It might seem odd that someone who worked at the CIA would offer up an opinion piece not related to Osama Bin Laden, on this, the 2nd anniversary of his ending. I actually think that now is the perfect day to talk about more important issues. I can think of no more important issue than the repatriotisation of captive American citizens abroad. That objective is complete….Levinson isn’t.

Levinson

The receptionist had a bowl of mini Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups on her desk. I remember that much. The large conference room where the asset validation / recruitment pitch security reviews were held for the Iran Operations Division was located in the main Iran Operations Division (IOD) Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). It was through a short maze of cubes filled with an operational targeting group and support staff. At the top of a raised section of the SCIF were a row of offices, and a few large sections of ceiling high glass that made up one wall of the conference room. Like most of the conference rooms I had been in at the Agency (and come to think of it, the other government jobs I’ve had) this one was mostly crammed full of a much too large conference table surrounded by an unwieldy amount of swivel chairs. To make matters worse, the outer edges of the room were encased with more chairs for overflow. It gave you a good sense of what goldfish must wake up to every day. Minus the reception desk with candy, and no I didn’t eat any.

I didn’t have access to this wing yet, having just moved to IOD, even though it had been over a month. I was in a SCIF across the hall and found this all out while on my way to the late morning meeting. Moments before I had grabbed my files and notes, headed out the SCIF I was in, and across the hall to the main door.

Beep

My blue badge just coughed at me; the obvious clunking of the magnetic lock suspiciously missing from my attempt at getting into my meetings. Nothing but silence, so I tried again.

Beep

Nope, not a fluke, I couldn’t get in. Just then the door burst open and a few people walked out, most likely on the way for a mid morning Starbucks break down the hall. In I went; ‘tail gating’ my way into the SCIF.

My first stop was down a long row of cubes straight ahead of me. My first office-mate from initial training was working as a Targeter somewhere along these rows. I had been bugging her for a few weeks to meet up and talk shop about IOD. She’d been there longer than me, and I wanted info on the Division. She’s also extremely focused and not surprisingly kept putting off meeting because she’d had too much she wanted to get done. Also no surprise, her cube was empty as she was in another meeting. Oh well, off to the conference room I went.

I was the second Staff Operations Officer (SOO) presenting a case at that mornings meeting. As this was my first, I was a little nervous. I knew the case, but felt like I had a vested interest given my previous line of work. These meetings were used to present potential agents, or HUMINT sources, for further development, recruitment, some sort of operation, handling issue or termination in a peer review setting. The peers in this case were more senior officers from the given division or operation group, as well as referents from the Counter Intelligence Center, Office of Security, the appropriate Directorate of Science and Technology officer and the ever present legal representative. The meetings were a clinical affair, at least based on my experience. I had written up my briefing packet and had pretty much gotten is signed off by the relevant officers already the day before via email. I figured this would be a formality.

I started my Federal career as a Special Agent with what was the US Customs Service / Immigration and Naturalization Service Post 9/11 Bush era mash-up formerly known as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (now Homeland Security Investigations). After a half decade of working a spectrum of customs and immigration cases I decided I needed a change and went through recruitment and hiring for the National Clandestine Service at the CIA. During that time, on March 9th, 2007 retired FBI Special Agent Robert Levinson was kidnapped while working a post retirement private sector investigations job that took him to Kish Island, a resort spot and free trade zone in the Persian Gulf, in Iran.

I have never been a traditional “cop” type of investigator. Though I respect and honor the “thin blue line”, I think I’ve always done a pretty good job at maintaining my old friendships and not being “that guy” who looks like a cop and only hangs out with other cops. That said, I did and do take law enforcement very seriously and one thing that has always been a constant for me is looking out for my brothers and sisters on the job. I never knew Robert Levinson, and wasn’t a Bureau agent (worked with plenty), this event really made me take notice however. A part of me filed it away and though I probably wasn’t fully conscious of it at the time, I assumed that the Bureau would do right by their former agent and move heaven and earth to get him back.

Now over two years later, everyone is filing into the IOD conference room, and Robert Levinson is fresh on my mind. I had been working the desk of my particular IOD branch for a number of months and felt good to be finally making some headway on a developmental asset, especially when that asset was saying they had information about Robert Levinson. I’d like to think that anyone sitting on the desk at that time would have been interested like me, but most likely it was my previous Special Agent background that made me push the officer in the field on this case.

The officer in question was a bit of an oddity. Not only was he based in National Resources; he was also a Staff Operations Officer (SOO) like myself. This meant he had been a SOO for a while before heading to Ops Certification at the Farm, so he could then officially recruit his own agents. This was also one of his first developmental assets, so it was our own special “big deal”, not that any of the more seasoned officers around seemed to care.

National Resources (NR) seems to be one of those misunderstood offices within the NCS. A few previous CIA officers, Henry Crumpton and “Ishmael Jones” for example, have detailed a bit about NR in their recent books. I had exposure to NR while working for the agency formerly known as ICE (or HSI as its called now), and later worked in NR for a time once inside the CIA. I find that most people I speak with see some kind of nefarious purpose for having what are supposed to be overseas “Spies” working within the United States. For clarity sake, NR is charged with a few very important functions that make operating within the US essential and beneficial to the Agency and our nations citizens.

NR officers handle communications and debriefings with US citizens who willingly cooperate with the Agency. These would be people traveling to countries of interest, or working with specific people of interest to the Agency. There are some other mechanisms here I won’t detail, but they pertain to agreements with companies in the US for similar activities.

Officers from NR also work to spot, assess, develop and recruit foreign individuals who are traveling inside the US. These might be people who live within the US continually with some form of permanent immigration status (green card, etc) or with a visa. Their access may involve them traveling back to their country of origin and then returning to the US. At that point they’d be met and debriefed by the NR officer. The scenarios vary quite a bit, but most NR spots are quite busy, and I’ve assisted in some very interesting recruitments based on NR cases. One such recruitment was facilitated by utilizing my previous years working immigration cases as a Special Agent with ICE to dig through hundreds of files in a targeting assignment to find a good lead for an officer to approach. In the end, the officer used my targeting package to successfully recruit and run this individual. I only know all this because my supervisor in that office was nice enough to keep me updated on the cases after I moved to DS&T.

My specific case on this day centered on an individual within the Iranian security apparatus. As things panned out they claimed to have access to a wide variety of information, some of which was related to Kish Island activities as well as the kidnapping of Robert Levinson. His motivation was purely financial, and our hope was to get some kind of good validating info about his access from an upcoming meeting. I felt the review was a moot point, so when it was my turn I quickly presented the case and led with what I thought was the most crucial bit of information we wanted to know more about: Levinson.

“I don’t want to hear fucking Kish Island mentioned again!”

It was blurted out with such a bureaucratically laced snide plop that I was caught a bit off guard. Factor in that it was one of the Deputy Chiefs of Operations for IOD who threw it down at me in the middle of my brief, well, let’s just say I wasn’t used to being talked to that way. I took a quick breath, sat on the comment for a second, suppressing my initially reaction that I won’t detail here, and then continued explaining why I thought the issue was important.

He wasn’t having any of it. He said he didn’t care to hear more, and that he had been led to believe there was more to this potential asset than anything to do with Kish Island. I quickly made my case and roped in one of the referents that had given me the unofficial sign off to present the case that morning. The Deputy Chief then seemed to sputter out, as if it had been some sort of compulsory obligation, not unlike the Brooks Brothers he was sporting that day. The operation was given an initial approval, so basically the officer could meet the potential asset and potentially recruit them. It all seemed really a strange and unnecessary way of recruiting people. When I’ve worked confidential informants in the past, well, I had done it differently, but I don’t own a nice suit, so what do I know?

Now, at this point I should say that I really wish I had some miraculous breakthrough with the Levinson case. It’s obvious that I did not, and had no other real part in this. I don’t know much of what happened after I rotated out of the office for a training course. After my certification course I jumped Directorates and moved to the Directorate of Science and Technology. I didn’t get any other updates from that office. This was, and absolutely still is, common for officers moving around to different offices in their careers at the Agency. As much as Agency HRS folks like to talk about “Hall Files” (your reputation at the Agency, as whispered in the halls), I found out early that just about every officer is as good as their most current assignment or operation. You might have things keep you in the spotlight throughout your career, but as soon as your flame goes dim, the giant information pit that is the Agency swallows you up. Much like Iran swallowed up Robert Levinson.

I have spoken with a former colleague and friend of Levinson, as well as exchanged messages with members of his family. I’m no expert on the man, by any stretch, but its clear that he is highly respected by his friends and loved by his family. In January of this year the Levinson family started a White House online petition that requested the government focus their energy on finding and freeing Levinson. The shocking result was that way more people turned out in favor of the creation of a “Death Star”

I found out more recently that several offices did get spotty information about Levinson during my time at the Agency. It seems like those cases and experiences were kind of like mine. Some initial interest, then nothing. Not like an effort not to do anything about Levinson, more a general uncertainty or inaction with regards to the information that was coming in. For instance, one officer I spoke with had been asked to review a video that was believed to be of Levinson while working in another IOD office. There was no follow up that he knew of, however.

I started out writing this piece before March of 2013, hoping to have this completed in time with Robert Levinson’s 7th anniversary in captivity. That obviously did not happen. I noticed that several organizations made statements about Levinson’s plight, including various former and current FBI Special Agent Associations, to include a moment of silence marking the dubious anniversary. While the attention and respect for their own is to be respected and honored, I can’t help but wonder what exactly has changed?

Robert Levinson is not the only American in captivity, not even the only being held by Iran. How many other anniversaries have gone by without much notice? How many other junior intelligence officers have pitched access agents who are said to have knowledge of Americans being held overseas? Were those cases given more attention by management?

