This ThreatStream pulls live tweets about the complex itself and looks at related issues in the Iranian nuclear program from three angles:

• Parchin Facility: All tweets about the facility.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: A much wider net pulling in all discussion about any nuclear topics and Iran.
• IAEA: Any tweets related to the International Atomic Energy Agencies activities in Iran.

Click here to launch the ThreatStream or here to see the full list of available live national security streams.

A similar bomb explosion on Jan. 12, 2010, killed Tehran University professor Masoud Ali Mohammadi, a senior physics professor. He was killed when a bomb-rigged motorcycle exploded near his car as he was about to leave for work.

In November 2010, a pair of back-to-back bomb attacks in different parts of the capital killed one nuclear scientist and wounded another.

The slain scientist, Majid Shahriari, was a member of the nuclear engineering faculty at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran and cooperated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The wounded scientist, Fereidoun Abbasi, was almost immediately appointed head of Iran’s atomic agency.

And in July 2011, motorcycle-riding gunmen killed Darioush Rezaeinejad, an electronics student. Other reports identified him as a scientist involved in suspected Iranian attempts to make nuclear weapons.

Rezaeinejad allegedly participated in developing high-voltage switches, a key component in setting off the explosions needed to trigger a nuclear warhead.

Something to think about, especially for those constantly touting Iran’s theoretically fearsome international terror capabilities, is the obvious weakness underscored here. Someone has been dirt napping very important Iranians, on their own turf mind you, one after another. Iran has not been able to retaliate in any meaningful way and they also haven’t been able to protect these guys on their own territory. Perhaps they’re just quietly readying their fearsome array of two-stroke gas powered flying boats for an all out retaliatory assault…

Will these targeted killings slow down the Iranian nuclear program? That is highly unlikely this far in the game. However, they do send a powerful message, they definitely underscore the regime’s weaknesses, they eliminate some dangerous individuals, and they will hopefully discourage others from pursuing similar career paths. Just head over to Google, search on “Iranian scientist”, and look at the resulting images. Would you want that job?

Follow developments in Iran live with the Blogs of War Iran Monitor at http://iran.blogsofwar.com.

It’s difficult to predict how the case against him will now proceed. Mr Hekmati has a high profile and holds an American passport. A decision to go ahead with his execution may have an impact on tensions between Iran and the West – which have got worse in recent weeks.

Iranian officials said his cover was blown even before he had arrived in the country, because he had been spotted by Iranian agents at the US-run Bagram military air base in neighbouring Afghanistan.

On 18 December, Mr Hekmati was shown on Iranian state television allegedly confessing to being part of a plot to infiltrate Iran’s intelligence services for the CIA.

The appeal window is pretty small, 20 days, but it’s highly unlikely that the execution will proceed. Alive, Iran can use him for propaganda purposes or as a bargaining chip. Hekmati doesn’t strengthen their hand much but Iran is already in a terribly weak position. They’ll take any angle they can get. However, If they execute him little will be gained while tensions will go through the roof. So, I expect him to be just fine but in Iranian custody for quite some time.

Follow developments in Iran live with the Blogs of War Iran Monitor at http://iran.blogsofwar.com.

Apparently the tape was received by the family quite some time ago and is being released to, hopefully, move the investigation forward:

Asked about the timing of the tape’s release, an F.B.I. spokeswoman, Jacqueline Maguire, said in a statement: “The video was not previously released due to ongoing investigative initiatives. The investigation to locate Mr. Levinson continues, as the U.S. government continues to work to find him and bring him home safely.”

Earlier this year, Mr. Levinson’s family received another e-mail containing photographs of him wearing what looks like orange prison garb and with a full beard. The F.B.I. was able to trace the various e-mails back to Internet cafes in either Pakistan or Afghanistan but not back to the person or group that created them, said the people briefed on the inquiry.

Mr. Levinson was 59 when he went missing on Kish Island where he had gone to meet with an American fugitive known as Dawud Salahuddin. Mr. Salahuddin has lived in Iran since 1980 when he fled there after assassinating a former aide to the Shah of Iran outside his home near Washington. Mr. Levinson’s family and American officials have said that Mr. Levinson went to Iran to investigate cigarette smuggling for a private client.

I’ve created a monitor to stream tweets about this case. You can follow the live updates at http://levinson.blogsofwar.com.

A senior commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) revealed exclusive images of the next generation Bavar 3 Stealth Flying Boat this afternoon. The craft will apparently heavily leverage technology found in the recently captured American drone.

“Yes, we have exploited some aspects of the barbaric regime’s technology that we found in the RQ-170 Sentinel stealth aircraft. However, we found the craft inferior in many ways and have applied our superior technology to improve its capabilities.” the command said. “For example, The RQ-170 is not a boat. We have remedied this by adding stealth pontoons made of fiberglass rather than aluminum. We have also replaced the engine, which our engineers could not start, with a more reliable TAKSAZ 125cc motor.”

Perhaps the most striking difference is the addition of a pilot. According to the commander “The backwards regime is forced to use so-called drones because their pilots are afraid to take to the air. Also, many of them are too fat. Iran does not have such a problem thus the Bavar 3 will be deployed in swarms which are beyond counting by crusading forces. There are no countermeasureres!”

This, like most Iranian press reports, is a completely fabricated exclusive.

After about two hours, police seemed to be back in control of the building. Live TV footage showed riot police removing protesters.

Security forces fired tear gas, the semi-official Fars news agency reported. It said some protesters and police had been injured in the clash.

However, later reports said some protesters were still in the embassy. The governor of Tehran and the city’s head of security have entered the building to try to persuade them to leave, the BBC has learned.

An unconfirmed report from the official Irna news agency said a separate group of protesters had broken into another British embassy compound in the north of the city and seized “classified documents”.

I’ve been thinking about how Iran will react to its increasing isolation so the timing of this is interesting. This is especially relevant as we close in on Syria. There is plenty of room for debate about whether a preemptive strike on Iran would make sense but removing Syria from the equation certainly helps manage the uncertainty that would follow. Whatever the intent, the end result is a very isolated and weakened, Iran. Syria aside, Iran is still feeling intense pressure from many different angles at the moment – a lot of them internal.

