trafficking cartel. According to the complaint, Arbabsiar arranged to hire CS-1 and CS-1’s purported accomplices to murder the Ambassador, and Shakuri and other Iran-based co-conspirators were aware of and approved the plan. With Shakuri’s approval, Arbabsiar has allegedly caused approximately $100,000 to be wired into a bank account in the United States as a down payment to CS-1 for the anticipated killing of the Ambassador, which was to take place in the United States.

According to the criminal complaint, the IRCG is an arm of the Iranian military that is composed of a number of branches, one of which is the Qods Force. The Qods Force conducts sensitive covert operations abroad, including terrorist attacks, assassinations and kidnappings, and is believed to sponsor attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq. In October 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Qods Force for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations.

The complaint alleges that Arbabsiar met with CS-1 in Mexico on May 24, 2011, where Arbabsiar inquired as to CS-1’s knowledge with respect to explosives and explained that he was interested in, among other things, attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia. In response, CS-1 allegedly indicated that he was knowledgeable with respect to C-4 explosives. In June and July 2011, the complaint alleges, Arbabsiar returned to Mexico and held additional meetings with CS-1, where Arbabsiar explained that his associates in Iran had discussed a number of violent missions for CS-1 and his associates to perform, including the murder of the Ambassador.”

Tweets are flooding the Iran Saudi, Mexico, and Terrorism streams on the Blogs of War National Security Monitor but I’ve created a unified page dedicated to the plot at http://iranplot.blogsofwar.com. I’ll keep this page in the Alert section as long as this story is unfolding. I suspect that will be quite a while.

Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project, a columnist for PBS Need to Know, a contributing editor to Current Intelligence, and he blogs about Central Asia at Registan.net. He’s the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. You can follow him on Twitter @JoshuaFoust.

John Little: Let’s talk about The Unforgivable Horror of Village Razing. In that post, which details the destruction of a booby-trapped Afghan village with 49,200 lbs. of ordnance and what you feel is the unsympathetic response to the resulting suffering, you drop some pretty heavy ordnance of your own:

Look, war is hell. I have no illusions about that. But what is happening right now in Southern Afghanistan is inexcusable. There were rumors of this policy of collective punishment in the Arghandab before (see this overwrought Daily Mail story that stops right before the village actually was destroyed for an idea of what is going on), and I’m really struggling to see how such behavior does not violate Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention—that is, how this behavior is not a war crime, especially given the explicit admission that such behavior is merely for the convenience of the soldier and not any grander strategy or purpose.

This sort of abhorrent behavior is not limited to the Arghandab, either. Broadwell explicitly states that it has the Petraeus stamp of approval, and Pahjwok has reported U.S. Marines in Helmand province explicitly warning local villagers of collective punishment if insurgents hide out in their settlements. It is probably a safe assumption to say that this is a widespread phenomenon.

A lot of people would say “Look, this may have been clumsy, inefficient, and lazy on our part but a Taliban outpost was cleared, civilian and friendly causalities were avoided, and we’re going to help the civilian owners rebuild. Relax Mr. Foust. This is war, not a war crime.”

So, with a few days to reflect, do you still think this event might point to an illegal policy of collective punishment? Can you see any merit at all in arguments of those who support the military’s casualty minimization strategy?

Joshua Foust: With some further reflection, I think I was right to struggle with whether destroying villages like this is a war crime. Some friends helped me wrap my head around what actually constitutes a violation of the Fourth Convention, and I don’t think this qualifies as such. However, the reason I feel comfortable with that struggle is this is the sort of thing we should question.

In that link to the Daily Mail story about another village facing this same fate, the soldiers seem to be threatening the villagers with the destruction of their homes if the villagers don’t turn in more IEDs. There are two ways to interpret that story (and the one here, about the Arghandab). Either the soldiers are punitively destroying entire settlements in punishment for not resisting the Taliban, or they’re communicating—incompletely—that if they can’t remove the Taliban from these areas, they have no way of removing the bombs and IEDs left over except by detonation.

From everything I’ve read about these incidents, and from speaking with people close to one of them, it’s probably bad communication being compounded by a false sense of urgency and action bias. These are not large villages—maybe a few dozen houses at the most. There’s no compelling, strategic reason for the U.S. military to literally burn a hole through them once the Taliban have run off. If the Taliban are gone, then we can ponder defusing and decontamination at a deliberate pace (the village razing incident is written in a way that suggests the decision to burn the village was made quickly, for the sake of battle momentum). There’s no need to rush in with B-1s dropping tons of explosives on them.