Now that I am out of that direct stream of knowledge, I really could not even guess. As a country we seem to have a very short memory when it comes to critical events, so I would not be surprised if the Robert Levinson’s captivity, and that of former US Marine Amir Hekmati or pastor Saeed Abedini are not garnering the kind of attention that should really be given to those of our citizens being held captive by another nation.

Popular culture has educated people with the common US Military motto of “No Man Left Behind”. Though not always a reality, the spirit of the motto is something we could all do better at.

This is the point where I reach back to new officer training at the Agency and try to tie in history with the present day. As part of new officer training we all were encouraged to read “The Book of Honor” by Ted Gupp. His book details a number of the fallen Agency officers that have stars appearing on the Wall of Honor in the Original Headquarters Building (OHB) , and appear in the Book of Honor at the base of the wall. I bring this up because I think its very relevant to this discussion of our citizens in captivity around the globe.

I also bring it up because I just recently listened to the audiobook (I drive a lot for my current job and listen to quite a few audiobooks). Upon hearing these stories again, all the while thinking of Robert Levinson’s case, I see a definite pattern emerge. While the “Book of Honor” details CIA officers who perished in the line of duty, the lack of positive action, or downright inaction of our most senior officials in doing everything possible within their power to help US Citizens in harms way or captivity is shocking. If you are not familiar with these people I urge you to read or listen to Ted Gupp’s excellent book. In it you will learn about the likes of legendary Hugh Francis Redmond who spent 19 years as a captive in China, or John J. Merriman who though not a captive, was seemingly denied much needed medical aid after a plane crash in the Congo in 1964.

It seems to me as if government officials don’t care about what happens to Levinson. My feeling is that the issue is so far out of hand, that unless a direct and easy solution presents itself, the predominant risk adverse nature of our current intelligence apparatus will drag its feet until that “sure thing” comes along. This I believe needs to change. We as citizens should demand that our government takes immediate action to secure the release of our fellow citizens being held captive overseas. Its time to stand up and fight for people like Robert Levinson. We can choose to spend our precious time foaming about previously authorized interrogation programs, the stock market or movie stars, or we can take a stand for something more lasting and meaningful. People like Robert Levinson spent a career in service to our country. I don’t know his career trajectory, but it is safe to say from my first hand experience as a Special Agent, he gave more than he got to the citizens of this nation. He doesn’t deserve to sit locked up by a sworn enemy like the Iranian regime.

You might be asking yourself what you can do to help. If so, I’m glad to hear it. I’m not sure what good it actually does, but Internet access makes it very easy now to contact your representative. Why not check out http://www.house.gov/representatives/find/Twitter, retweet it. Then follow @HelpBobLevinson and show your support.

You can find that information on the Levinson family’s website as well as on the Wikipedia page devoted to him.

Jon Iadonisi is the founder of White Canvas Group (Twitter) and leads the innovation and application of new products and solutions for all clients. He blends over 15 years of diverse experience in computer science, cyber security, and applied creativity into solving tomorrow’s challenges. He is regularly sought by the Department of Defense, various Intelligence agencies, members of the US Congress, industry conventions and popular media outlets to provide expert opinion and briefings on information age unconventional warfare. Prior to joining the private sector, Jon served as a Navy SEAL, where he designed, planned and led various combat operations that integrated innovative technologies and tactics into the operating environment, ultimately creating new capabilities for the Special Operations Community and Central Intelligence Agency. He is a combat-wounded and decorated veteran who earned a B.S. in Computer Science from the US Naval Academy, and M.S. in Homeland Security from San Diego State University. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Criminal Justice from the University of New Haven, focusing his research on the emerging field of cyber crime. Jon is a guest lecturer at San Diego State University and Georgetown Law School and is an academic and athletic all-American who participated in the 2000 Olympic Rifle team trials.

Tim Newberry is the co-founder of White Canvas Group and is responsible for day-to-day operations and sustained client engagement. Tim’s 15 years of identifying, developing, and executing projects in areas ranging from computer science to nuclear engineering has helped him hone a process-oriented delivery model that ensures clients’ objectives are met on time and on budget. Prior to joining the private sector, Tim spent eight years as a Naval Submarine Officer and Nuclear Engineer. He has a master’s degree in engineering from Catholic University, and a bachelor’s degree in computer science from the U.S. Naval Academy. Tim is currently pursuing a PhD in Criminal Justice from the University of New Haven in Connecticut, with an emphasis on understanding the intersection between cyber technologies and new age media with justice.

John Little: White Canvas has been involved in lot of interesting projects from crowdsourced crisis communications products like GridMeNow, to social media analysis, to your longtime involvement in the hacker conference scene. Can you briefly tell us where White Canvas is devoting most of its energy at the moment and where you see yourselves headed in the next 3-5 years.

Jon Iadonisi and Tim Newberry: John, first, thank you for hosting us in this forum. We’ve been a big fan of yours over the years and actually think we’ve got quite a bit in common with your content pursuits. As you allude to in the question above, we’ve been accused at times of being a bit unfocused and spreading ourselves too thin. We couldn’t disagree more.

Everything we do, day in and day out, now coming to the end of our fifth year, connects. It connects by focusing our efforts at an intersection between technology and people. Behind every social media account, keyboard, and mobile phone is a person. Our expertise is technology development but our focus is to serve people with that technology, with each one of our projects combining elements of design, science, and functional solutions.

Right now, we’re focusing on a handful of projects. We like to describe ourselves as a privatized DARPA (most of your readers will probably understand that analogy), except we like to produce a bit faster and be a bit more practical in solving tomorrow’s problems today. You’ll see GridMeNow spin off into its own company in the coming months as customer growth and demand warrants. 2013 will also see a renewed focus for WCG on the human factor in cyber security and digital operations for private and government customers. Our other significant energy focus will be an elite performance training system for military and law enforcement personnel, customizing systems currently used by professional and Olympic athletes.

Clients contact us regularly seeking other paradigm-shifting solutions, and we’re dedicated to evaluating those potential opportunities for future growth.

John Little: I know you guys were looking at the national security implications of social media, especially web video, well ahead of the Arab Spring. Has the marketplace for these concepts changed completely over the last three years or is it still an uphill battle with some customers?

Jon Iadonisi and Tim Newberry: Both. The Arab Spring undoubtedly caused global shifts in power but more critically, it caused a shift in the perception of what power is and who has it. Social media certainly helped those events transcend local boundaries onto the global stage; and the pressure of that elevated visibility shaped public opinions and corresponding ground action in near real time.

Video social media is the most important form of user-generated content when influencing someone to do something. That journey from being compelled or inspired to do something to taking action on that inspiration happens much quicker with video as opposed to just text, pictures, or audio. Video compels, inspires, incites action. That’s why we focus there, because it is the most potent form of influence, whether you use it for marketing or organizing. Further, the social technologies at play in these cases (YouTube, Vimeo, etc.) offer a transformative experience for the user/viewer because they instantly provide context (via comments, likes and shares), and connect users/viewers to wider online audiences via their own social presence. The video footage of the January 25 Tahrir Square protests in Egypt compelled a global audience in seconds. You personally could watch the event unfold via social media virally while other 1.0 organizations usually tasked with monitoring and analyzing these events (e.g. intelligence agencies, news bureaus, etc.) totally missed the boat. And in this case, the compulsion caused by the social video experience resulted in a united narrative promoting a regime change.

It’s still an uphill battle—that’s going to be the case for years, and unfortunately more so within the confines of government. But, we’re getting better at it – after all, the Internet is only about 20 years old.

John Little: It seems like with all the hype around social media and the internet in general that mobile gets overlooked as a driver. Twitter and Facebook wouldn’t be full of compelling real time content from Tahrir Square without the global spread of affordable hardware and networks. It’s really the convergence and ubiquitous nature of these technologies that is creating something special isn’t it?

Jon Iadonisi and Tim Newberry: The quick, simple answer is “absolutely” – I think we’ve heard recently that in many parts of Africa, cell phones and internet connectivity are more prevalent than running water. But the harder-to-measure second and third order effects this creates involve how PEOPLE are changing with this new dynamic. This is where we at White Canvas Group spend most of our time: helping people to navigate this new digital world order. Consider the fact that reliable, real-time information is being delivered via an underground Skype connection in Syria, which is then broadcast by the global news network powerhouses. It’s an inversion of power and influence. Many people don’t buy goods or services based solely on advertisements: they spend money based on peer recommendations or social network validation. These changes are only enabled by the convergence and spread of affordable connectivity. We think we’ll start seeing many more innovative uses of mobile technology in the future as burgeoning youth population bubbles reach critical mass inside the regions you mention and others.

John Little: You have a long history of participation in the hacker community through events such as DEFCON. And lately I’ve seen the two of you discussing cyber security on Fox Business News, CBN News, Government Computer News, C-SPAN and other media outlets. Cyber has been a beltway buzzword for some time now but it seems like, especially in the political arena, the threat is often hyped or mischaracterized, while real vulnerabilities are overlooked. It drives a lot of the information security professionals I know crazy. How can we move beyond the extremes of hype and apathy to implement the kind of broad and sustained effort needed to secure our digital infrastructure?

Jon Iadonisi and Tim Newberry: This transition will be lengthy, and in many ways similar to the societal adjustment towards terrorism post-9/11. Simply put, a broad sustained effort will not be embraced until either a generational change in the political landscape or a 9/11-scale cyber event. Until then, private businesses, institutions and individual American citizens will have to hold their own. We hate to be the bearers of doom and gloom, but the fact that those inside this professional industry are more focused on the context of a word instead of the practical manifestations of that word frankly says quite a lot about how much most people in this community care about it. Towards that end, and in the context of what the “industry” deems cyber security, we’re focused on providing tools, technologies, and perspectives that will help to fill that void; hopefully enabling individuals, companies, and organizations that are taking it seriously the ability and confidence to hold their own.