The embassy storming is also a clear sign of deepening political infighting within Iran’s ruling hardline elites with the conservative-led parliament attempting to force the hand of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and expel the British ambassador.

So expect more of this. I suspect it the situation in Iran will continue to grow more unstable as sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and covert actions continue. Of course, the desired outcome is that all of this will eventually trigger that revolution that Iran has been on the edge of (allegedly) for about a decade now. There are a number of ways this could play out short of shock and awe, in fact that’s the lease desirable option, but all of them will trigger brutal and unpredictable responses in Iran. Iranian hardliners will not slip quietly into the night.

Recommended on Twitter: @UANI – Against Nuclear Iran is a non-partisan, broad-based coalition united to prevent Iran from fulfilling its ambition to become a regional super-power possessing nuclear weapons.

Follow developments in Iran live with the Blogs of War Iran Monitor at http://iran.blogsofwar.com.

Regarding possible military dimensions:

43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

Page 8 Section G.43

On the evidence:

“As indicated in paragraph 6 above, among the information available to the Agency is the alleged studies documentation: a large volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, view graphs from presentations, videos and engineering drawings), amounting to over a thousand pages. The information reflected in that documentation is of a technically complex and interconnected nature, showing research, development and testing activities over time. It also contains working level correspondence consistent with the day to day implementation of a formal programme.”

Annex Page 4 Section B.12

On Iran’s lack of cooperation:

“Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected in the alleged studies documentation. However, many of the answers given by Iran to questions posed by the Agency in connection with efforts to resolve the Agency’s concerns have been imprecise and/or incomplete, and the information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory. This, combined with events such as the dismantling of the Lavisan-Shian site in late 2003/early 2004 (see paragraph 19 below), and a pattern of late or after the fact acknowledgement of the existence of previously undeclared parts of Iran’s nuclear programme, have tended to increase the Agency’s concerns, rather than dispel them.”

Annex Page 4 Section B.15

On missile integration

“The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111. From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing
payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.”

Annex Page 11 Section C.11.59

From the summary:

“The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be
ongoing.”

Page 10 Section K.53

You can download the full IAEA report from ISIS.

Recommended on Twitter: @IAEAorg. Official accout of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The alleged plot – directly from the department of Justice:

“The criminal complaint alleges that, from the spring of 2011 to October 2011, Arbabsiar and his Iran-based co-conspirators, including Shakuri of the Qods Force, have been plotting the murder of the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Arbabsiar allegedly met on a number of occasions in Mexico with a DEA confidential source (CS-1) who has posed as an associate of a violent international drug trafficking cartel. According to the complaint, Arbabsiar arranged to hire CS-1 and CS-1’s purported accomplices to murder the Ambassador, and Shakuri and other Iran-based co-conspirators were aware of and approved the plan. With Shakuri’s approval, Arbabsiar has allegedly caused approximately $100,000 to be wired into a bank account in the United States as a down payment to CS-1 for the anticipated killing of the Ambassador, which was to take place in the United States.

According to the criminal complaint, the IRCG is an arm of the Iranian military that is composed of a number of branches, one of which is the Qods Force. The Qods Force conducts sensitive covert operations abroad, including terrorist attacks, assassinations and kidnappings, and is believed to sponsor attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq. In October 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Qods Force for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations.

The complaint alleges that Arbabsiar met with CS-1 in Mexico on May 24, 2011, where Arbabsiar inquired as to CS-1’s knowledge with respect to explosives and explained that he was interested in, among other things, attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia. In response, CS-1 allegedly indicated that he was knowledgeable with respect to C-4 explosives. In June and July 2011, the complaint alleges, Arbabsiar returned to Mexico and held additional meetings with CS-1, where Arbabsiar explained that his associates in Iran had discussed a number of violent missions for CS-1 and his associates to perform, including the murder of the Ambassador.”

Tweets are flooding the Iran Saudi, Mexico, and Terrorism streams on the Blogs of War National Security Monitor but I’ve created a unified page dedicated to the plot at http://iranplot.blogsofwar.com. I’ll keep this page in the Alert section as long as this story is unfolding. I suspect that will be quite a while.

Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project, a columnist for PBS Need to Know, a contributing editor to Current Intelligence, and he blogs about Central Asia at Registan.net. He’s the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. You can follow him on Twitter @JoshuaFoust.

John Little: Let’s talk about The Unforgivable Horror of Village Razing. In that post, which details the destruction of a booby-trapped Afghan village with 49,200 lbs. of ordnance and what you feel is the unsympathetic response to the resulting suffering, you drop some pretty heavy ordnance of your own:

Look, war is hell. I have no illusions about that. But what is happening right now in Southern Afghanistan is inexcusable. There were rumors of this policy of collective punishment in the Arghandab before (see this overwrought Daily Mail story that stops right before the village actually was destroyed for an idea of what is going on), and I’m really struggling to see how such behavior does not violate Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention—that is, how this behavior is not a war crime, especially given the explicit admission that such behavior is merely for the convenience of the soldier and not any grander strategy or purpose.

This sort of abhorrent behavior is not limited to the Arghandab, either. Broadwell explicitly states that it has the Petraeus stamp of approval, and Pahjwok has reported U.S. Marines in Helmand province explicitly warning local villagers of collective punishment if insurgents hide out in their settlements. It is probably a safe assumption to say that this is a widespread phenomenon.

A lot of people would say “Look, this may have been clumsy, inefficient, and lazy on our part but a Taliban outpost was cleared, civilian and friendly causalities were avoided, and we’re going to help the civilian owners rebuild. Relax Mr. Foust. This is war, not a war crime.”

So, with a few days to reflect, do you still think this event might point to an illegal policy of collective punishment? Can you see any merit at all in arguments of those who support the military’s casualty minimization strategy?

Joshua Foust: With some further reflection, I think I was right to struggle with whether destroying villages like this is a war crime. Some friends helped me wrap my head around what actually constitutes a violation of the Fourth Convention, and I don’t think this qualifies as such. However, the reason I feel comfortable with that struggle is this is the sort of thing we should question.

