So Michael Ross and I were comparing craft beer selections on Twitter when @wesko suggested that we develop some spy-related beer names. I’ve compiled some of the initial contributions below but I suspect there many more ideas out there. Take a shot in the comments section or weigh in on Twitter – just tag your tweet with #SpyBeer.

@milaficent
Winning Hops and Minds
Drone Dunkel
Shining Path Pale Ale
Osama bin Lager (@milaficent, @wesko and @WarfareCenter suggested following this with 2 shots and a splash of water)
KGB Brown Ale
La Carre Lager
Smiley’s Pilsner
Hunt for Red Oktoberfest
The Stout of All Fears
Tailor Traditional Ale
Tinker Triple
Poorman Porter
Beggarman Bock
The Circus Cider
Jack Rye-an

@mrossletters
Dead Drop Draught
Case Officer Ale
Tinker, Tailer, Soldier, Brewer
The Spy Who Came in for a Cold One
Tenent’s Slam Drunk
The Honourable Brewboy

@wesko
(Passed) Polygraph Pale Ale
Waterboard Winter Bock
Honey Trap Summer Brew
Pink Bunny Porter
(Chocolate) Porter Goss
No Such Ale
Cofer Bock
Cyanide Pils
Honey Trappist Ale

@blogsofwar
Underwear Bomber Double IPA
Swallow Imperial Russian Stout
The Fall of Saison
Church Committee Bitter Ale
Stansfield Turner Non-Alcoholic Beer
Blonde, James Blond
Mead to Know
FSB ESB
Anna Chapman Spicy Red Lager (average beer but great label art)
Malty Hari
Sella Artois
O’Keg Kalugin
Charlie Wilson’s Beer
Licensed to Chill

@WarfareCenter
Cloak and Lager
Black Hops

@chrisargyris
HOPPSEC
Qods Light

@forbesmm
Dubbel Agent
Black Site & Tan
Hellfire Hefeweizen
Langley Lager
The Farm-house Ale
Tradecraft Tripel
NCS (National Clandestine Stout)
Pale Analyst Ale
JSOC Doppelbock
Bourne Barleywine
Mossad Märzen

@Dalton_NC
NOC Bock
Honey Pot Porter

@robertcaruso
Hertford Hoegarten
(Camp) Stanley Stout

@JGoldOrlando
L Pill-sner
In the Black & Tan
Safe-House Ale
The Man with the Golden Ale

@ufridman
Double-Tap 22 Pilsner

@meekwire
Gitmogarten
Hescoweizen

@El_Grillo1
Anarchist Black Bock
Ennis Ale
NSAle
Urquell-170 Strealth Drone Pils
Ale-Qaeda
No One Leffe Behind
DoubleTap
HezbolLager
Toby Esterhase’s LampLITEr Pale Ale
K.arla’s G.olden B.ier
Pils Haydon
Wet Hops
Dubbel Barrel

@webradius
Langley Lambic
Pilsner Palace
G’lilot Golden Ale

@SeamusBellamy
Covert Hops
Tinker, Tailor, Brewmaster, Spy.

@quartusoptio
TQGROWLER/9

@zivjeli
Benedict Arnold Pale Ale
Double Agent Cider
UAV – Ultra Amber + Vermouth
Provocateur Pils
ConfidentiAle

I’ve made the English translation PDFs and brief summary analysis of the documents available below. Full credit for the summaries goes to the report authors Don Rassler, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Liam Collins, Muhammad al-Obaidi, Nelly Lahoud – and of course the fine people who, at great risk, originally collected the intelligence.

SOCOM-2012-0000003
This letter was authored by Usama bin Ladin and addressed to Shaykh Mahmud (`Atiyya Abdul Rahman) on 27 August 2010. Mahmud is specifically directed to tell “Basir,” who is Nasir al-Wuhayshi (Abu Basir), the leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, to remain in his role (presumably in response to a request from Abu Basir that Anwar al-`Awlaqi take his position), and for him to send “us a detailed and lengthy” version of al-`Awlaqi’s resume. `Atiyya is also told to ask Basir and Anwar al-`Awlaqi for their “vision in detail about the situation” in Yemen. References are also made in the letter to the 2010 floods in Pakistan, a letter from Bin Ladin’s son Khalid to `Abd al-Latif, al-Qa`ida’s media plan for the 9/11 anniversary, and the need for the “brothers coming from Iran” to be placed in safe locations.