John Little: I know you guys are always looking forward and you can find opportunity almost anywhere. Are there any anticipated technological/social developments on the near horizon that you’re really excited about?

Jon Iadonisi and Tim Newberry: Unfortunately, innovation is a cliched term these days. We really enjoy following the modern day Da Vincis and Edisons. People who aren’t afraid to challenge the norm and risk changing the world. For example: Salvatore Iaconesi, diagnosed with brain cancer who instead of giving up hope, coded his medical records in a structured format, enabling thousands of people to help him successfully find a cure, which he did. Stories like his remind us that computing power, when used as a tool, enables creators a chance to globally impact our world. We’ve got a couple of promising projects we’d like to launch against Leukemia, and perhaps have a chance to impact the world. Until then, all we can do is fearlessly dream, and that begins like all of our projects: on a white canvas.

Michael Ross was born in Canada and served as a soldier in a combat unit of the Israel Defence Forces prior to being recruited as a “combatant,” (a term designating a deep-cover operative tasked with working in hostile milieus) in Israel’s legendary secret intelligence service, the Mossad. In his 13 year career with the Mossad, Ross was also a case officer in Africa and South East Asia for three years, and was the Mossad’s counterterrorism liaison officer to the CIA and FBI for two-and-a-half years. Ross is a published writer and commentator on Near Eastern affairs, intelligence and terrorism. He is the author of The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists. You can follow him on Twitter.

John Little: There are a few intelligence agencies with high profile headquarters and the CIA leads the pack in that regard. Mossad facilities have a much lower profile (outside of Israel at least). Can you talk a bit about the size and scope of the Mossad’s headquarters – and the environment?

Michael Ross: I am prohibited from disclosing the Mossad’s HQ actual location but it is convenient and well-situated to meet the needs of the organization. It has a very modern (but highly secure) university campus feel about it and the grounds and gardens are quite beautifully maintained. It is a sanctuary from the greater hustle and bustle of Israel. There are even works of sculpture by some renowned artists that adorn the landscape. It is quite self-contained with indoor shooting ranges, meat and dairy dining rooms (the Mossad is “kosher”), fully equipped fitness center and an outstanding gymnasium (where I used to play inter-mural basketball).

It’s not large given the small size of the organization but it is a busy place. The parking lots start filling up early and the lights are always burning at all hours somewhere in the complex. As with any top tier intelligence service with a global footprint, It never actually goes to sleep.

Also like other services, the really interesting activity is conducted off campus where specialized units are maintained in out-stations. The Mossad is very strict about compartmentation so operational personnel do not interact with the HQ component on the main campus. I was in the Mossad for about 7-8 years before I ever set foot in the main HQ campus.

John Little: So it sounds very different from many other agencies that rotate officers in and out of HQ assignments then?

Michael Ross: Very, we have no cubicles and people can, and often do, spend their entire careers overseas until retirement. Some come back to HQ after many years overseas to take up senior management roles. There is also a population of operational personnel that live in Israel but travel to assignments all over the globe on a regular basis and for many years.

John Little: Overall, how did you feel about your interaction with HQ when in the field? Complaints about disconnects and micromanagement are common in intelligence literature. Is life in the Mossad any different?

Michael Ross: One of the great axioms of secret intelligence services is the sniping that goes on back and forth between HQ and the field and the Mossad is not immune to this side of HQ-field unit interaction. Given our flatter bureaucracy and overall size (and compartmentation) there is probably much less of it but it does exist. We have also made significant headway in divesting ourselves of the embassy station system. This makes for a more fluid (and less hierarchical) management style less conducive to counter-productive turf wars.

When I was in the field we used to think that some HQ requests were unreasonable and did not take into account the reality of our working environment. When I was in HQ, I thought some of the people in the field were high-maintenance prima donnas, so it works both ways. One of my great lessons was that HQ always has the big picture in mind so I came to realize that my quibble with some strange tasking did not always take into account the fact that what I was doing was a piece of something much, much bigger.

Our organizational culture is based on our management layers being populated by people whose resumes contain many years of operational experience in the field. If you don’t go overseas, you don’t get promoted in the Mossad. This helps mitigate any HQ-field disconnect because the people giving you taskings and orders at HQ have been there, done that, and worn the t-shirt.

John Little: Was your time at headquarters a nice change of pace or a shock to the system? I can imagine the office politics and rigidity being a bit off-putting after someone has spent many years in the field.

Michael Ross: It was actually an environment that I never really embraced nor felt comfortable with. Suddenly there were all these protocols and yes, a certain degree of rigidity to the proceedings. I was also an unknown because I came from this highly compartmented existence (people serving in the Mossad who are not members of the unit have no idea what my former operational division, “Caesarea”, does in the field). One of the hardest parts of being in HQ however, was the reduction in pay given that being in the field includes all kinda of extra allowances.

So I suddenly show up and everyone pays you a much respect because you were a combatant in the flagship unit of the Mossad but they also say, “You have no clue how things work here, so you better get up to speed and quickly.”

I also realized that all my report writing, cable communication overseas, etc. were all now to be in Hebrew. Both Hebrew and English are official languages in the Mossad meaning you can use either one, but nobody is going to use English because nobody else does. I’m fluent in the language but having been under cover for several years, did everything I could to forget it. Now I’m in a milieu where the majority of people are highly educated native Israelis and the writing and communication standards are very high. When I was in the field, I did all my reporting in English (for obvious reasons).

Luckily, I was placed in a staff officers course right after entering HQ. It’s an advanced course that people wait years to get on and I was able to jump the queue because of my time in the field. Combatants achieve rank at an accelerated pace over their peers in other operational and support divisions and so I entered HQ with the equivalent military rank of Major and left as a branch head at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel (the ranking is military equivalent as our salaries, benefits, and pension are indexed against the IDF).

It was a real education and I was able to work with some terrific people in the CIA and FBI but after 2.5 years, I could not wait to get back into the field as soon as possible. I don’t have a personality type that thrives in an overly structured environment. I also found the politics of working with the vast and Byzantine U.S. intelligence community frustrating. In retrospect I was probably better suited to working a liaison role with a country whose intelligence service has no diplomatic relations with Israel.

John Little: Were your options limited to domestic postings or liaison roles at that phase of your career? It sounds like, generally speaking, once you are called back to headquarters your operational work is done.

Michael Ross: Typically if you come from one operational division’s field component, you return to its HQ counterpart but I did something different and tossed myself into the deep end by joining a division that didn’t know me at all: The Liaison and Special Political Operations Division known as “Tevel” which is Hebrew for “World”. While liaison work seems cushy, it’s not at all and almost all my colleagues were former case officers or combatants. One of my colleagues was a deep cover combatant for many years and took part in the operation to assassinate Abu Jihad in Tunisia.

Some of my colleagues joined the HUMINT division so coming in from the field doesn’t necessarily ground you in any way. You can go back to a posting in the field almost immediately if you want.

The truth of the matter is that HQ doesn’t need more people to fill roles at the office. Support people can be hired fairly easily. What the Mossad always has in short supply are officers that can be deployed in the field under foreign cover. If you come from an operational background, there are always opportunities to go back out until you return take up a management role at HQ or retire.

John Little: So what was a typical day like for you at headquarters? Was it a constant grind of 16 hour days and layers of bureaucracy to navigate or different?

Michael Ross: It started with 05:30 wake-up to beat traffic and a 45 minute commute to the office where I’d hopefully score decent parking.

Days at work in the office started by reading cable traffic from our Washington station (always entertaining) and meetings both internally and with our liaison partners from either the local CIA station or FBI Legatt (but never at the same time!).

As the CT liaison officer to the U.S. IC, I was constantly exchanging material and data on terrorists and their targets with both agencies, but a huge part of my job was dealing with attack alerts. Israel and the U.S. are main focal points of every potential terror attack on one of our many missions, schools, and military installations worldwide. A source report of an impending attack on a U.S. target would have me coordinating the transfer of said warning to my U.S. counterpart together with our CT division and the division responsible for the source of the warning. I’d call the CIA station on the “STU” (secure telephone unit) connecting the station with Mossad HQ. Together, we’d make sure that all the relevant security functions knew about the warning, it’s viability, and any other relevant intelligence. It was a fast-paced, dynamic position where delay could cost lives. I greatly enjoyed working with my American counterparts and I think it was mutual. Beyond terror attack alerts, we worked on joint operations, exchanged delegations on many mutual subjects and basically kept the relationship on track. I especially remember the period where the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked. Not only was I involved in helping the U.S. immediately after the attacks, I represented the Mossad as part of the CIA team that captured some of the main players in Baku in 1998 (based on our intelligence provided to the CIA). That was a “full circle” moment when I realized how important and powerful liaison relationships can be between two top tier services working together.

I normally worked a 12-14 hour day, but if the terrorist attack threats were coming thick and fast (either sourced by us or from CIA sources) I’d be dealing with them at all hours. It’s ironic, but when I was living under deep cover, I got way more sleep than I did when I was working in HQ. After doing this job, was it any wonder I couldn’t wait to get back to the field?

This is about “a day” at the Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters Building. In the following piece, I will attempt to shed light on what an average day might look like for someone who is on rotation at Headquarters. Before you become disappointed, this isn’t about the Jason Bourne’s, James Bond’s or Jack Ryan’s of the intelligence world. The Central Intelligence Agency is housed on a compound in the Washington Metropolitan Area (WMA) located in the middle of some of the worst traffic areas (it gives the 405 in Los Angeles a run for its money) and most diverse populations in the country. If you are interested in a career in the National Clandestine Service, expect to spend a few years at Headquarters, which will include very long days, a never ending cycle of priorities and the joy of everyone in the area intent on playing “spot the spook” with everyone they encounter. Mix that in with a career destined to stress the family out from the inevitable home time interruptions and limited days off.