In that link to the Daily Mail story about another village facing this same fate, the soldiers seem to be threatening the villagers with the destruction of their homes if the villagers don’t turn in more IEDs. There are two ways to interpret that story (and the one here, about the Arghandab). Either the soldiers are punitively destroying entire settlements in punishment for not resisting the Taliban, or they’re communicating—incompletely—that if they can’t remove the Taliban from these areas, they have no way of removing the bombs and IEDs left over except by detonation.

From everything I’ve read about these incidents, and from speaking with people close to one of them, it’s probably bad communication being compounded by a false sense of urgency and action bias. These are not large villages—maybe a few dozen houses at the most. There’s no compelling, strategic reason for the U.S. military to literally burn a hole through them once the Taliban have run off. If the Taliban are gone, then we can ponder defusing and decontamination at a deliberate pace (the village razing incident is written in a way that suggests the decision to burn the village was made quickly, for the sake of battle momentum). There’s no need to rush in with B-1s dropping tons of explosives on them.

So I didn’t intend, and I still don’t intend, to accuse anyone of malice. I stand by my charge of laziness, however. Look at the aftermath: this is rural Afghanistan. No one has land deeds or property records. The soldiers are giving the local sub-governor a pot of money and the power to issue now-official land deeds. There is no way in hell people will be compensated appropriately for what they lost (which is required under Article 40 of the Afghan constitution). There will be winners and losers, and the U.S. is funding the picking of winners and losers—a dangerous situation, and one I frankly think is impossible to solve without massive corruption. This is not a hopeful result, in other words. And the callousness with which both the soldiers and that researcher writing about them discuss it—up to sniffing that the Afghans should thank us for rebuilding, as if destroying a family’s possessions is perfectly okay so long as you replace it later—led me to assume the worst. I don’t see how this is a better, more humane option that will create fewer headaches in the long run than attempting to defuse and decontaminate mined villages.

Either way, and whatever more details emerge as these people try to explain themselves, we should be up front in asking hard, probing questions about the deliberate erasure of entire communities. I’m frankly shocked at how many people reacted against that. Our conduct in Afghanistan should never be above question.

John Little: Paula Broadwell, the author of the piece that triggered all of this, has since offered some clarification. There’s nothing earth shattering there though. It is exactly along the lines of what one would expect:

The Taliban had laden the roads, compounds, everywhere with booby traps. In the commander’s assessment, the deserted village was not worth clearing. If you lost several KIA and you might feel the same… SOF had tried to clear the village and had several EKIA but also lost two guys. Afghan commandos had attempted to take the village and got hammered by the IEDs and HEMsas well…

[T]he villagers told all of these visitors {Petraeus, an ABC news crew] that Flynn was their hero and they wanted him to move into the village with them. They express great gratitude for helping them claim security in their river valley and push the Taliban out. Sure they are pissed about the loss of their mud huts (look at the picture again) but that is why the BUILD story is important here.

Your counter-argument, if I can attempt a summary, is that even if we accept the military’s version of the story it still seems to indicate poor execution of our counterinsurgency strategy. You point to a naivete that, if systemic, is quite troubling:

The gullibility of Americans is also something I thought we would have moved beyond in 2011, but it still remains. In civil wars, locals—that is, non-combattants—are always friendly to the guys with guns. In the passage above Paula expresses dismay, and toys with feeling little sympathy for, villagers who accepted money rather than violence to leave their village. That is worse than calloused, and it’s the kind of glib attitude that comes, depressingly commonly enough, from the zombies living in the military’s COIN bubble. I’ve seen elders in Afghanistan smile warmly at me, talk about how much they hate the Taliban, and so on… only to, mere days later, be caught passing information along to a local insurgent commander because they were scared witless by a night letter tacked to their door. Christian Bleuer explored this years ago—in Kapisa, of all places—and it really is a universal phenomenon. Displaced villagers will warmly greet armed groups… especially if those groups are handing out money as well. It means nothing beyond that, however. We should not be this gullible still. But we are, and that’s really sad to see.

Do you think that this is a broader issue? If so, can it be addressed with better training or do you think that inherent flaws in strategy are coming to light in stories like this?

Johsua Foust: I think it’s absolutely is the broader issue. The military still is, by and large, operating in total ignorance of not just local issues, but a basic acceptance of the humanity of Afghans. I shy away from complaining they misunderstand culture—and I say this having made my income for several years through coaching the Army on cultural issues in Afghanistan—because it doesn’t require specialized knowledge to see that poor people have bad housing, and that they are exceedingly vulnerable to displacement during conflict (to keep it confined to this one issue). So in this case, I’m baffled at the complete lack of empathy toward the villagers who were given a choice: resist the Taliban and suffer, or take some cash and flee.

As for addressing it, I lose my way a bit. I’ve seen what counts as “cultural training” within TRADOC, and at CGSC under General Caldwell. It’s a mixed bag, like most training is. You will always have good students and bad students, guys for whom this sort of mindset comes naturally and guys who either struggle with it or reject it outright. I am not knowledgeable enough about the Army’s training system to say how that can be remedied, or if it even can be.

But here’s part of the problem in discussing all of this: none of us were there. Frankly, Paula Broadwell wasn’t there when they burned this village to the ground. So already we’re working on filtered experiences, and that introduces a lot of bias that’s difficult to sift through when trying to figure out what happened. I’ve also never worn the uniform (at least, as a soldier), nor have I led men into combat—so I get really uncomfortable complaining about a bad decision made in defense of soldiers’ lives. And most people are—understandably, and appropriately, I think—hesitant to second-guess the decisions of a commander leading his men in combat.

However, there are some things that are worth questioning, even if it’s painful, and even if it ends up going nowhere. The decision to raze a town should be one of them. You don’t call in almost 50,000 pounds of bombs on a single target without a lot of signatures up the line of command. So this wasn’t a rogue decision, and it wasn’t done in the spur of the moment—this was a deliberate, considered, approved decision. And so far, from all the tiny amounts of data we have on it, it is an appalling decision. So in that sense, I think we really do need to keep pressing on the issue to try to figure out what really happened.