SOCOM-2012-0000004
This document is a letter authored by the American al-Qa`ida spokesman Adam Gadahn to an unknown recipient and was written in late January 2011. In the first part of the document Gadahn provides strategic advice regarding al-Qa`ida’s media plans for the tenth anniversary of 9/11. The letter is in essence a response to many of the requests/queries that Bin Ladin makes in his letter to `Atiyya dated October 2010 (SOCOM-2012-0000015), particularly those concerning a media strategy for the ten-year anniversary of 9/11. In other parts of the document Gadahn incisively criticizes the tactics and targeting calculus of the Islamic State of Iraq (AQI/ISI) and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP); he strongly advocates for al-Qa`ida to publicly dissociate itself from both groups. The document concludes with a draft statement, which provides a candid assessment of these issues.

SOCOM-2012-0000005
This document is a letter dated 7 August 2010 from “Zamarai” (Usama bin Ladin) to Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin, which merged with al-Qa`ida after Bin Ladin’s death. The document is a response to a letter Bin Ladin received from al-Zubayr in which he requested formal unity with al-Qa`ida and either consulted Bin Ladin on the question of declaring an Islamic state in Somalia or informed him that he was about to declare one. In Bin Ladin’s response, he politely declines al-Shabab’s request for formal unity with al-Qa`ida.

SOCOM-2012-0000006
This document is a letter believed to have been composed in December 2010 and its content relates to SOCOM-2012-0000005. The letter is addressed to Azmarai, perhaps a typo or misspelling of the nickname Zamarai (a nickname or kunya for Bin Ladin). While the identity of the author is unclear, the familiar tone and implicit critique of Bin Ladin’s policy vis-a-vis al-Shabab suggest that this is from a high ranking personality, possibly Ayman al-Zawahiri. Referring to “our friend’s letter” and the perspective of the “brothers…[who might have been] too concerned about inflating the size and growth of al-Qa`ida,” the author of the document urges the receiver to “reconsider your opinion not to declare the accession [i.e. formal merger] of the brothers of Somalia…” This is clearly a reference to al-Qa`ida’s potential merger with al-Shabab and suggests that al-Qa`ida’s relationship with the “affiliates” is a subject of internal debate. If indeed the author of the letter is Ayman al-Zawahiri this could be an indication of a major fissure over a key strategic question at the pinnacle of the organization (for different interpretations of this letter, see Appendix of “Letters from Abbottabad”).

SOCOM-2012-0000007
This letter is authored by Mahmud al-Hasan (`Atiyya) and Abu Yahya al-Libi and addressed to the amir of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hakimullah Mahsud. It is dated 3 December 2010 and is sharply critical of the ideology and tactics of the TTP. The letter makes it clear that al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders had serious concerns about the TTP’s trajectory inside Pakistan, and the impact the group’s misguided operations might have on al-Qa`ida and other militant groups in the region. The authors identify several errors committed by the group, specifically Hakimullah Mahsud’s arrogation of privileges and positions beyond what was appropriate as the TTP’s amir; the TTP’s use of indiscriminate violence and killing of Muslim civilians; and the group’s use of kidnapping. `Atiyya and al-Libi also take issue with Mahsud labeling al-Qa`ida members as “guests” and the attempts made by other groups (presumably the TTP) to siphon off al-Qa`ida members. The authors threaten that if actions are not taken to correct these mistakes, “we shall be forced to take public and firm legal steps from our side.”

SOCOM-2012-0000008
This letter was originally an exchange between Jaysh al-Islam and `Atiyya that was forwarded first to a certain `Abd al-Hamid (and presumably to Bin Ladin later). The gist of Jaysh al-Islam’s letter makes it known that the group is in need of financial assistance “to support jihad,” and that the group is seeking `Atiyya’s legal advice on three matters: 1) the permissibility of accepting financial assistance from other militant Palestinian groups (e.g., Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad); 2) the permissibility of investing funds in the stock market in support of jihad; and 3) the permissibility of striking or killing drug traffickers in order to use their money, and even drugs, to lure their enemies who could in turn be used by Jaysh al-Islam as double-agents. `Atiyya’s response, written sometime between 24 October 2006 and 22 November 2006, is cordial but distant, responding to the questions but refraining from giving any strategic advice.