So I didn’t intend, and I still don’t intend, to accuse anyone of malice. I stand by my charge of laziness, however. Look at the aftermath: this is rural Afghanistan. No one has land deeds or property records. The soldiers are giving the local sub-governor a pot of money and the power to issue now-official land deeds. There is no way in hell people will be compensated appropriately for what they lost (which is required under Article 40 of the Afghan constitution). There will be winners and losers, and the U.S. is funding the picking of winners and losers—a dangerous situation, and one I frankly think is impossible to solve without massive corruption. This is not a hopeful result, in other words. And the callousness with which both the soldiers and that researcher writing about them discuss it—up to sniffing that the Afghans should thank us for rebuilding, as if destroying a family’s possessions is perfectly okay so long as you replace it later—led me to assume the worst. I don’t see how this is a better, more humane option that will create fewer headaches in the long run than attempting to defuse and decontaminate mined villages.

Either way, and whatever more details emerge as these people try to explain themselves, we should be up front in asking hard, probing questions about the deliberate erasure of entire communities. I’m frankly shocked at how many people reacted against that. Our conduct in Afghanistan should never be above question.

John Little: Paula Broadwell, the author of the piece that triggered all of this, has since offered some clarification. There’s nothing earth shattering there though. It is exactly along the lines of what one would expect:

The Taliban had laden the roads, compounds, everywhere with booby traps. In the commander’s assessment, the deserted village was not worth clearing. If you lost several KIA and you might feel the same… SOF had tried to clear the village and had several EKIA but also lost two guys. Afghan commandos had attempted to take the village and got hammered by the IEDs and HEMsas well…

[T]he villagers told all of these visitors {Petraeus, an ABC news crew] that Flynn was their hero and they wanted him to move into the village with them. They express great gratitude for helping them claim security in their river valley and push the Taliban out. Sure they are pissed about the loss of their mud huts (look at the picture again) but that is why the BUILD story is important here.

Your counter-argument, if I can attempt a summary, is that even if we accept the military’s version of the story it still seems to indicate poor execution of our counterinsurgency strategy. You point to a naivete that, if systemic, is quite troubling:

The gullibility of Americans is also something I thought we would have moved beyond in 2011, but it still remains. In civil wars, locals—that is, non-combattants—are always friendly to the guys with guns. In the passage above Paula expresses dismay, and toys with feeling little sympathy for, villagers who accepted money rather than violence to leave their village. That is worse than calloused, and it’s the kind of glib attitude that comes, depressingly commonly enough, from the zombies living in the military’s COIN bubble. I’ve seen elders in Afghanistan smile warmly at me, talk about how much they hate the Taliban, and so on… only to, mere days later, be caught passing information along to a local insurgent commander because they were scared witless by a night letter tacked to their door. Christian Bleuer explored this years ago—in Kapisa, of all places—and it really is a universal phenomenon. Displaced villagers will warmly greet armed groups… especially if those groups are handing out money as well. It means nothing beyond that, however. We should not be this gullible still. But we are, and that’s really sad to see.

Do you think that this is a broader issue? If so, can it be addressed with better training or do you think that inherent flaws in strategy are coming to light in stories like this?

Johsua Foust: I think it’s absolutely is the broader issue. The military still is, by and large, operating in total ignorance of not just local issues, but a basic acceptance of the humanity of Afghans. I shy away from complaining they misunderstand culture—and I say this having made my income for several years through coaching the Army on cultural issues in Afghanistan—because it doesn’t require specialized knowledge to see that poor people have bad housing, and that they are exceedingly vulnerable to displacement during conflict (to keep it confined to this one issue). So in this case, I’m baffled at the complete lack of empathy toward the villagers who were given a choice: resist the Taliban and suffer, or take some cash and flee.

As for addressing it, I lose my way a bit. I’ve seen what counts as “cultural training” within TRADOC, and at CGSC under General Caldwell. It’s a mixed bag, like most training is. You will always have good students and bad students, guys for whom this sort of mindset comes naturally and guys who either struggle with it or reject it outright. I am not knowledgeable enough about the Army’s training system to say how that can be remedied, or if it even can be.

But here’s part of the problem in discussing all of this: none of us were there. Frankly, Paula Broadwell wasn’t there when they burned this village to the ground. So already we’re working on filtered experiences, and that introduces a lot of bias that’s difficult to sift through when trying to figure out what happened. I’ve also never worn the uniform (at least, as a soldier), nor have I led men into combat—so I get really uncomfortable complaining about a bad decision made in defense of soldiers’ lives. And most people are—understandably, and appropriately, I think—hesitant to second-guess the decisions of a commander leading his men in combat.