John Little: Based on your experience do you believe that there is willingness, at the command level, to look at events like this and identify opportunities to enhance the approach or is there just overwhelming pressure to execute, to maintain momentum?

Joshua Foust: I’m sure there is willingness somewhere in the chain of command. The problem is, General Petraeus knows this is going on—he hosted an ABC camera crew viewing the rubble—and we have no data to suggest he thinks the approach is flawed or could be improved. I do know there is pressure—implicit pressure, in a lot of ways, but pressure nevertheless—to “execute a counterinsurgency strategy” in the south. And that can easily lead to bizarre or inexplicable behavior getting sold as COIN.

John Little: Given the challenges (many of which originate in powerful neighboring states) do you think it’s possible that the current state of affairs is about as close to success as we’ll get? Is Afghanistan doomed to remain a problem to be managed rather than an emerging modern state that can be nurtured or incubated? Could it even be said that in the end our footprint there is less about Afghanistan and more about countering a long list of troublesome regional forces?

Joshua Foust: I think there can definitely be some improvement to the current state of affairs. I’d love to see us go back to cooperating with Iran in tracking down Taliban figures, as we were in 2001-2 (there are rumors the Iranians coordinate some counter-drug operations with the U.S., but no one wants to talk about that). I really do think that we can lessen the problem emanating from Pakistan by exploring a way to guarantee their interests in a post-America Afghanistan, and that one way we can do that is with beginning political reconciliation with the Taliban.

None of those developments means militancy will go away or the war will end. And in that sense, I don’t think management means “doom” in the sense of it being a negative thing. A reduced American footprint, combined with increased regional engagement, has the potential to be a net improvement for the country. It could also blow up in our face—which is the challenge with any course of action.

John Little: So is COIN only useful in the sense that it buys time until we negotiate a political solution with Pakistan and other regional players? If and when that agreement comes do you think that it will publicly acknowledge Pakistan as the guarantor of Afghanistan’s stability? Does it require that commitment and acknowledgment to succeed?

Joshua Foust: I don’t get the sense that COIN is a delaying tactic. A lot of people at the top—including General Petraeus and his fan club—genuinely believe COIN is the best thing, ever, for all things in Afghanistan. I obviously don’t share that assumption, but I do think they believe that honestly and aren’t playing a shell game. I also don’t have any indication that the top leadership has any real interest in political solutions with Pakistan and other regional players (which would, by design, have to include Iran, only Iran is excluded from NATO summits on the topic).

Now, I happen to think that we must publicly acknowledge and at least make a good-faith effort to secure Pakistan’s interests in post-America Afghanistan. I also am not aware of any push within the U.S. policy community to do that. Everything remains focused on “breaking” the Taliban, of severing Pakistan’s relationship to it, and so on. I’m not at all hopeful those counterproductive ideas will be reversed by the 2014 “withdrawal” date.

John Little: Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that something resembling a withdrawal occurs in 2014. We’ll also assume (and this is probably the safer assumption of the two) that the current military and diplomatic approaches will continue on their current tracks with little or no change. Where does that leave Afghanistan and where does that leave the region? What does 2015 look like?

Joshua Foust: I don’t see any evidence that we’re actually going to withdraw in 2014. Even Joe Biden, who had been consistently and vocally supporting “drop-dead” withdrawal dates, just told Hamid Karzai that we’ll be sticking around past 2014. So from where I sit, that leaves Afghanistan largely unchanged—there might be some withdrawal, but probably not to the extent that even people like CNAS advocate (which would be down to near-2005 levels, or around 25,000-30,000 troops). There will also be an increasingly shrill wing of the commentariat that will cry bloody murder at the thought of reducing our presence without catastrophic victory, regardless of ground conditions—which is exactly what’s happened with the July, 2011 date.

So, 2015? It will probably look much more like 2008 than anything else. And that ain’t good.

New rule: every time you enable or make excuses for Iran you should be lashed, one for every post-graduate degree you have.

Is that anti-intellectual? No…that’s anti-you. They don’t want to negotiate with us and never will. Period. There’s nothing to talk about.

Does that mean send Fifth Fleet and a bunch of AC-130s and B2s to level Iran? No. It means keep making scientists assume room temperature.

It means the head of the IRGCs drone program mysteriously disappearing from his balcony. And motorcycle-borne assassinations.

In sum, Iran doesn’t want an actual military faceoff and neither do we. Instead of negotiating endlessly, let’s be as ruthless as them.

Iran’s relationship with the United States, and Western world in general, has been defined by the assumption that they are untouchable. Analysts are quick to point out that intense Iranian nationalism is a barrier to any attempts at deconstruction/reconstruction of their political system. Invaders, even those with good intentions, are not welcome. Counterterrorism types are quick to point to Iran’s feared global network of terror facilitators and proxies who will respond to any conventional military attack with wave after wave of terrorist attacks on every corner of the globe. This is Iran’s version of mutually assured destruction and it has served them well.

Our own capabilities have served us well too. The Iranian political class does not want a what is assuredly an unsurvivable conventional war. Their strategy, executed quite well I think, has been to challenge the West on multiple fronts but pull back short of the line. If conventional war does come they fully expect it to come from the air and have prepared accordingly. This balance, if you can call it that, has worked because of an underlying assumption on the part of the Iranians. They believe that they can play dirty while the West is shackled by a number of self-imposed restraints and ultimately a (justifiable) fear of putting boots on the ground.

By identifying and targeting those who actively work to support Iran’s most evil intentions (nuclear scientists for example) we can send a different message: you are not safe. In fact, you are not safe anywhere. You are not safe when you travel and, more importantly, you are not safe in your own home. We will, if you persist, kill you during your morning commute. Do not sleep too soundly in that five star hotel because we just might smother your ass with a pillow.