SOCOM-2012-0000009
This document is part of a longer letter which was not released to the CTC. It is not clear who authored the letter or to whom it was addressed. It discusses the potential need to change the name of “Qa`idat al-Jihad.” The author is of the view that the abridging of the name “al-Qa`ida” has “lessened Muslims’ feelings that we belong to them.” The author is further concerned that since the name “al-Qa`ida” lacks religious connotations, it has allowed the United States to launch a war on “al-Qa`ida” without offending Muslims. The author proposed a list of new names that capture Islamic theological themes: Ta’ifat al-tawhid wa-al-jihad (Monotheism and Jihad Group), Jama`at wahdat al-Muslimin (Muslim Unity Group), Hizb tawhid al-Umma al-Islamiyya (Islamic Nation Unification Party) and Jama`at tahrir al-aqsa (Al-Aqsa Liberation Group).

SOCOM-2012-0000010
This letter is authored by “Abu `Abdallah” (Usama bin Ladin), addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) and dated 26 April 2011 – a week before bin Ladin’s death. In it, Bin Ladin outlines his response to the “Arab Spring,” proposing two different strategies. The first strategy pertains to the Arab World and entails “inciting people who have not yet revolted and exhort[ing] them to rebel against the rulers (khuruj ‘ala al-hukkam)”; the second strategy concerns Afghanistan and it entails continuing to evoke the obligation of jihad there. The letter also makes reference to a wide variety of topics including: the scarcity of communications from Iraq, “the brothers coming from Iran,” and hostages held by “our brothers in the Islamic Maghreb” and in Somalia. The document also briefly discusses Bin Ladin’s sons, his courier, Shaykh Abu Muhammad (Ayman al-Zawahiri), and other individuals of interest.

SOCOM-2012-0000011
This letter, dated 28 March 2007, is addressed to a legal scholar by the name of Hafiz Sultan, and it is authored by someone who is of Egyptian origin. The author makes it explicit that he was alarmed by al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s conduct and he urges Sultan to write to that group’s leaders to correct their ways. The author also asks for legal guidance on the use of chlorine gas, which he appears not to support. A reference is also made to “the brothers in Lebanon” and the need to arrange “to have one of their representatives visit us in the near future.” A message from the “brothers in Algeria” is also included.

SOCOM-2012-0000012
This letter dated 11 June 2009 was written by `Atiyya to the “honorable shaykh.” It is possible that it was addressed to Usama bin Ladin, but it may have been addressed to another senior leader. The majority of the letter provides details on the release of detained jihadi “brothers” and their families from Iran and an indication that more are expected to be released, including Bin Ladin’s family. It seems that their release was partially in response to covert operations by al-Qa`ida against Iran and its interests.

SOCOM-2012-0000013
This is a draft that formed the basis of a publicly available document, part four in a series of statements that Ayman al-Zawahiri released in response to the “Arab Spring.” Through the document one can observe al-Qa`ida’s editing process (reflected in the editor’s comments highlighted in green and in a bold font). While it is not clear if Bin Ladin himself did the editing, whoever did so has solid grammatical foundations and prefers a more self-effacing writing style than al-Zawahiri. The edits were not included in al-Zawahiri’s final speech which was released in a video on 4 March 2011 on jihadi forums. Of the 12 proposed corrections only one appears in al-Zawahiri’s speech.

SOCOM-2012-0000014
This document consists of two letters addressed to “Abu `Abd-al-Rahman,” almost certainly `Atiyya `Abd al-Rahman. It was sent by an operative who knows `Atiyya and is a religious student with ties to the senior shaykhs and clerics in Saudi Arabia. While the letters are not dated, their contents suggest they were composed soon after January 2007; they read very much like an intelligence assessment, designed to provide `Atiyya with some perspective on how al-Qa`ida generally, and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) more specifically, are perceived amongst Saudi scholars of varying degrees of prominence. The author provides `Atiyya with brief summaries of private meetings the author had with certain scholars, with the clear intent of evaluating the level of support that al-Qa`ida enjoys from some relatively prominent members of the Saudi religious establishment.