However, there are some things that are worth questioning, even if it’s painful, and even if it ends up going nowhere. The decision to raze a town should be one of them. You don’t call in almost 50,000 pounds of bombs on a single target without a lot of signatures up the line of command. So this wasn’t a rogue decision, and it wasn’t done in the spur of the moment—this was a deliberate, considered, approved decision. And so far, from all the tiny amounts of data we have on it, it is an appalling decision. So in that sense, I think we really do need to keep pressing on the issue to try to figure out what really happened.

John Little: Based on your experience do you believe that there is willingness, at the command level, to look at events like this and identify opportunities to enhance the approach or is there just overwhelming pressure to execute, to maintain momentum?

Joshua Foust: I’m sure there is willingness somewhere in the chain of command. The problem is, General Petraeus knows this is going on—he hosted an ABC camera crew viewing the rubble—and we have no data to suggest he thinks the approach is flawed or could be improved. I do know there is pressure—implicit pressure, in a lot of ways, but pressure nevertheless—to “execute a counterinsurgency strategy” in the south. And that can easily lead to bizarre or inexplicable behavior getting sold as COIN.

John Little: Given the challenges (many of which originate in powerful neighboring states) do you think it’s possible that the current state of affairs is about as close to success as we’ll get? Is Afghanistan doomed to remain a problem to be managed rather than an emerging modern state that can be nurtured or incubated? Could it even be said that in the end our footprint there is less about Afghanistan and more about countering a long list of troublesome regional forces?

Joshua Foust: I think there can definitely be some improvement to the current state of affairs. I’d love to see us go back to cooperating with Iran in tracking down Taliban figures, as we were in 2001-2 (there are rumors the Iranians coordinate some counter-drug operations with the U.S., but no one wants to talk about that). I really do think that we can lessen the problem emanating from Pakistan by exploring a way to guarantee their interests in a post-America Afghanistan, and that one way we can do that is with beginning political reconciliation with the Taliban.

None of those developments means militancy will go away or the war will end. And in that sense, I don’t think management means “doom” in the sense of it being a negative thing. A reduced American footprint, combined with increased regional engagement, has the potential to be a net improvement for the country. It could also blow up in our face—which is the challenge with any course of action.

John Little: So is COIN only useful in the sense that it buys time until we negotiate a political solution with Pakistan and other regional players? If and when that agreement comes do you think that it will publicly acknowledge Pakistan as the guarantor of Afghanistan’s stability? Does it require that commitment and acknowledgment to succeed?

Joshua Foust: I don’t get the sense that COIN is a delaying tactic. A lot of people at the top—including General Petraeus and his fan club—genuinely believe COIN is the best thing, ever, for all things in Afghanistan. I obviously don’t share that assumption, but I do think they believe that honestly and aren’t playing a shell game. I also don’t have any indication that the top leadership has any real interest in political solutions with Pakistan and other regional players (which would, by design, have to include Iran, only Iran is excluded from NATO summits on the topic).

Now, I happen to think that we must publicly acknowledge and at least make a good-faith effort to secure Pakistan’s interests in post-America Afghanistan. I also am not aware of any push within the U.S. policy community to do that. Everything remains focused on “breaking” the Taliban, of severing Pakistan’s relationship to it, and so on. I’m not at all hopeful those counterproductive ideas will be reversed by the 2014 “withdrawal” date.

John Little: Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that something resembling a withdrawal occurs in 2014. We’ll also assume (and this is probably the safer assumption of the two) that the current military and diplomatic approaches will continue on their current tracks with little or no change. Where does that leave Afghanistan and where does that leave the region? What does 2015 look like?

Joshua Foust: I don’t see any evidence that we’re actually going to withdraw in 2014. Even Joe Biden, who had been consistently and vocally supporting “drop-dead” withdrawal dates, just told Hamid Karzai that we’ll be sticking around past 2014. So from where I sit, that leaves Afghanistan largely unchanged—there might be some withdrawal, but probably not to the extent that even people like CNAS advocate (which would be down to near-2005 levels, or around 25,000-30,000 troops). There will also be an increasingly shrill wing of the commentariat that will cry bloody murder at the thought of reducing our presence without catastrophic victory, regardless of ground conditions—which is exactly what’s happened with the July, 2011 date.

So, 2015? It will probably look much more like 2008 than anything else. And that ain’t good.

New rule: every time you enable or make excuses for Iran you should be lashed, one for every post-graduate degree you have.

Is that anti-intellectual? No…that’s anti-you. They don’t want to negotiate with us and never will. Period. There’s nothing to talk about.