Individual specificity is the future of war. It is brutal and ugly but it is less brutal and ugly than the alternative. By definition some tactics (the high casualty innocent civilian targeting terrorism favored by our enemies) are still off limits. In a war against individuals innocents are spared and justice is served. The illusion of safety for bad actors who support hostile regimes is shattered. Apply these tactics on a larger scale and over time, indefinitely, and these regimes will likely find it increasingly difficult to place intelligent people in supporting roles. The message to scientists, agents, oppressors, even “religious” leaders is clear: you are not just a small irrelevant cog in a larger machine, you are not lost in the crowd, YOU are the enemy and we will kill you.

There are definitely signs that this is happening, both in the struggle against Iran and in the greater war on terror. But is it happening on the scale needed to change some of these long standing assumptions? This is largely a covert effort (which it should be) so evaluation is difficult. Observers can only point to Iran’s behavior as an indicator. My gut feeling is that our capabilities in this area are increasing (just wait until we get indoor nano-scale lethal UASs) as is our comfort level with the approach but we’re not quite there. Iran continues to move aggressively froward on a dangerous track. Ironically, our greatest hope in preventing a devastating war is in taking off the gloves and getting dirty. We have to be “as ruthless as them”.

Ahmadinejad Hails ‘Nuclear’ Iran
“One day they said we cannot enrich uranium, but with the resistance of our leader, nation … and with the help of God, the Iranian nation has become nuclear,” Ahmadinejad said. “They (Americans) want to dominate our region but the Iranian people will never let them do that,” he said in a speech at Tehran’s Azadi (Freedom) Square before a crowd of hundreds of thousands. “The head of the atomic energy organisation (Ali Akbar Salehi) said the first stock of 20 percent fuel was produced and delivered to scientists,” he added.

Another Activist Receives Death Sentence in Iran
Iran has convicted another opposition activist on charges related to the country’s post-election turmoil and sentenced him to death, the judiciary said Tuesday. That brings to at least 10 the number of those facing the death penalty for unrest following June’s disputed presidential election, in which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner.

Iranian Opposition in Standoff With Regime
Since the disputed June 12, 2009 presidential election, both the pro-regime and opposition sides have been using various means of persuasion to try to dominate the other. Neither side is backing away.

Clashes in Iran on Anniversary of Islamic Revolution
Iranian opposition Web sites say security forces fired tear gas to disperse opposition supporters gathering in central Tehran. There are reports that leading reformist politicians Mehdi Karroubi and former President Mohammad Khatami were attacked when they attended the rally. The opposition also says authorities briefly detained Mr. Khatami’s sister-in-law, Zahra Eshraghi, and her husband Mohammad Reza Khatami. The reason was not reported. Eshraghi is the grand-daughter of the leader of the Islamic Revolution, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

How Obama Can Really Help the Pro-Democracy Movement In Iran
History shows that intervention is easier said than done. Past U.S. attempts to sway Iranian internal affairs — such as the CIA-fomented 1953 coup d’état against a democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh — have proven costly for U.S. interests. Most notably, Washington’s support for the shah fueled the 1979 Islamic Revolution, inspiring anti-Western movements in Pakistan, Egypt, and beyond.

Blame China for Iran’s Nukes
China’s greed for secure oil imports and its willingness to deal with outlaw regimes to get these imports is causing a breakdown in the world’s only system for disciplining countries that endanger peace. If the U.N. sanctions break down in Iran, this opens up a serious danger of war—and China will bear a heavy share of the blame.

FM spokesman: China Hopes Early Resumption of Negotiation on Iran Nuclear Issue
China said Thursday it hoped negotiations on Iran nuclear issue would be resumed at an early date and it would continue its efforts for this end. “Dialogues and negotiations are the best ways to resolve this issue, ” said Ma Zhaoxu, spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, at a regular press conference. Ma also said “China is serious on safeguarding the effectiveness of the international system of nuclear non-proliferation”. He called for an early resumption of the peaceful negotiation, and said China would contribute to it.

Iran: Destroy Israel if it Strikes
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told Syrian President Bashar Assad that Israel “must be resisted” and finished off “once and for all” if it launches a military operation in the Middle East, Reuters cited an Iranian report as saying on Thursday.

State Warns Insurers on Business with Iran
On the eve of major demonstrations in Iran, California Insurance Commissioner Steve Poizner demanded Wednesday that insurers doing business in California withdraw $6 billion of investments they indirectly hold in Iranian nuclear, energy and defense companies that he said are backing the nation’s “rather evil” regime.

Iran Blocks Gmail While Americans Fret Over Google Buzz’s Privacy Implications
Gmail will be replaced by a nationally-administrated system, which it is incredibly easy to imagine will be heavily monitored and censored, and which can be switched off at a moment’s notice.

We Must not Ignore Human Rights in Iran
Old habits are difficult to break. After years of almost singularly focusing on the nuclear issue, the west has been slow to react to the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in Iran. While United Nations Security Council members are preparing new sanctions over the nuclear issue, the UN has yet to address Iran’s human rights abuses since the fraudulent elections last summer.

Worth Watching: Free Iran Twitter List

A critical network upgrade must be performed to ensure continued operation of Twitter. In coordination with Twitter, our network host had planned this upgrade for tonight. However, our network partners at NTT America recognize the role Twitter is currently playing as an important communication tool in Iran. Tonight’s planned maintenance has been rescheduled to tomorrow between 2-3p PST (1:30a in Iran).

The folks at Twitter/NTT were initially reluctant to back off from the scheduled down time but phone calls and the #nomaintenance hashtag apparently pushed them in the right direction.

Israel is drawing up plans to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and is prepared to launch a strike without backing from the US, it has been reported.

Officials in the Israeli Defence Ministry told the Jerusalem Post that while they prefer to act in consultation with the US, they were preparing plans that would allow them to act in isolation.

“It is always better to coordinate,” a senior Defence Ministry official told the newspaper. “But we are also preparing options that do not include coordination.”

I’d put the odds of a unilateral Israeli attack at less than 10%. This is their standard attempt to prod us into action. It has fallen on deaf ears for years and is even less likely to move the incoming administration.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has fallen sick from exhaustion but the illness is not as serious as political opponents suggest, an Ahmadinejad ally told Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA).