SOCOM-2012-0000015
This document is a letter dated 21 October 2010 from Bin Ladin to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya). The letter is primarily focused on issues in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. In the letter Bin Ladin specifically comments on: the security situation in Waziristan and the need to relocate al-Qa`ida members from the region; counter surveillance issues associated with the movement of his son Hamza within Pakistan; the appointment of `Atiyya’s three deputies; various al-Sahab videos and the media plan for the tenth anniversary of 9/11; the release of an Afghan prisoner held by al-Qa`ida; and the trial of Faisal Shahzad. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Saif al-`Adl, and Adam Gadahn are also mentioned in the document.

SOCOM-2012-0000016
This document is a letter addressed to “Abu Basir” (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP) from an unidentified author, most likely Usama bin Ladin and/or `Atiyya. The letter is in part a response to specific requests for guidance from AQAP’s leadership. The author specifically advises AQAP to focus on targeting the United States, not the Yemeni government or security forces. The author also discusses media strategy and the importance of AQAP’s relations with Yemen’s tribes.

SOCOM-2012-0000017
This document is a series of paragraphs, some of which match the content found in SOCOM-2012-0000016. This document was likely written by the author of that document. This letter discusses strategy, the need for al-Qa`ida to remain focused on targeting the United States (or even against U.S. targets in South Africa where other “brothers” are not active), the importance of tribal relations in a variety of different countries, and media activity.

SOCOM-2012-0000018
This document is a letter addressed to Usama bin Ladin from “a loving brother whom you know and who knows you” and dated 14 September 2006. The author is critical of Bin Ladin for focusing al- Qa`ida’s operations on “Islamic countries in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular.” He enumerates the numerous negative consequences of engaging in jihad inside Saudi Arabia, and informs Bin Ladin that people are now repulsed by the technical term “jihad” and even forbidden to use it in lectures. The author strongly advised Bin Ladin to change his policies.

SOCOM-2012-0000019
This document is a long letter authored by Usama bin Ladin after the death of Sheikh Sa‘id (Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid) in late May 2010 and it is addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) who he designates as Sa‘id’s successor. Bin Ladin’s letter is concerned with the mistakes committed by regional jihadi groups, which have resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslim civilians. Bin Ladin indicates that he would like to start a “new phase” so that the jihadis could regain the trust of Muslims. He directs `Atiyya to prepare a memorandum to centralize, in the hands of AQC, the media campaign and operations of regional jihadi groups. Considerable space is devoted to a discussion about Yemen, external operations and Bin Ladin’s plans for his son Hamza. This document includes an additional letter that Bin Ladin forwards to `Atiyya authored by Shaykh Yunis, presumably Yunis al-Mauritani, consisting of a new operational plan that al- Qa`ida should consider adopting.

Michael Ross was born in Canada and served as a soldier in a combat unit of the Israel Defence Forces prior to being recruited as a “combatant,” (a term designating a deep-cover operative tasked with working in hostile milieus) in Israel’s legendary secret intelligence service, the Mossad. In his 13 year career with the Mossad, Ross was also a case officer in Africa and South East Asia for three years, and was the Mossad’s counterterrorism liaison officer to the CIA and FBI for two-and-a-half years. Ross is a published writer and commentator on Near Eastern affairs, intelligence and terrorism. He is the author of The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists. You can follow him on Twitter.

John Little: You left the Mossad in October 2001. You have cited the isolation and personal sacrifices made (chiefly the impact on your family) during your intelligence career as motivators. With a decade behind you are you happy with your decision? What’s life like for you now?

Michael Ross: To be honest, there are times when I wish I was back in harness simply because it would have been a most interesting and dynamic period to be a spy but then, it wasn’t exactly dullsville during my tenure either as I was in the field when 9/11 occurred. Having said that, I think I was ready to move on to other things and return to Canada. I realized that my lifestyle in Israel didn’t always include meaningful interaction with others outside the profession – which I believe to be an essential element to maintaining good mental health in this business. It’s also important to add parenthetically that my marriage had faltered and while it would be easy to blame this on my work, there is no doubt that it played a contributing factor. My life now is very good although I wish I could see my sons more often. I certainly feel that I have much to contribute in an advisory, teaching or consultancy role given that I had such a unique and rich insider’s view of a part of the world – that for obvious reasons – has an increasing impact on our lives in the west whether we want it to or not.