Does that mean send Fifth Fleet and a bunch of AC-130s and B2s to level Iran? No. It means keep making scientists assume room temperature.

It means the head of the IRGCs drone program mysteriously disappearing from his balcony. And motorcycle-borne assassinations.

In sum, Iran doesn’t want an actual military faceoff and neither do we. Instead of negotiating endlessly, let’s be as ruthless as them.

Iran’s relationship with the United States, and Western world in general, has been defined by the assumption that they are untouchable. Analysts are quick to point out that intense Iranian nationalism is a barrier to any attempts at deconstruction/reconstruction of their political system. Invaders, even those with good intentions, are not welcome. Counterterrorism types are quick to point to Iran’s feared global network of terror facilitators and proxies who will respond to any conventional military attack with wave after wave of terrorist attacks on every corner of the globe. This is Iran’s version of mutually assured destruction and it has served them well.

Our own capabilities have served us well too. The Iranian political class does not want a what is assuredly an unsurvivable conventional war. Their strategy, executed quite well I think, has been to challenge the West on multiple fronts but pull back short of the line. If conventional war does come they fully expect it to come from the air and have prepared accordingly. This balance, if you can call it that, has worked because of an underlying assumption on the part of the Iranians. They believe that they can play dirty while the West is shackled by a number of self-imposed restraints and ultimately a (justifiable) fear of putting boots on the ground.

By identifying and targeting those who actively work to support Iran’s most evil intentions (nuclear scientists for example) we can send a different message: you are not safe. In fact, you are not safe anywhere. You are not safe when you travel and, more importantly, you are not safe in your own home. We will, if you persist, kill you during your morning commute. Do not sleep too soundly in that five star hotel because we just might smother your ass with a pillow.

Individual specificity is the future of war. It is brutal and ugly but it is less brutal and ugly than the alternative. By definition some tactics (the high casualty innocent civilian targeting terrorism favored by our enemies) are still off limits. In a war against individuals innocents are spared and justice is served. The illusion of safety for bad actors who support hostile regimes is shattered. Apply these tactics on a larger scale and over time, indefinitely, and these regimes will likely find it increasingly difficult to place intelligent people in supporting roles. The message to scientists, agents, oppressors, even “religious” leaders is clear: you are not just a small irrelevant cog in a larger machine, you are not lost in the crowd, YOU are the enemy and we will kill you.

There are definitely signs that this is happening, both in the struggle against Iran and in the greater war on terror. But is it happening on the scale needed to change some of these long standing assumptions? This is largely a covert effort (which it should be) so evaluation is difficult. Observers can only point to Iran’s behavior as an indicator. My gut feeling is that our capabilities in this area are increasing (just wait until we get indoor nano-scale lethal UASs) as is our comfort level with the approach but we’re not quite there. Iran continues to move aggressively froward on a dangerous track. Ironically, our greatest hope in preventing a devastating war is in taking off the gloves and getting dirty. We have to be “as ruthless as them”.

Ahmadinejad Hails ‘Nuclear’ Iran
“One day they said we cannot enrich uranium, but with the resistance of our leader, nation … and with the help of God, the Iranian nation has become nuclear,” Ahmadinejad said. “They (Americans) want to dominate our region but the Iranian people will never let them do that,” he said in a speech at Tehran’s Azadi (Freedom) Square before a crowd of hundreds of thousands. “The head of the atomic energy organisation (Ali Akbar Salehi) said the first stock of 20 percent fuel was produced and delivered to scientists,” he added.

Another Activist Receives Death Sentence in Iran
Iran has convicted another opposition activist on charges related to the country’s post-election turmoil and sentenced him to death, the judiciary said Tuesday. That brings to at least 10 the number of those facing the death penalty for unrest following June’s disputed presidential election, in which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner.

Iranian Opposition in Standoff With Regime
Since the disputed June 12, 2009 presidential election, both the pro-regime and opposition sides have been using various means of persuasion to try to dominate the other. Neither side is backing away.

Clashes in Iran on Anniversary of Islamic Revolution
Iranian opposition Web sites say security forces fired tear gas to disperse opposition supporters gathering in central Tehran. There are reports that leading reformist politicians Mehdi Karroubi and former President Mohammad Khatami were attacked when they attended the rally. The opposition also says authorities briefly detained Mr. Khatami’s sister-in-law, Zahra Eshraghi, and her husband Mohammad Reza Khatami. The reason was not reported. Eshraghi is the grand-daughter of the leader of the Islamic Revolution, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

How Obama Can Really Help the Pro-Democracy Movement In Iran
History shows that intervention is easier said than done. Past U.S. attempts to sway Iranian internal affairs — such as the CIA-fomented 1953 coup d’état against a democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh — have proven costly for U.S. interests. Most notably, Washington’s support for the shah fueled the 1979 Islamic Revolution, inspiring anti-Western movements in Pakistan, Egypt, and beyond.