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during a recent meeting with Iraq’s former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jafari.

“The president will eventually fully recover and will continue with his work, but the shame of this thing will be left forever for some people,” Mohammad Esmail Kowsari said in the IRNA report.

It’s be a real shame if this rumor tainted Ahmadinejad’s legacy wouldn’t it?

The European Union has imposed new sanctions against Iran in protest of its nuclear program, the EU presidency announced Friday.

Current EU president France said EU nations would show restraint in giving public loans that help companies trading with Iran and would carefully watch financial groups doing business with Iranian banks, especially the Saderat bank.

EU countries will also inspect airplanes and ships traveling to and from Iran, notably Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, to check that they are not carrying contraband to the country.

The move was in accordance with an agreement reached between European ambassadors last month and marked a strict implementation of the latest UN Security Council resolution.

It sounds weak but AFP knows a bold move when it sees one:

The measures, in line with an agreement by European ambassadors last month, are a robust application of the latest UN Security Council resolution on Iran.

The UN has called for “vigilance” in entering into new commitments for public-provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits.

The EU has gone further by urging member states to exercise “restraint” in its dealings with Iran in those areas.

That’s right, we have a shocking case of cowboy diplomacy on our hands here.

A senior official of French energy giant Total said that its company is interested in continuing cooperation with Iran in its oil and gas sectors, the semi-official Mehr news agency reported on Tuesday.

In a letter to Iranian Oil Minister Gholam-Hossein Nozari, Total Chief Executive Christophe de Margerie rejected recent reports on Total’s withdrawal from South Pars gas field, describing them as political propaganda, Mehr news agency quoted an unnamed Total official as saying.

“Total’s stance on Iran is quite clear. We are interested in continuing our activities,” the official said.

I’m still wondering if there isn’t more to this story than the “polticial propaganda” angle. Perhaps Iran gave a little unseen ground? Then again it’s not really hard to believe that Total is going for the oil and the BBC got their story wrong.

You can read a transcript of the entire briefing at DefenseLink. It’s interesting stuff. The briefing covers a lot of ground but Iran comes up often:

So, if I could have my first slide, please. If I kind of sit back and look at a strategic overview, we all know that the ballistic missile threat has continued to proliferate around the world. Access to these weapons has increased over the past many years and, in fact, two countries that we’re very much concerned about — specifically North Korea and Iran and the developments that they are continuing to make in their missile programs.

According to our own Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran is working on an extended range version of the Shahab-3 and a new 2,000-kilometer medium-range ballistic missile which they term the Ashura. In addition, in February of this year, Iran claimed that it had successfully launched an exploratory space vehicle, space rocket. The analysis that has been indicated shows that it has a resemblance to the Shahab-3 missile as well. And in November and in just this past week, Iran orchestrated launches of several short- and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel and the U.S. bases in the Middle East.

Now, recognizing this growing threat, we have embarked on a strategy where we initially wanted to protect the United States from North Korea, because that was the more advanced threat that we saw from the launches that they conducted in 1998 and again in 2006 with their longer-range missiles. And we have turned to field that capability; we have done so. And I’ll show you what that configuration looks like today.

The next phase was to be able to operate in one region or one theater, which we’ve also done. We’re not completely there, but we’re beginning to continue to roll out capabilities against a shorter and medium-range threats using mobile assets like our sea-based Aegis and Patriot systems that are deployable.

And in addition, we wanted to turn our attention to expanding our coverage against Iran because we view them as the next — the next concern that we had to worry with. And that meant that we needed to protect the United States and then to expand that protection for our deployed forces and our allies and friends in the European theater, and then eventually it would operate in more than one theater with our mobile assets.

Despite the opposition of his own generals and widespread scepticism that America is ready to risk the military, political and economic consequences of an airborne strike on Iran, the president has given an “amber light” to an Israeli plan to attack Iran’s main nuclear sites with long-range bombing sorties, the official told The Sunday Times.

“Amber means get on with your preparations, stand by for immediate attack and tell us when you’re ready,” the official said. But the Israelis have also been told that they can expect no help from American forces and will not be able to use US military bases in Iraq for logistical support.

I can’t imagine that Bush would believe that limiting overt support to Israel would allow us to escape any of the resulting fallout. Israel and America will not be viewed as independent operators regardless of the circumstances. There are still a few other wrinkles in all of the attack plans that have to be addressed anyway:

The one thing that all sides agree on is that any strike by either Iran or Israel would trigger a catastrophic round of retaliation that would rock global oil markets, send the price of petrol soaring and wreck the progress of the US military effort in Iraq.

The upside to all of this chatter is that it likely has moderate (or at least somewhat pragmatic) forces in Iran freaked out. If they have their say, or if the hardliners are smart enough, we’ll see the Iranians ratchet it down a bit – at least until after the election. All bets are off if this continues on it’s current track.

Meanwhile, the head of Total, Christophe de Margerie, told the Financial Times the company’s planned development of the huge South Pars gas field in southern Iran would not go ahead.

“Today we would be taking too much political risk to invest in Iran because people will say: ‘Total will do anything for money’,” he said.

Total was the last major Western energy group to have seriously considered investing in the country’s huge gas reserves.

Analysts say the move will be a big blow to the Iranian energy industry.

It means Iran is now unlikely to significantly increase its gas exports until late into the next decade, they add.

Diplomacy clearly isn’t working but there is some hope in the fact that there are still many powerful economic cards to be played:

We’ve been pursuing the diplomatic track for several years, we’ve had four Security Council resolutions, and yet the Iranian regime is still busy installing new centrifuges.

The diplomatic track has to work – the alternatives are appalling. And I believe that our Iran policy can still work.

The Iranian regime may believe that time is on their side, but the state of the Iranian economy says differently. So does the state of Iran’s enrichment program. The regime has claimed for years to be further ahead than it is, and it continues to do so. Enrichment is hard technology to master, and our assessment is that Iran is still some way from doing so.