John Little: The Israeli position is never a dull one is it? I know you moved on in the aftermath of 9/11 but what is your sense of how the Mossad was impacted by those events? The impact on the US intelligence community was, and continues to be, significant. Do you think the Mossad experienced similar expansion, structural changes, or cultural shifts?

Michael Ross: I was off and on in Mossad headquarters well after 9/11 and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. There were some fundamental changes primarily in the realm of counterterrorism (CT). The branch dedicated to al Qaida – which we called “Global Jihad” due to the amorphous patchwork confederation of Jihadist entities we were dealing with – increased significantly in manpower, resources, and scope. Traditionally, those of us at the sharp end of CT operations were regarded as the poor cousins of the intelligence world. Nobody considered terrorism to be anything more than a major nuisance and we were always reminded by our peers working counter-proliferation that terrorist entities did not constitute any strategic threat to national security in the manner that non-conventional weapons pose. Of course no clear thinking individual thinks that way anymore. In many ways however, the U.S. has been concentrating so much on al Qaida that it has been overlooking other terrorist threats. The Mossad appears to be the only intelligence service that is devoting any significant resources to Hizballah and their Iranian sponsors. It didn’t seem to alarm the U.S. very much that a senior Hizballah commander, Ali Mousa Daqduq, was caught helping Shi’ite militias target coalition forces in Iraq or that the Taliban are carrying Irainian-manufactured weapons.

John Little: And now Hizballah, along with everyone else in this struggle, is trying to cope with the scope, pace, and chaos of the Arab Spring. Despite the opportunity for positive change the landscape has rarely been this unstable and unpredictable. Do you have a sense for how the Mossad is prioritizing and adjusting? How do you think they and their partners in allied intelligence communities should be positioned in this environment?

Michael Ross: Hizballah has been on the ropes for a while now. While they claim that the 2006 war with Israel was a great victory, in the scheme of things, it had a very detrimental effect on this wholly-owned subsidiary of the Iranian regime. Nasrallah is in perpetual hiding and the arch-terrorist, Imad Mughniyeh, is dead leaving behind a significantly diminished operational capability. Hizballah is also in financial dire straits and has lost billions from its coffers (hence the increased criminal enterprises aimed at making money for the organization popping up around the world) but the greatest set-back has been the international pressure on Iran and the civil war in Syria. This has Hizballah very worried because they are not only losing a chief sponsor and logistical corridor in Syria, the Syrian regime has been shooting at Lebanese citizens across the border. For an organization whose raison d’etre is the ostensible defence of Lebanon from foreign threats, this has placed them in a very awkward position. You only have to imagine a scenario where the IDF shoots a Lebanese journalist across the border to grasp the situation. The Lebanese are very savvy and as the body count rises in Syria and the conflict spills over into Lebanon (and it will) with Hizballah supporting the Assad regime, it’s not going to bode well for Hizballah’s already tattered support in Lebanon.

I don’t envy the analysts in the Mossad or the CIA these days. The ground is shifting so quickly underneath their feet, it must be very hard to come up with a cogent analysis of what the future holds anywhere in the region. The Mossad has a clear advantage from a finger-on-the-pulse perspective as it lives in the neighborhood and there is a sense of urgency simply because what happens in Syria can quickly escalate to something on your immediate doorstep as it has with Turkey and Lebanon. Israel has maintained a very low profile throughout the so-called “Arab Spring” but that doesn’t mean it’s asleep and I think this is a very wise course of action. Now is the time for subtlety in Middle East diplomacy and intelligence services should be active partners in determining the best course of action for policymakers to take. It’s one of many reasons why I advocate a hands-off position vis-a-vis Syria.

John Little: There is obviously something to gain for Israel and its allies if Syria transitions to a more reasonable posture but can you foresee a scenario where regime change occurs without also triggering significant downstream violence and weapons proliferation issues? Israel arguably has the most to lose if Syria slips into chaos and chemical weapons fall into the wrong hands. From Israel’s perspective could the unintended consequences of intervention currently pose a bigger threat than Syria itself?