I was a Paramilitary Officer in Special Activities Division (SAD) of the National Clandestine Service (NCS). I spent all of my time in the NCS and my experience with other Directorates comes from my many interactions and projects with them. I spent some time in the Iran Operations Division, Information Operations Center, and National Resources Division but the majority of it was in SAD. Special Activities Division is an amazing place to work because, not only is it full of professional and mission focused Officers, those Officers exude the same code of ethics and camaraderie (but on a higher level since these Officers, with few exceptions, are picked from the best this country has to offer) that I missed since departing the Military. My time there was a blur of hard work, great people, constant internal/external pressure, and far more travel than I did while in the military.

The Agency houses some of the most intelligent and hard-working people, but even those premier Officers can’t escape a case of the “Mondays”. These Intel Officers attempt to protect US citizens and national interests (often times in spite of the bureaucracy that pretends to guide it) at a great personal sacrifice of personal time, social life, and public acknowledgement of their service. The truly amazing work of the CIA is as humbling as it is frustrating since you are constantly battling between effective mission completion, the Teamster style legal team that constantly looks over your shoulder, management, the ever evolving interests and focus of Congress and Senate (oversight and funding), and finance who dash your hopes of ever getting your operation off the ground if the decimal places don’t line up. The paramount responsibility is always the safety of your fellow Officers as well as that of the agents who risk their lives (and many times that of their families) to provide HUMINT in order to fill the intelligence gaps designated by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).

On any given day the random Intelligence Officer wakes up before the club crowd gets to bed so he/she can get to the office before traffic and the Agency parking lot tempts them to request a mental health day. The awe of passing through the gates of the George Bush Center of Intelligence (a unique government building and living history museum rolled into one) quickly fades when one looks for one of the few remaining parking spots in the back 40 of the immense Agency compound. After the cross country trek to your office in the bowels of the Agency’s Old (or new) Headquarters Building and finally sitting at your desk in one of the endless cube farms, a sinking feeling, that your emails and morning meetings will result in 18 to 20 hours of work that needs to be crammed into the next 8-10 hours, quickly settles in. All of this happens while prepping for your upcoming TDY. You open your email and find that while you were spending the precious few hours with your family, others were diligently typing more than 50 priority emails that require your immediate attention (aside from those patronizing – you’re a good kid – ones from the ODNI). While deep in your latest mental rant about being tasked with something that is actually handled by another office, you mentally calculate which would take longer: explaining the actual process to the one tasking you AND the office that should do it, or just doing it yourself. The meeting results in task changes to many of the items you completed yesterday and adds a few management fires which easily puts your day at about 22-24 hours of actual work, including the paperwork, constant emails and instant messages needed to clarify and re-clarify your tasks, requests, responses, trip plans, and remaining meetings. After your seventh meeting and 63rd email, you realize that you missed your window to eat lunch by 2 hours and the resultant hunger delusions make you rationalize with yourself “its ok, you can just leave early since you didn’t spend your mandated 30 minute lunch time eating”.

After grabbing something from one of the many vending machines that adorn every floor of the building, you rush off to meet with someone from another office that may have some vetting info for one of your cases. On the way there you run into an Officer from another office who needs to ask you a few questions regarding one of his cases and get your thoughts on a request he needs to route for some resources your office controls. You finally finish and get to the intended office only to see your “contact” leaving. Chasing him down is the only option so off you go until you catch up and lay out your needs. A colleague from your office catches up to you and indicates that something has come up and a meeting has been called which you need to attend. An hour later you appear with new tasking to head a planning group which in two days, can have an effective rough draft of a plan that can be briefed to senior management in case the new potential hotspot becomes an actual. This involves pulling other Officers from their schedules, requesting information on resources, planning logistics and searching for assets in a location that hasn’t been dealt with in quite some time due to its low key, low priority status from the NIE and congressional funding. It is now 5 o’clock and you realize that if you leave now, you might be able to sit down and eat while your family sits in front of their already cleared places at the dinner table but that won’t happen because your boss calls your office in for a “quick” meeting to brief the results of his meeting with the Group and Branch Chiefs.

The quick meeting lasts about 45 minutes and concludes with immediate taskers for you to reach out to the field and other Divisions in order to coordinate some changing priorities. A renewed sense of urgency drives you to jump right in because these changes relate to a case you have been working on for several months which, until now, looked to be stagnating. You finally conclude your last instant message conversation and send your last email. You log off with a sigh, a stretch and begin to walk out when you hear “have a good night” from your boss’ office. When you peek around the corner he is typing emails and checking off items on what looks to be a very long list. You then realize he is going to be there for a few more hours. You say good night and walk out the door, then past security and out into the dark. It is then that you realize it is after 8pm. Cell phones are not authorized in the building and because you were either on the phone or away from your desk basically the entire day, you have had no contact with home. As you begin the drive home, you are sure that all you will get when you try to explain why is the all too familiar rolling eyes.

Cheer up though… its only Wednesday!!!

Just to start, no I wasn’t there. I wasn’t even in DC on 30 December 2009 when Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi blew himself up taking the reported 7 Americans and 1 Jordanian and 1 Afghan with him.

I was in San Diego for the holidays, visiting family. I remember getting up and coming downstairs to make coffee for myself. Then I must have checked my phone and saw the news.

My mind raced, as I’m sure anyone whose life has been directly tied to the last 10 plus years of war does anytime news like this comes out. Who do I know OCONUS? Who can I call or text? Where can I get the most recent info? Can I get back to Langley to help in any way?

I have known of fellow agents getting injured or killed on duty. The hard part for me was this was a different kind of experience at that time. I never served in the military, so I missed that terrible experience of being just that close to something you can’t directly help or affect change upon.

I felt, and quite literally was, useless at that time. I can’t begin to imagine what those on the ground, in country and back at Langley actually felt. A few hours after I first read the news I was able to get a cryptic SMS back from a colleague who let me know that no one close had been injured or killed in the attack.

A lot has been written, mostly by fellow former Intelligence Officers who likely have years of experience on me, and as equally should know better, about what led to Balawi’s successful suicide attack that day in Khost. You can search online to see the various run downs of who was or was not following tradecraft, or who should or should not have been Chief of Station. My goal is not to try and armchair quarterback anything. Swept up in the craziness that must have been a surging tide of “what if” the Officers on the ground and back at Headquarters pushed to make that meeting happen. Sometimes you push too hard, and chances are those are the times some crazy person will try to blow you up. The term “perfect storm” comes to mind.

This being the 3rd anniversary of this terrible event, I just wanted to share what I took away from everything.

I only knew one Officer killed at Khost, very peripherally. Elizabeth Hanson was a Targeting Officer (officially titled Specialized Skills Officer – Targeting). Very simply, her job was to look for leads to piece together detailed information related to HUMINT targets of interest. I always thought of it as looking for that one piece of thread to pull, that when pulled it unraveled the whole sweater. Balawi was that piece of thread; at least that was the idea.

I went through recruitment at the Agency at a time of flux for Headquarters based officers (HBOs). In fact, I was hired as a Targeting Officer (SSO-­T), but by the time I entered on duty and drove to the back reaches of the Purple lot, I was a Headquarters Based Trainee (HBT).

Like most things in a huge bureaucracy, titles matter. Networking is hugely important in an Agency career and although it seems counter intuitive, its even more important as a headquarters based officer. I found that conversations with new acquaintances usually began with a short bio. What did you do before coming to the Agency? Where are you from? Then always ended up with: What are you? Meaning, what sort of Officer are you. Imagine the fun that could be had by knuckle-­dragging Paramilitary Officers when they ask that last question and were given the response of, “I’m an HBT”…which was followed by a quick deafened response of “HVT!” (high value target). Laughter ensued.

By now quite a few former Agency Officers have detailed recruitment and training, and have even spoken of the rotations that new officers do within headquarters. For the HBT’s, soon to be HBO’s, we did similar rotations, with a certification course related to our final job selection coming right before being home-based in an office.

As part of networking and building a so called “Hall File”, or reputation, the National Clandestine Service’s HR department (HRS) advised us to attend sponsored “brown bag” lunches. These were usually informal (if your idea of informal is crowding into a conference room, in a bad suit eating your Subway sandwich purchased at the Agency Subway counter all the while sitting next to a Group Chief who is talking about how great their office is) events that were used to introduce prospective home-­basing officers to an office, as well as share general information about an office or operation that was being talked about at length.

HRS also pushed the idea of more seasoned HBO’s creating individual mentoring groups for the Staff Operations Officers, Targeting Officers and Collection Management Officers. These were a rotating peer mentoring group that had the goal of helping new HBO’s find their way through the bureaucracy. Sometimes they helped calm nerves, or make introductions to offices of interest, or just shared stories about their jobs. From my memory, I met Elizabeth Hanson at one of these peer meetings for Targeting Officers. I only put it together after meeting one of her former certification instructors during my SOO certification. For whatever reason the Targeting Officers had the more active peer-­?mentoring group at Langley.

Elizabeth Hanson kept a small plaque with a meaningful quote on it at her desk. I know this because I had the same head instructor as her during my certification phase as a SOO. At graduation this instructor related Elizabeth’s story to us, and then tearfully gave us all the same small desk plaque with quote. She asked us to think on the quote and what it meant to us, and to live our lives and careers the way Elizabeth did hers. Its funny, the quote itself is less meaningful than the gesture through someone’s grief at losing a friend.

When onboarding with the Agency, going through initial orientation, class instructors like to try and demystify the Agency for new employees. It would seem obvious that most of us, even when approaching the job with open eyes, have bought into at least some of the romanticism and mystique that surrounds life at the CIA, especially life working under some sort of cover. Maybe it’s for that reason, romanticism, that I’ve held onto my memory of that day at graduation. I find meaning in remembering our fallen colleagues, who right or wrong, gave of their lives in pursuit of something bigger than themselves.