So we will continue to offer a clear choice: Come into compliance with UN resolutions and be part of the international community, or remain in breach and suffer growing political and economic isolation.

Update 7/15/08:
China View is reporting that the Total deal is on:

A senior official of French energy giant Total said that its company is interested in continuing cooperation with Iran in its oil and gas sectors, the semi-official Mehr news agency reported on Tuesday.

In a letter to Iranian Oil Minister Gholam-Hossein Nozari, Total Chief Executive Christophe de Margerie rejected recent reports on Total’s withdrawal from South Pars gas field, describing them as political propaganda, Mehr news agency quoted an unnamed Total official as saying.

“Total’s stance on Iran is quite clear. We are interested in continuing our activities,” the official said.

“Iran will not attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz and we will not allow them to close the Strait of Hormuz. I can’t say it anymore clearly than that,” Vice-Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, the commander of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, told a conference on Gulf naval security in Abu Dhabi.

The head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said in remarks published last week that Tehran would impose controls on shipping in the Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz waterway if it was attacked.

Any such move by Iran would be viewed as an act of war and the response would overwhelming. Iran will not act first here but it’s almost a given that they’ll do everything in their power to strike back at our fleet and commercial shipping, with fast boats and missiles, if attacked.

The report said that according to assessments in Israel, recent turmoil in Lebanon, where Hizbullah de facto established control of the country, was advancing an American attack.

Bush, the officials said, opined that Hizbullah’s show of strength was evidence of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s crowing influence. They said that according to Bush, “the disease must be treated – not its symptoms.”

These rumors were circulating years ago. If Israeli officials were briefed or otherwise involved in discussions like this the last place you’d hear about it is Galatz. I’d bet that this was intended for Iranian consumption.

Update III:
Jules Crittenden is ready:

“Called for” and gonna do it are two very different things. It’s entirely called for. Strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and Quds Force training camps and headquarters. Any more crap out of Iran, and follow-on strikes on the oil and transportation infrastructure Iran uses to support and facilitate terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere. It’s long overdue.

Update II:
The White House has a slightly different take:

“An article in today’s Jerusalem Post about the president’s position on Iran that quotes unnamed sources — quoting unnamed sources — is not worth the paper it’s written on,” the White House said in a statement hours after the Israeli newspaper published the report on its Web site.

Update:
Chuck Adkins is surprised that people are falling for it.

Lebanese Political Journal
SSNP guys sit on many corners in Hamra and are patrolling on motor scooters. Their flags are everywhere, and they are gloating. I was regularly mistaken for being an SSNP guy while out walking, because I am the right age, wearing the right clothes, and fitting the right physique to be one of their guys. The SSNP security guys gave me nods, the Army diverted their eyes, and the neighborhood residents gave me looks of absolute hatred.

Across the Bay
Aside from assaulting the Hariri Foundation — a foundation that has paid for the education of thousands upon thousands of Lebanese college students — Hezbollah and its goons have focused their venom, hatred and destruction on the media. The very first thing they attacked, burned and destroyed were newspapers, radio stations, and TV stations that support March 14th political line.

NOW! Lebanon
At least 16 people were killed in clashes in Lebanon on Saturday between supporters of the government and the opposition, security and hospital officials said. Fierce clashes in the Akkar region of north Lebanon killed 14 people, including civilians, when members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party battled supporters of the Future Movement, a security official said. “The headquarters of the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) in Halba fell to the Future Movement forces,” said the official, adding that seven people were found dead inside.

Blacksmiths of Lebanon
News sources in Lebanon are reporting a statement issued by Army Command calling for the withdrawal of all armed elements from the street. The Army’s statement also declared the establishment of an internal probe into the airport security affair, without the removal [as yet] of Brigadier General Wafik Shoukair as head of airport security; and the establishment of its own study into the Hizballah communication network, along lines that “would not harm the resistance’s integrity and security”.

The final update sums matters up nicely.

Blogging Beirut
SHIT HAS HIT THE FAN

The United States is conferring with the U.N. Security Council and others in the Middle East about possible measures against those responsible for the recent violence in Beirut, the White House said on Friday.

The White House has accused the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah of inciting the violence in the Lebanese capital and routing forces loyal to the U.S.-backed government.

Because nothing frightens the enemies of peace and freedom like a diplomatically crafted expression of concern.

The U.S. military reported Monday on a “significant” confrontation involving five Iranian Revolutionary Guard boats that “harrassed and provoked” three U.S. naval ships in international waters over the weekend.

U.S. military officials said the incident occurred Saturday night in the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping channel leading in and out of the Persian Gulf.

The five Iranian ships made “threatening” moves — in one case coming within 200 yards of a U.S. ship, the U.S. officials said.
Don’t Miss

In one radio transmission, the Iranians told the U.S. Navy: “I am coming at you. You will explode in a couple of minutes,” the U.S. military officials told CNN.

When the U.S. ships heard that radio transmission, they manned their gun positions and officers were “in the process” of giving the order to fire when the Iranians abruptly turned away, the U.S. officials said.

No shots were fired and no one was injured in the confrontation.

I’d say that they were probing our defenses. The Iranians are not going to attack us directly, they’re not that stupid, but the information gathered in this exercise could be passed on to Iranian state sponsored terrorists or used in retaliatory strikes if we launch an air campaign. It’s the radio transmission that I find really odd here. We’ve had problems with these boats before but I’ve never heard of a case where the Iranians verbally threatened to attack.

Update 1/9/2007:
Mike Nizza of The Lede links to Navy video of the event and a transcript. While it’s helpful to see supporting evidence I should make it clear that I wasn’t expressing doubts about the Navy’s report in my initial post. I’m just really surprised by the hostile radio exchange.

The United States, which believes Tehran harbours ambitions to acquire a nuclear weapon, had urged Moscow not to send the fuel.

However, Russia said that it received assurances from Iran that the shipped fuel will not be used for any other purpose. It said there was no evidence to prove that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, and that the Bushehr project could not be used in a weapons programme in any case.

And they only have to wave our own National Intelligence Estimate in our faces when we object.