Blame China for Iran’s Nukes
China’s greed for secure oil imports and its willingness to deal with outlaw regimes to get these imports is causing a breakdown in the world’s only system for disciplining countries that endanger peace. If the U.N. sanctions break down in Iran, this opens up a serious danger of war—and China will bear a heavy share of the blame.

FM spokesman: China Hopes Early Resumption of Negotiation on Iran Nuclear Issue
China said Thursday it hoped negotiations on Iran nuclear issue would be resumed at an early date and it would continue its efforts for this end. “Dialogues and negotiations are the best ways to resolve this issue, ” said Ma Zhaoxu, spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, at a regular press conference. Ma also said “China is serious on safeguarding the effectiveness of the international system of nuclear non-proliferation”. He called for an early resumption of the peaceful negotiation, and said China would contribute to it.

Iran: Destroy Israel if it Strikes
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told Syrian President Bashar Assad that Israel “must be resisted” and finished off “once and for all” if it launches a military operation in the Middle East, Reuters cited an Iranian report as saying on Thursday.

State Warns Insurers on Business with Iran
On the eve of major demonstrations in Iran, California Insurance Commissioner Steve Poizner demanded Wednesday that insurers doing business in California withdraw $6 billion of investments they indirectly hold in Iranian nuclear, energy and defense companies that he said are backing the nation’s “rather evil” regime.

Iran Blocks Gmail While Americans Fret Over Google Buzz’s Privacy Implications
Gmail will be replaced by a nationally-administrated system, which it is incredibly easy to imagine will be heavily monitored and censored, and which can be switched off at a moment’s notice.

We Must not Ignore Human Rights in Iran
Old habits are difficult to break. After years of almost singularly focusing on the nuclear issue, the west has been slow to react to the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in Iran. While United Nations Security Council members are preparing new sanctions over the nuclear issue, the UN has yet to address Iran’s human rights abuses since the fraudulent elections last summer.

Worth Watching: Free Iran Twitter List

A critical network upgrade must be performed to ensure continued operation of Twitter. In coordination with Twitter, our network host had planned this upgrade for tonight. However, our network partners at NTT America recognize the role Twitter is currently playing as an important communication tool in Iran. Tonight’s planned maintenance has been rescheduled to tomorrow between 2-3p PST (1:30a in Iran).

The folks at Twitter/NTT were initially reluctant to back off from the scheduled down time but phone calls and the #nomaintenance hashtag apparently pushed them in the right direction.

Israel is drawing up plans to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and is prepared to launch a strike without backing from the US, it has been reported.

Officials in the Israeli Defence Ministry told the Jerusalem Post that while they prefer to act in consultation with the US, they were preparing plans that would allow them to act in isolation.

“It is always better to coordinate,” a senior Defence Ministry official told the newspaper. “But we are also preparing options that do not include coordination.”

I’d put the odds of a unilateral Israeli attack at less than 10%. This is their standard attempt to prod us into action. It has fallen on deaf ears for years and is even less likely to move the incoming administration.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has fallen sick from exhaustion but the illness is not as serious as political opponents suggest, an Ahmadinejad ally told Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA).

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during a recent meeting with Iraq’s former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jafari.

“The president will eventually fully recover and will continue with his work, but the shame of this thing will be left forever for some people,” Mohammad Esmail Kowsari said in the IRNA report.

It’s be a real shame if this rumor tainted Ahmadinejad’s legacy wouldn’t it?

The European Union has imposed new sanctions against Iran in protest of its nuclear program, the EU presidency announced Friday.

Current EU president France said EU nations would show restraint in giving public loans that help companies trading with Iran and would carefully watch financial groups doing business with Iranian banks, especially the Saderat bank.

EU countries will also inspect airplanes and ships traveling to and from Iran, notably Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, to check that they are not carrying contraband to the country.

The move was in accordance with an agreement reached between European ambassadors last month and marked a strict implementation of the latest UN Security Council resolution.

It sounds weak but AFP knows a bold move when it sees one:

The measures, in line with an agreement by European ambassadors last month, are a robust application of the latest UN Security Council resolution on Iran.

The UN has called for “vigilance” in entering into new commitments for public-provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits.

The EU has gone further by urging member states to exercise “restraint” in its dealings with Iran in those areas.

That’s right, we have a shocking case of cowboy diplomacy on our hands here.