I’ve taken to trying to honor those fallen in some meaningful way. At this point in my Federal career, there isn’t much I can do directly. Instead I choose to think about other fallen colleagues, even those I never worked with directly. I also try and get out and do something meaningful to me. Today I’ll be out honoring the fallen nine by pushing myself through the Crossfit Hero WOD “The Seven”. I do it every year, and the plaque still sits on my desk at work. Always there to remind me what I would attempt if I had no fear of failure. Egging me on to push through the fear.

• Jennifer Lynne Matthews CIA officer, chief of base (Age 45)
• Harold Brown Jr CIA officer (Age 37)
• Elizabeth Hanson CIA officer (Age 30)
• Darren LaBonte CIA officer (Age 35)
• Scott Michael Roberson CIA officer (Age 39)
• Dane Clark Paresi Blackwater Worldwide (Xe) (Age 46)
• Jeremy Wise Blackwater Worldwide (Xe) (Age 35)
• Al Shareef Ali bin Zeid Jordanian intelligence official (Age Undisclosed)
• Arghawan Security director at the base (Age Undisclosed)

Dr. Johnson is Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at Marine Corps University’s Command and Staff College. Prior to joining the faculty in 2009, she taught at The Georgetown Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University and the School of International Service at American University. Dr. Johnson has spoken on topics related to military ethics across the services in the United States and at service schools abroad. She has published numerous articles and book chapters and is currently writing a book on emerging trends in military ethics. Her most recent work, “The Wizard of Oz Goes to War: Unmanned Systems in Counterinsurgency” is forthcoming in Strawser (ed.) Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military. You can follow her on Twitter.

John Little: Let me start by saying that Blogs of War will never knowingly be the launching point for a leak of classified information – no matter how big the scoop. I consider protection of classified information to be a patriotic duty even if one is not directly tasked with that responsibility. At the same time it is impossible to ignore the fact that anyone who discusses or studies intelligence is able to do so, in large part, because of a long history of unauthorized disclosures. Once a story drops in a major publication the damage can’t be undone or minimized. The information is distributed too quickly and too widely. Given that, what responsibility do ordinary Americans, commentators, and journalists have after the initial disclosure?

Rebecca Johnson: I agree whole-heatedly that protection of classified information is everyone’s responsibility – even those who aren’t in direct government service. American lives and missions really are at stake, and it will be a cold day in hell before I do something I know could sacrifice either. I’m not persuaded by the argument that once information is leaked it’s too late to minimize damage. That may be true, but to me, it’s irrelevant. Journalists and government sources both have their own missions and motivations for what they do. I can’t do anything about what brings classified information into the public realm. I can – and must – accept responsibility for my own actions. That means my sharing of classified information (because even if it’s leaked, it’s still classified), puts me not only on the wrong side of the law, but on the wrong side of my duty to work to make the country more secure. People know I work in national security are more likely to take what I share as actual US policy. I think I have to be more careful than analysts who aren’t related to the government or regular private citizens. They might not read a specific story in the paper, but if I share what I consider to be the ‘important bits’, then I’m highlighting the potentially most damaging elements of the leak for anyone to see. I won’t do free work for enemies of the United States. I know they’re perfectly competent to identify the damaging parts of leaks themselves, but again, I’m not responsible for them. I’m only responsible for me.

Ordinary Americans have a responsibility as well. Everyone knows (but often forget) not to telegraph troop movements. Posting on Facebook that you can’t wait to see Tommy when he gets back from Afghanistan next week may not violate federal law, but it’s not the smartest thing to do. Americans also have a responsibility to be involved and communicate their opinions to the government. Here, I would simply caution that leaked classified information by definition gives only a very small part of the picture. Taking one leak and using it to indict some facet of US policy is shortsighted and sure to be inaccurate. Here, I would encourage folks to give a story time to develop, turn to a multitude of sources from different perspectives, and keep their eyes focused on what’s really important – the strength of the country, not scoring partisan or personal points.

John Little: But patience and careful consideration are in short supply. Is there a way to introduce a common ethical framework back into this arena (as opposed to a purely legal one) when it looks like the dysfunctional relationship between media and social media exhibited in the Sandy Hook School shooting is the new norm? The notion of personal responsibility doesn’t exactly appear to be on the rise either.

Rebecca Johnson: If they’re in short supply, then it’s probably a good idea to practice more! I just don’t buy this line of argument. The people working the issues are the ones generating the classified material to begin with; they don’t magically see it for the first time once it’s leaked (very often, at least!). It’s the public — and primarily those of us who work in this area, but maybe not a specific issue directly — who want to know what’s happening on the ‘high side’ and create a lot of the churn following a leak. I am a true believer in our particular system of democratic governance but I couldn’t care less about feeding personal egos or people’s desire to be ‘in the know’. There are times when people claim disclosure is in the name of democratic transparency, but what they really mean is that it’s in the name of advancing their particular agenda or sense of personal entitlement. Anyone who’s in this business to be the center of the ‘look what I know’ universe would be better served just staring in a mirror all day. It would be far more helpful for everyone.

I see Sandy Hook differently, primarily because we’re not talking about national security and classified information. It does, however, highlight both sides of social media – important information is shared quickly and efficiently, but the impulse people (not just journalists) have to be the one who shares the information first resulted in the wrong man being accused of a horrific crime in a very public, terribly painful way. Did he find out that he was accused of mass murder on twitter before or after he learned that his brother had killed his mom and 26 other people on Facebook? That is the very real cost of social media and citizen journalism. In terms of a common ethical framework, I would suggest the following (and I’m speaking here to your basic user of social media – I’ll leave journalism ethics to the professionals):

• Sourcing in everything. If you don’t know the credibility of a source, ask before you share. If that takes you extra time, oh well. If you’re not in a position to be breaking news, it probably doesn’t matter if you’re 15 minutes behind the curve. No one will remember you weren’t first out of the box tomorrow, and it could spare you from looking like a complete jackass if you share something that turns out to be wrong.
• Ask yourself what good would come from sharing a particular piece of information. If you’re just piling on, or potentially exposing someone’s (or the country’s) vulnerability, maybe don’t RT. When big stories break there is a group dynamic that takes over that motivates people to share more than they should. If you lack the judgment and impulse control to moderate what you share on social media, then really – REALLY – take the time to practice developing that skill. It will serve you well in life.
• Remember that no one really cares what you think anyway. You honestly don’t have to vocalize every single thing you know or suspect to be true. I’m active on social media, so I won’t pretend to be immune to this temptation, but there seems to be a sense in which people use social media to feed self-importance. Folks who follow me on twitter know I tweet all sorts of irrelevant nonsense. It’s actually intentional. I ain’t all that, and chances are, you ain’t either. Get over yourself. You don’t have to share what you know. You certainly don’t have to let yourself get caught up in a story as it’s developing if you lack the skills to moderate yourself effectively. Just stop.
• Do you want to be right, or do you want to be effective? There are all sorts of baiters lurking on social media trying to draw people into saying something they shouldn’t. You don’t have to correct every knucklehead who gets a story wrong. Really. Work your issues and let stupid take care of stupid. It can be stomach churning to watch stories build in a direction I know to be wrong, but that’s life. People would do well to remember why they’re on social media to begin with and not let one-off distractions compromise their larger goals.

John Little: Lastly, do you think we are doing enough to prepare incoming public servants and soldiers with the burden that comes with having access to sensitive information in an environment that also encourages persistent personal broadcasting?

Rebecca Johnson: This is a great question. No. This is true of both PERSEC and OPSEC. Every day for a month I had Facebook recommend that I friend an individual whom I’ve never met but who serves in a Cabinet level position in the current administration. Finally I friended the individual (who — *sniff* — has yet to accept my friend request) and posted a courtesy message on my wall that whichever of my friends who knows the principal may want to have a gentle conversation about privacy settings. If this is the level of security for senior leaders, imagine the lack of preparation and accountability at more junior levels. I have found myself correcting my own students numerous times for PERSEC issues on social media, and my students are seasoned professionals.

In terms of OPSEC, most service members are pretty good at keeping quiet on things they shouldn’t discuss; here I would say the breakdown comes not in preparing people not to leak classified information, but in reminding people that there is a lot of open source material that still should not be shared – at least by them. Since DOD changed its policy on the use of social media, each of the services has adopted guidelines and operating procedures, but these tend to be communicated by Public Affairs Officers, rather than by commanders or small unit leaders. I’ve had the good fortune of working with leaders who embrace social media rather than run from it, and that definitely helps in building a culture of responsible social media engagement. Still, I know this isn’t the norm.

In the military, familiarity on the part of unit leaders with what social media is and the general common sense prudential rules for how to leverage it goes a long way to training subordinates in responsible practices. I’m not saying leaders should be monitoring their people’s twitter feeds; I’m saying that familiarity puts leaders in a better position to actually lead in this area. In civilian organizations (including DOD) where there is a mix of career public servants and political appointees, it can be harder to get everyone on the same page in terms of what’s appropriate to share. I’m less familiar with what individual agencies do to regulate social media use on the part of their employees, but I would suggest that the obligatory “these views do not represent” disclaimer people cram into their profile is not enough.

Banning or over-regulating the use of social media is obviously not the answer either; it’s a fact of life and has the ability to make us all better at what we do. For me, it comes down to responsible engagement. My boss likes to say that we have two ears and one mouth for a reason – so we will listen twice as much as we speak. When it comes to social media I’d push it even further. We have two ears, two eyes, and one mouth. We’d all do better to stay on receive mode and be judicious in when and why we shift into transmit.

For the country’s premier intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency sure seems to be airing copious amounts of laundry (fresh and dirty alike) as of late. According to press reports it’s drones, Bin Laden movies, and DCIA affairs, Oh My!