DefSec Gates, speaking at the Manama Dialogue, reminds everyone that Iran presents a problem on many fronts:

Gates pointed to Iran’s activities that defense officials report have left many of its neighbors feeling threatened. “Everywhere you turn, it is the policy of Iran to foment instability and chaos, no matter the strategic value or the cost in the blood of innocents,” Gates said.

Navy Adm. William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. Central Command and part of the U.S. delegation here, told reporters yesterday Iran’s meddling – from supplying weapons to insurgents in Iran and Afghanistan to its seizure in March of 15 British sailors – is destabilizing to the United States as well as the Persian Gulf region

“Their behavior has really been a problem, and to the extent that it destabilizes the region, which it does, then it becomes a problem for us,” he said. “Everything they’ve done publicly has been a problem.”

Gates said during a question-and-answer session following his address he’s “not confident” high-level dialogue between the United States and Iran would do any good in light of Iran’s inflammatory foreign policy. “Iran has to take some steps” for such a dialogue to be meaningful, he said.

Iran had been scheduled to send a delegation to the Manama Dialogue, but cancelled at the last minute.

In the meantime, Gates pointed to the international community as the only barrier to Iran re-starting its nuclear weapons program.

He urged Gulf-region leaders to pull together to demand that Iran “come clean” about past activities, suspend enrichment and openly affirm it has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. He also argued for them to demand inspections to make sure Iran lives up to its commitments and can’t restart its nuclear weapons program at a moment’s notice, or “at the whim of its most militant leaders.”

Gates pressed for the international community to “continue – and intensify – our economic, financial and diplomatic pressures on Iran to suspend enrichment.” He urged leaders to take the “peaceful but effective measures necessary to bring a long-term change of policies in Tehran.”

Asked if the United States is planning a military confrontation with Iran, Gates emphasized that the U.S. focus is “100 percent diplomatic and economic.”

Anyway, there is an official site for those who are interested. Wikipedia has more information including a pretty comprehensive rundown on the participants.

National security advisor Steve Hadley recently laid out some goals, if you can call them that, for the event:

…the focus of these discussions are the Israelis and the Palestinians launching a negotiating process, supporting them in their efforts to implement the road map, which we still think is the critical path for achieving peace, and, in parallel, building Palestinian institutions and making sure there’s international support for that. That’s what really this meeting is all about and that’s what we hope will come out of it.

In other words, they’re not hoping for much. Or as Rick Richman puts it:

So the conference will “launch negotiations” — since the last few months of actual negotiations over a “document” have failed. Since failure is not an option, this will be called a success.

Frank Viviano is bit more optimistic:

The atmosphere is marked by weakness, uncertainty and pessimism. Yet that may prove to be the Annapolis conference’s greatest strength, an unexpected prelude to breakthrough on the 60-year road to an Arab-Israeli-settlement. It is between the lines of bleak editorials, op-ed columns and analyses in the press of the Middle East itself that this hope, however slim, can be read. From Riyadh and Beirut to Cairo and Jerusalem, pre-conference media coverage has been a strange mosaic of dark foreboding and unusual glimmers of light. No less unusual is the fact that Annapolis will bring together all of the governments and mainstream players in this unending conflict for the first time – precisely because because all of them are reeling in crisis. In a sense, there could be no more potent chemistry for success at the negotiating table. The closest equivalent is the “Nixon shock” of 35 years ago, when a fiercely anti-Communist U.S. president, faced with riots in the American streets and a war about to be lost in Southeast Asia, suddenly found common ground with a marxist China gravely enfeebled by cultural revolution.

John Bolton is cranky, pessimistic, and right (as usual):

“If there is a conference and it fails, we are not simply in the status quo that we had before,” Bolton said during a Web-based question-and-answer session. “We are in a worse position, because it will show a decline in American influence, a failure in a very visible way. I wish we weren’t doing this at all.”

And The Washington Post falls somewhere in the middle:

If there are causes for optimism, they lie in the hopeful public rhetoric of Mr. Olmert and Mr. Abbas — and the fears that lie behind it. Mr. Olmert has publicly pledged several times that Israel will negotiate seriously, and he said last week that he believed there was a chance to complete a peace deal by the end of next year. His government, like many in the Middle East, is deeply worried by Iran’s attempt to expand its influence throughout the region and believes a failure of the talks would play into Tehran’s hands. That prospect may be enough to produce some progress at the Annapolis meeting and in the months to come. But the breakthrough that Ms. Rice thought was possible still looks remote.

While, Henry Siegman hits all of the Arab talking points on the way to this ridiculously one-sided conclusion:

If the international community has been largely indifferent to—or impotent to do anything about—what some have tried to portray as a quarrel between Israel and Palestinians over where to draw the border between the two, it is far less likely to remain indifferent to an Israel intent on permanently denying its majority Arab population the rights and privileges it accords to its minority of Jewish citizens. It would be an apartheid regime that, one hopes, a majority of Israelis would themselves not abide.

According to the prosecution, during his IDF reserve duty, the psychiatrist was exposed to classified material including emergency plans of the IDF Medical Corps, detailed plans for the deployment of medical units and control centers, procedures for providing psychiatric services to the home front during a war and tactics for evacuating civilians in the event of rocket attacks, as well as IDF intelligence and operations assessments.

The November 22 indictment served in the Petah Tikva Magistrate’s Court asserts that “in April 2007, Shamir decided to provide information to hostile entities in exchange for money and he contacted the Iranian Foreign Ministry by electronic mail.”

Stupid – but it gets worse:

In addition, it is alleged that in August 2007, Shamir sent faxes from his home to the Iranian consulates in London and Turkey and, about a month ago, after receiving no responses, he faxed them again. Police said that after sending the faxes he destroyed them and saved the fax numbers to his cellular phone memory in order lessen the chances of detection.

If only all spies were this stupid.

Iran’s Interior Minister Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi here on Wednesday warned against any possible military attack against Iran, promising that Iran’s response would be crushing.

“Any country or power which invades Iran will face a crushing response. We will defend our security and our country in the strongest way in case of any possible military attack,” he added.