As a former Officer of both the National Clandestine Service and Directorate of Science and Technology, I cringe every time I read an article about the Agency. Usually it’s for a variety of reasons, however, lately it is over minor easily corrected journalistic errors.

Employees of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service (formerly the Directorate of Operations or Human Intelligence side of the Agency) are Officers of one sort or another. They are not agents, or operatives. They can be Operations Officers (Core Collectors is another name), the main recruiters and handlers of the actual agents. In that category are a small number of Paramilitary Operations Officers (PMOO’s), Air Operations Officers (AOO’s) and likely a few others I’ve forgot now. Alongside the deployed OO’s there are Collection Management Officers (CMO’s), also called Reports Officers.

Within the NCS there are also another group, and I admit it becomes even more confusing as the Agency itself seems to change these names on an intermittent basis. This group is the Headquarters Based Officers (HBO’s), which break down into Staff Operations Officers (SOO’s), to the variety of Specialized Skills Officers, Specialized Skills Officers – Targeting (or Targeters) and headquarters based CMO’s.

While the above may seem confusing it would seem that journalists, who’s careers are based on detailed research and analysis should be able to avoid inaccuracies by looking at a few places online. First, the CIA.gov website provides career opportunities to include a description of each and how to apply. A second option is any of the major beltway contractors that supply security clearance wielding talent to the Agency. In fact, I’ve seen more detailed descriptions of my previous positions on contractor websites than on the Agency itself (ah um).

Keep in mind that just covers a small section of the Agency. I haven’t touched on the DS&T who have Technical Operations Officers (now called Technical Intelligence Officers), Technical Targeting Officers, Engineers and a whole host of others and I won’t even begin with the Directorate of Intelligence. I guess I could wing it like so many reporters but I am not an idiot so I won’t.

To learn more about the host of job titles, responsibilities and levels of management at the agency one simply needs to check out the infamous Ishmael Jones’ memoir “The Human Factor” for that fun bit of government service. Although I take a lot of it with a grain of salt, and am not overly fond of the manner in which it was published, Jones gives a depressingly accurate portrayal of the Rubix Cube that is Agency management. This would have been an excellent primer for reference in light of the recent coverage that I’ve been reading regarding a mysterious Agency heroine that seems to have had a major role in the final tracking and removing of Osama Bin Laden.

Washington Post contributor Greg Miller writes about this Agency officer (see, its so easy! I called her what she is, an Officer. You can too yah hacks, I mean journalists!) in a December 10, 2012 article on the upcoming Zero Dark Thirty film. The main thrust of Miller’s article is about a seemingly combative Officer who followed through on a hunch about Bin Laden’s courier network, leading to his ultimate face shooting by US forces on May 2nd, 2011. Along the way it appears other Agency Officers disagreed with her insistence on couriers being the in to Bin Laden.

First, after having worked in the same Agency I find it completely plausible that this Officer was blocked and sidelined by more senior (in pay grade and likely age) Officers. Secondly, but as important as the first, I find it extremely unlikely that she was the only person that thought tracking the communication networks was a good idea. I can recall, quite clearly, this theory being referenced during recruitment and training: Tracking communication networks just makes sense.

I can’t help but smile at the Targeting Officer’s response to seeing the others named on the mass internal email about their Agency awards. Like any other office environment, the “reply all” is a common equivalent to storming out of a meeting with middle fingers raised high. Nothing says, “shove it!” like blasting everyone and their Security Officer (another group of Officers I forgot! Directorate of Support/Office of Security and hey, the CIA does actually have Agents, of the protective variety. The CIA Office of Inspector General also has agents, except their agents are “special”) with a reply all on some of the most secure (and archived) intranet servers in the nation (nothing made me laugh more than calling out with a confused “What does Conficker mean?” every time I logged onto my computer) . I would have to intuit that this was also a response to her not receiving her GS-­?14 promotion.

Yes, promotions. This is a truly secretive and mysterious bit of Agency business. It is not too often that you’ll read about CIA salaries and pay grades. Why is that? This Targeting Officer was apparently passed over for her promotion panel, which would have bumped her from a GS-­?13 to a GS-­?14. Though it seems like a minor detail, my time in the NCS showed me how an Officer’s promotion potential was directly attributed to the title next to their name. Most specifically, those Officers with anything other than OO (or CO) in their job description had one hell of a time busting through the GS-­?13 ceiling. According to another “Inglorious Amateur”, this ceiling is doubly vexing if the Officer is female. Suzanne Kelly of CNN did an interesting article related to the challenges female Officers face, serving in the Intelligence Community. This issue seems to be heating up even more in the news, thanks to a new found interest, positive or negative, in Agency based fiction.

As an example, shortly before leaving the NCS I took part in a specialty certification course which entailed a lot of writing, reporting, guiding, spooky agency stuff and practicing lock picking while listening to lectures in a conference room (it was either the lock picking or play with the toys they had on the tables to keep from dozing off) for hours. It just so happens that a 2 to 4 hour block (seemed like an eternity) of instruction on the promotion potential of a Headquarters Based Officer career track took place shortly before graduation. According to the instructor, the Director of NCS (D/NCS) detailed him to conduct a study of how many SOO’s the Agency had, and how they were being promoted through the NCS. Needless to say, the results were hysterically abysmal so much so that I distinctly remember wondering why the D/NCS would actually let this Officer give a lecture based on his findings. From the looks on my groups’ faces, it was definitely not good for morale.

Basically, he results of the study seemed to indicate that NCS SOO’s (one could extrapolate that it could incorporate all HBO’s) seemed to top out at the GS-­?13 level. Most reached this level after 5 to 7 years on the job, which the vast majority hanging out in the GS-­?12, which was reached at 2 to 3 years after onboarding. Of course the female officers seemed to have a bit of a harder time promoting to that same ceiling. The Officer told us that the best it seemed we could hope for would be to aspire to become a Deputy Branch Chief. It is hard to express exactly what this means without going into detail on the structure of the Divisions and Centers in the NCS, but let’s just say it’s a bit like telling Dwight Schrute (of The Office TV show) that he will never move past his position of Assistant to the Branch Chief (hell its almost the same thing, actually!).

We also learned that no HBO’s had made Group Chief, Chief of Station, and there were no HBO’s represented in the Senior Intelligence Service (SIS, executive level employees, or, the Mandarins that Ishmael Jones refers to in his book).

The NCS is an organization run primarily by Operations Officers. It’s apparent, from day one that OO’s are held in higher regard. If for no other reason than the vast majority of those running the NCS are OO’s, or some other Officer that has been through “The Farm” or otherwise “Ops Certified”. They hold themselves in higher regard because of their title; it seems, regardless of their production or work product under said title. The NCS has also created the HBO type positions based on an antiquated need to find jobs for Operations Officers who would not or could not return to the field. These HBO positions appear to have also come into being because of a need to find jobs for Agency spouses. There were at least two spouses turned Targeting Officers in my orientation class when I started. I also got a nice lecture from an Agency spouse turned HRS (or Human Resources) Officer about finding my wife a suitable job doing administrative work when I went looking for advice on how to make our recent move to DC work. Pay no mind to the fact that my wife had a very successful job in the tech industry, making more money than I did as an Agency HBO!

All that said, I give a big thumbs up to this Targeting Officer. A big thumbs down to lazy journalists and film directors (yes, I’m talking to you Katheryn Bigelow! I saw the preview for the movie referring to the heroine as an Analyst). I find it sad that so much is made over this movie when, as Agency Officers we drudge on knowing we face a disingenuous society and a media that shows nothing but contempt for those that attempt to ensure their right to free speech. At least care enough to get our job titles right when you are trying to expose our identities and drag our patriotism through the mud.

10. Ramadan Shallah: Leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. His low ranking is because he’s a weak terrorist leader but still has plenty of blood on his petite doll-like hands.

9. Samir Kuntar: Druze member of the PLF in Lebanon who murdered an Israeli policeman, Eliyahu Shahar, 31 year-old Danny Haran, and Haran’s 4-year-old daughter, Einat Haran, whom he killed with blunt force against a rock and for indirectly causing the death of two-year-old Yael Haran by suffocation, as her mother tried to quiet her crying while hiding from Kuntar. In November 2008, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad presented Kuntar with Syria’s highest medal.

8. Mahmoud al-Zahar: Founding father of HAMAS and considered a hard line hawk, even by HAMAS’ standards

7. Mohammed Deif: Commander of HAMAS’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. That’s reason enough.

6. Ali Moussa al-Daduq: Senior Hezbollah advisor captured in Iraq while acting on Iran’s behalf and responsible for the killing of U.S. military personnel in southern Iraq.

5. Ahmed Abu Khattala: Leader of the Benghazi-based Ansar al-Sharia group closely involved in the September 11 assault that killed four Americans including ambassador Christopher Stevens.

4. Hassan Nasrallah: “Secretary-General” of Hezbollah.

3. Hamid Arabnejad: Managing-Director of Mahan Air, the Iranian regime’s airline tasked with ferrying weapons/explosives, IRGC-QF personnel, and mayhem all over the world.

2. Qassam Soleimani: Head of Iran’s IRGC-QF. That’s more than enough reason.

1. Bashar al-Assad: How many lives could have been saved by rubbing out this man Christopher Hitchens once famously dubbed, “The human toothbrush”. Sic Semper Tyrannus.

Michael Ross was born in Canada and served as a soldier in a combat unit of the Israel Defence Forces prior to being recruited as a “combatant,” (a term designating a deep-cover operative tasked with working in hostile milieus) in Israel’s legendary secret intelligence service, the Mossad. In his 13 year career with the Mossad, Ross was also a case officer in Africa and South East Asia for three years, and was the Mossad’s counterterrorism liaison officer to the CIA and FBI for two-and-a-half years. Ross is a published writer and commentator on Near Eastern affairs, intelligence and terrorism. He is the author of The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists. You can follow him on Twitter.

Common topics such as the drunkenness of locals, religious hypocrisy and the persecution of women entertained and, at times, enraged citizens. Yet, despite the provocative nature of the typeset, there was no reflex towards violence or calls for assassinations.

However ridiculous or blasphemous the content was, Western civilization had accepted that a single citizen’s viewpoint was their opinion, with no logical or cognitive association to that of a state or nation.

Now nearly 300 years later, YouTube has replaced Poor Richard’s Almanac and readership is counted in terms of millions, versus merely thousands. Most recently, YouTube and, specifically, the content that resides in this domain, has been cited as a critical catalyst for global unrest. The modern penname equivalent of Silence Dogood is Sam Bacile, and his blasphemous parody on religion have enraged viewers today, just as his ancestor, Silence Dogood, achieved three centuries earlier, except without violence.

Ostensibly, US public policy and national security as it relates to the digital domain seems to be relegated to the ranks of page views and viral video growth — a serious oversight. The justification proclaimed by citizens of our alleged allies for their killing of four innocent US citizens and patriots in Beghazi, Libya initially was said to be directly linked to a video they didn’t create, promote and, most likely, didn’t even know about. Said justification has yet to be publicly refuted by any of our ‘allied’ nations, though they continue to enjoy annual US tax payer contributions.

Such silence is in contrast to the tens of thousands of comments not only condemning the video, but also the violence. Recent analytics illustrate segmentation and demographics reflecting an obvious preponderance to Middle Eastern countries, with primacy towards the 45-55 year-old age groups — an age group hopefully reflective of the wisdom and civility to teach their future generations that violence isn’t the answer to someone’s opinion, however distasteful or blasphemous. Otherwise, as a civilization, we’ve retrograded to a population well before Silence Dogood’s time.

As Americans, we are challenged with managing the global reflex of a fourteen minute video, while protecting religious expression and first amendment rights. Chiefly, we must understand why certain elements of our allied citizenry elect to deprecate the very understanding of civility. Is violence the new reflex? Secondly, as Americans, we must determine the impacts and protection of the first amendment as it applies to the online environment.

The Internet has been the fastest adoptive technology since man created fire, evolving from an experiment into a critical component of society. Yet, we are idle in thought, reaction and ideas towards this increasing and repetitive lifeline of society.

Instead of focusing on blocking viewers in certain geographies or removing videos from YouTube that both are largely pointless based on the proliferation and endless reach of this domain, why don’t we strategically seek to understand the timing of events that led a foolish video that was made public in June to cause unrest around the 11th anniversary of 9/11, three full months later — metaphorically a lifetime in this dynamic digital world. Only after we understand, can we hold people accountable.

Jon Iadonisi is the founder of White Canvas Group, a company that specializes in cultivating alternative and disruptive strategies. Iadonisi’s depth of experience, diversified expertise and unique operational background has provided a perspective that has enabled him to contribute to solving national security problems. He spent the past fifteen years using innovative computing technologies coupled with cutting edge scholarship to solve complex problems, some of which later became implemented as new strategies and capabilities for the US government.

Iadonisi is regularly sought by the Department of Defense, various intelligence agencies and members of Congress to provide expert opinion and briefings on information age unconventional warfare. Prior to joining the private sector, Iadonisi served as a Navy SEAL, where he designed, planned and led various combat operations that integrated innovative technologies and tactics into the operating environment, ultimately creating new capabilities for the Special Operations Community and CIA. He is a combat-wounded and decorated veteran who earned a BS in Computer Science from the US Naval Academy and MS in Homeland Security from San Diego State University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and guest lectures at San Diego State University and Georgetown Law School.

John Little: It seems rather obvious but contacting a stranger on the Internet, especially one not connected to the intelligence community, in an attempt to launch a spying career exposes potential applicants to quite a bit of risk doesn’t it? I usually point people in the direction of an official recruiting site such as http://www.intelligence.gov/careers-in-intelligence/ or http://www.intelligence.gov/careers-in-intelligence/types-of-opportunities/for-students.html if they express interest but I have often been troubled by how much they reveal in their direct messages or emails. How do you deal with people who, misguided or not, want to join the Mossad? As a Canadian citizen that is a sensitive topic is it not?

Michael Ross: I receive innocent queries from people on a fairly regular basis enquiring how they can join the Mossad. In fact, I recently corresponded with a well-meaning person who informed me that their renowned skate-boarding prowess allowed them to travel to all manner of exotic locales. You have to admit that a skateboarder appearing at the gates of Fordow would certainly be the most original approach the Iranians had ever encountered however, gaining access to a target by skateboard is the least important of things to consider when setting out on the career path of professional espionage. I think people who want to be spies should set out by exercising some initiative in finding out what they can through open sources first before furtively approaching me on Twitter or via an email.

My first question when someone approaches me is what is their citizenship? If they are an Israeli citizen then I have no problem directing them to the Mossad’s website at: http://www.mossad.gov.il/Eng/AboutUs.aspx. If they are citizens of other countries, I politely advise them that it’s not a good idea to offer one’s services to another country’s intelligence service regardless how closely the countries are allied – unless you are in fact – a citizen of that country. If the person approaching me is a U.S. citizen, I direct them to the plethora of intelligence agencies that are available to the American citizen. U.S. citizens are spoiled for choice in this realm.

I think people have been conditioned by Hollywood to believe that spies can be stateless soldiers of fortune and so long as they’re fighting terrorists, details about nationality and allegiance are not that important in the scheme of things. I have to often explain that while we share many worthy goals, intelligence services pursue differing agendas that are driven by national security priorities specific to their government. For a long period of time, the Mossad had a very difficult time convincing the British SIS that Hezbollah was more than just a localized threat to Israel. Likewise when on rare occasion they approached us concerning a matter involving IRA terrorist activity. Turkey couldn’t understand why the PKK wasn’t top of the counter-terrorism agenda for everyone else. You can see through these examples that while we’re all countering terrorism, national security priorities do not always align 100% between allies.

In my own case, I lived for a long time in Israel, served in the IDF, became fluent in Hebrew, and spent some years going native before I was even considered for recruitment. While national security priorities differed between Canada and Israel, I never once felt that I was straying into a grey zone that would put me in a moral conflict with my Canadian citizenship.

I encourage people interested in pursuing a career in the intelligence milieu to do their homework. Official websites offer a great deal of useful information about how to apply and what criteria they are specifically looking for in a potential candidate. If you approach me without doing all that initial research, I’ll tell you that by first coming to me, the message you’re sending is that you’re probably not cut out for this business.

John Little: And what would you say to those aspiring CIA/Mossad officers about their communication and personal security practices in that period leading up to potential employment? It’s never too early to practice discretion is it?

Michael Ross: Well, first of all, if you write me asking how to join the Mossad and your IP address shows you live in Dahieh, then you’re either suicidal or think I’m asleep at the wheel. Either way, people should be aware that computers are the most insecure devices ever conceived by man and users should bear that in mind when using electronic communication.

For anyone interested in joining an intelligence service – regardless of which – it’s best to do the research and then keep your intentions to yourself. One thing that is highly valued in a candidate for recruitment is an innate sense of discretion. During the course of your being assessed as a candidate to work for an intelligence service, questions will be asked about with whom you’ve been communicating your intentions. When it comes out (and it will) that you’ve been emailing far and wide, it’s going to indicate to your perspective employer that you’re clearly not the right stuff.

As for social media, having pictures of yourself engaged in any type of indiscreet activity or participating in online behavior that can be translated as even mildly compromising, isn’t going to help your case. Let the sentiment behind the saying, “discretion is the better part of valour” be your guide.

Other Discussions with Michael Ross
A Gentle Reminder About Security and Social Media for Security Cleared Professionals

Yesterday afternoon, I went to the White House and asked the President to be allowed, for personal reasons, to resign from my position as D/CIA. After being married for over 37 years, I showed extremely poor judgment by engaging in an extramarital affair. Such behavior is unacceptable, both as a husband and as the leader of an organization such as ours. This afternoon, the President graciously accepted my resignation.

As I depart Langley, I want you to know that it has been the greatest of privileges to have served with you, the officers of our Nation’s Silent Service, a work force that is truly exceptional in every regard. Indeed, you did extraordinary work on a host of critical missions during my time as director, and I am deeply grateful to you for that.

Teddy Roosevelt once observed that life’s greatest gift is the opportunity to work hard at work worth doing. I will always treasure my opportunity to have done that with you and I will always regret the circumstances that brought that work with you to an end.

Thank you for your extraordinary service to our country, and best wishes for continued success in the important endeavors that lie ahead for our country and our Agency.

With admiration and appreciation,

David H. Petraeus

Of course an extramarital affair is a legitimate reason for a leader in the intelligence community to step down but this comes at a time of incredible tension both within the intelligence community and between the various players involved in the Benghazi incident.

 
So is there more to this story? You bet. But the details will likely fall short of the elaborate conspiracy theories that are flooding social media at the moment. Well, that’s a given. Much more will follow as the media searches for the story behind the story.

Once again we’ll be watching to see how the balance of power shakes out within the intelligence community, how the defense intelligence establishment responds (there’s blood in the water…), and where the agency goes from here. At this moment there is only uncertainty.

I’ve modified the Petraeus Monitor at Covert Contact to track this event. I have also added a monitor for Acting Director Michael Morell highly recommend it if you want to watch this story play out in real-time over the next few weeks.

Iran defense minister confirms Hezbollah drone was Iranian
“Whatever we have at our disposal will be used at the proper time in defending the Muslim community and Islamic territories and that’s natural,” Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said on Sunday adding, “Given the Zionist regime’s frequent incursions into the Lebanese airspace, we see it as the natural right of Lebanon’s Hezbollah to fly its drone above the Occupied Territories.” The minister added that the flight of the Hezbollah drone proved the weakness of the Jewish entity’s iron dome. “The so-called iron dome of the Zionist regime’s defense space collapsed by this action and it became clear that the Zionist regime could not be safe from the fury of the Muslim community,” Vahidi said.”

Former Lebanese PM: UAV not a state decision
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said that the Hezbollah-dispatched unmanned aerial vehicle that flew over Israel was sent at Iran’s behest, and was not a Lebanese decision, a statement issued by Siniora’s press office said on Sunday. “Sending the drone over Israel is not a Lebanese decision, however the move was made at an Iranian behest. Such act needs techniques only available in Iran,” Lebanese news site The Daily Star quoted Siniora as telling his visitors at his Sidon’s office.

Israel unveils enhanced drone
As part of Sunday’s showcase, held in central Israel, the Shoval drone flew towards the sea and identified a commercial vessel on the Mediterranean, dozens of kilometers away from Israeli shores. Live footage displayed in HD quality on the control screens showed foreign reporters virtually every detail on the ship, including its Japanese flag, the name on its front and the sailors walking on board. The drone can also identify aircraft flying over the sea and determine whether they are suspicious. Its radar, which has a 300km (190 mile) range, can reach as far as Cyprus, Turkey and Egypt. “The system can inquire and intercept any object within just a few minutes,” a senior IAI official said. The UAV weighs 1,200 kilograms (2,645 pounds) and can carry 256 kilograms (565 pounds) in surveillance cargo. “The Shoval has satellite communication abilities, which means any footage it takes will be broadcasted online to distant location like Paris. This capability allows it to operate during bad weather, in which case it will fly under cloud height and will not be affected by the rain,” the official said.

Iran to Use New Drone for Air Defense, Bombing Missions
A senior Iranian military commander said that the country’s newly unveiled Haazem (Determination) drones are multi-purpose and multi-range vehicles with air-defense, reconnaissance and aerial bombardment capabilities. Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base Brigadier General Farzad Esmayeeli stressed that Iran’s defense industries enjoy a high capability in designing and producing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and stated that Haazem is a drone designed and manufactured by Iranian air defense experts in three short, mid and long range models and for air defense missions. He said that the drone can be used as a target for air defense systems and also for reconnaissance missions. Esmayeeli said the UAV can also be equipped with missiles and used for aerial bombardments as well.

Hezbollah drone photographed secret IDF bases
The Hezbollah drone that infiltrated the Negev last week beamed back live images of secret Israeli military bases, the Sunday Times reported on Sunday. According to the report, the drone was airborne for three hours before being intercepted by an F-16I jet. It is believed to have transmitted pictures of preparations for Israel’s joint military exercise with the US, as well as ballistic missile sites, airfields and, perhaps, the nuclear reactor in Dimona, the Sunday Times reported.

Israel terrified by outlook of future Iran, Hezbollah combat UAVs: Analyst
“The fear of Israelis is that these UAVs, Iran or Hezbollah can develop them to become combat UAVs meaning [having] the capability of launching missiles or themselves being used as guided missiles against targets in Israel. So personally, I think we will see it more in any future conflict between Hezbollah and Israel,” CEO and founder of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), Riad Kahwaji said in a Press TV interview.

Israel’s IAI wins $958M India drone deal
Israel Aerospace Industries, flagship of the Jewish state’s defense sector, is reported to have secured a $958 million contract from India’s military to upgrade its IAI-built Heron and Searcher unmanned aerial vehicles. UAVs are one of the biggest money-spinners for Israel’s defense industry and India, which is engaged in a massive multiyear rearmament program, is a key customer. Israel’s Globes business daily cited Indian media reports that the deal covers some 150 UAVs acquired from IAI since the 1990s that are operated by India’s army, air force and navy.

South Korea’s Kamikaze UAV Could Scare the Ojom Out of Kim Jong-un
South Korea’s aptly named the Devil Killer fits that bill; it’s a portable kamikaze UAV currently under development by Korea Aerospace Industries in conjunction with Konkuk and Hanyang Universities. It measures five feet in length and weighs approximately 55 pounds. When unfolded, its boasts a four foot wingspan. The Devil Killer will be powered by an electric motor and reportedly reach speeds in excess of 250 MPH, allowing it to strike North Korean targets up to 25 miles away in just 10 minutes.

Photo: Lockheed Martin Cormorant

Mistakes can be forgiven but covering them up, especially when your excuse changes from day to day, points to a much larger problem:

Michael Hayden, former CIA director, and Michael Chertoff, who served as Homeland Security chief, hit out after Biden stunned many in the intelligence community by insisting that the U.S. consulate in Benghazi did not ask for additional security before it was attacked on September 11 – directly contradicting what security officials and diplomats have testified under oath.

The tough joint statement was issued via the Romney campaign. In it they added: ‘Blaming those who put their lives on the line is not the kind of leadership this country needs.’

‘During the Vice Presidential debate, we were disappointed to see Vice President Biden blame the intelligence community for the inconsistent and shifting response of the Obama Administration to the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,’ they said in the statement.

‘Given what has emerged publicly about the intelligence available before, during, and after the September 11 attack, it is clear that any failure was not on the part of the intelligence community, but on the part of White House decision-makers who should have listened to, and acted on, available intelligence. Blaming those who put their lives on the line is not the kind of leadership this country needs.’

There may be layers of failure contributing to this incident but the response from the White House is appalling. It’s not just that they have demonstrated the wrong kind of leadership. They haven’t demonstrated any leadership at all. And then there are the hints (I’m being generous) of ethical and moral failings permeating the entire affair. That is not forgivable.

With the State Department backtracking on its story, disturbing and shameful background details on the security situation continuing to emerge, and hearings on “The Security Failures of Benghazi” being held today there is going to be a flood of commentary and information on Twitter.

Fortunately, I’ve created a monitor for these issues on Covert Contact. These monitors usually require a small subscription fee but this is a critical issue and I want to help as many people follow it as possible. Just click on the start button below to launch the monitor.

It’s an impressive bit of video but little is known about the drone or its origins:

From the moment that it was identified, a squadron of F-16I fighter jets were scrambled from the Ramon airbase in the Negev, and accompanied the UAV. The air force was able to shoot down the UAV at any time, but chose to fly along with it for several minutes. For safety reasons, the air force took a decision to shoot down the UAV over the northern Negev.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz received real-time updates throughout the incident, the IDF said.

IDF ground forces collected the fragments and were analyzing them.The IDF did not believe that the UAV was on an attack mission, but rather sent to gather intelligence. There were no explosives attached to the air craft, and it did not originate in the Gaza Strip, contrary to Palestinian reports.

It remains unclear where the UAV took off from.

While facts are hard to come by at the moment speculation is tightly focused on Lebanon, Hezbollah, and of course Iran. And it should be. Miri Regev, a former IDF spokeswoman, quickly offered her thoughts on her Facebook page:

This may have been something like Hezbollah’s Mirsad-1 but I haven’t seen any mention of that specific platform. It would be helpful if there was a less destructive way to take these out of the sky so they could be analyzed. The giant fireball of death brought forth by the IDF is cool and all but it probably doesn’t leave much to look at.

Anyway, is going to be a increasingly common challenge for Israel. There are plenty of state sponsored bad actors who can get within drone distance of their territory and that problem isn’t going away. However, this technology is getting cheaper and more accessible by the minute. State sponsorship or particularly deep pockets are not required to build a moderately capable UAV and it is getting easier and cheaper with each passing day. Building and deploying weaponized UAVs poses an even greater challenge but advancing technology continues to boost the killing power of the individual and so that too will get easier and more common.

Still, DIY ISR and weapon delivery platforms are likely to remain just an annoyance for some time. The value of the intelligence they generate is questionable at best. And if the aim is to kill or destroy the impact will be minimal unless someone gets extremely creative with the payload. In most cases these platforms are more likely to benefit conventional forces, rather than non-state actors, who can deploy them with greater frequency and effectiveness.

Ouch. This is a bad leak. j.mp/QottON The Détente is quickly disintegrating.

— Robert Caruso (@robertcaruso) October 2, 2012

I was able to streamline much of the production and account maintenance processes and requests are coming in for custom monitors. This means that I am able to restructure the subscription system and slash prices. So starting this week the three-tiered plan system is gone. All subscribers now have Covert Contact Pro level features and the price, which was $99 a month, has been slashed to only $10 per month. That is an amazingly low price for over 350 international relations, political, and national security live streams. I’m constantly fine tuning the streams and adding more as news breaks. To keep up with developments follow Covert Contact on Twitter or the Covert Contact blog.

This is an exciting change and not one that I thought I would be able to make so quickly. This gets Covert Contact as close to being “free” as possible and hopefully back into the hands of many observers. I hope you will give it a look and subscribe.

The entire ThreatStream project is spinning off into it’s own entity called Covert Contact. This new framework will offer a more robust set of tools and support via three affordable levels of service to subscribers. The entire ThreatStream code base is being re-developed to support this.

Even the most basic Covert Contact plan will offer coverage of dozens of countries and topics with more advanced (although still very affordable) plans offering a deeper dive into issues and more advanced support. I’ve heard from everyone from students, to journalists, to intelligence professionals and the new plans were constructed (and priced) with those kinds of needs in mind. Covert Contact will offer the features intelligence, military, and government professionals value while still being accessible to students and individuals on a budget.

Organizations have also contacted me with requests for custom or self-hosted monitors. Covert Contact will offer a fast, easy, and very affordable mechanism for making this happen – especially during breaking events. Details and pricing will be available when Covert Contact launches – hopefully in about one week. Until then, follow Covert Contact on Twitter or drop me a note if you have additional questions.

Here’s a sneak peek at the new site as it’s under development:

 
Thank you for your continued patience and support!