Michael Ross: Knowing the status of and providing options to secure Assad’s prodigious chemical weapons (and deployment systems) arsenal is a top priority for the Mossad and western intelligence services. I participated in an unsuccessful foiling operation against rogue Russian General Anatoly Kunsevich in the late 1990′s who was assisting Syria obtain nerve agents for their Scud missiles. Syria has been developing a non-conventional weapons capability for some time (and until the 2007 Israeli raid on al-Khibar, a nuclear weapons program).

It’s an axiom of the intelligence world to hope for the best but to prepare for the worst and this absolutely applies to Syria right now. First off, I’m not convinced that Assad won’t prevail and successfully crush the uprising. He may end up significantly weaker than he was, but still retain power over the majority of the country. The Allawite regime still enjoys Russian – and to a lesser degree – Chinese support so this civil war is far from over. In fact, right now I see it as a Middle eastern version of the Third Balkan War circa 1992-1995. It could still go in several directions for a long time.

If Assad loses and a strong faction of anti-western jihadists emerges as the dominant power in Syria, a potential scenario arises where a terrorist entity brandishing non-conventional weapons threatens Israel and the west. We have to monitor this situation very closely and especially the intervening foreign factions that could ultimately radicalize Syria. Syria still is a secular nation and its people not easily given to Islamic extremist urges, but we’ve all seen how quickly Islamism can take root when there is a power vacuum in the region. My hope is that the Syrian resistance relies on that strong secular base of support and a new Syria – divested of both Iran and Hezbollah – emerges with a more reasonable geopolitical posture.

John Little: Mossad officers are probably faced with a wider array of hostile operating environments than any other service. As a result they periodically catch some heat for their false-flag operations and cover methods. Some of that criticism has come from “unnamed sources” within the US intelligence community. In your experience do these types of issues ever impact the level of professional cooperation between the Mossad and the US intelligence community or is this background noise?

Michael Ross: There is no doubt that there is a vocal constituency of U.S. intelligence officials that for whatever reason, don’t like the Mossad. It’s been my experience however, that the loudest critics of the Mossad are the furthest from the bilateral intelligence dialogue and operational relationship. The Mossad is indifferent to these critics and it would be fair to say that some of these negative sentiments are reciprocated but at the working level and especially while in the pursuit of joint operational objectives, there is a warm and intimate relationship that is appreciated by both sides.

The negative grumbling really is nothing more than background noise. Mark Perry wrote a piece in Foreign Policy last January describing Mossad officers posing as CIA while in London as a means to recruit Iranian dissidents. The Mossad never uses U.S. cover because of a bilateral agreements and to be frank, U.S. cover is only marginally better than Israeli and to even consider a scenario where it would be conducted in London under the noses of one of the best security services in the world (MI5) is beyond ludicrous. The Mossad also doesn’t need U.S. cover to recruit and train its own cadre of Iranian dissidents. Suffice it to say, you can pretty much say and/or write whatever you want about the Mossad and it will go unchallenged and to be quite frank, as a service it could care less what a journalist or conveniently unnamed CIA official writes or says.

It’s worth noting that it’s the CIA that employs a press office and small army of communications professionals to keep its image untarnished. Imagine if all that money, time and effort were expended in putting case officers in the field to recruit foreign sources of intelligence? The Mossad is on the ground in places where Angels fear to tread and as a result has operational cover imperatives that other services either refuse to employ or take for granted. I find it somewhat ridiculous that competing intelligence services disingenuously make heavy weather out of the fact that the Mossad uses foreign cover to conduct its operations as if this is supposed to be out of bounds. Of course this never stopped any service from accepting the extremely valuable intelligence (obtained at high risk by Mossad combatants and case officers) and shared via the Mossad’s liaison division.

For an interesting insight into the CIA’s organizational culture, I highly recommend my friend Ishmael Jones’ book, “The Human Factor: Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture.” It’s quite an eye-opener.

John Little: While we’re discussing identity and operations – The reconstruction of the 2010 Mahmoud al-Mabhouh assassination highlights the surveillance capabilities increasingly deployed by private entities and local governments and the challenges those systems pose to covert activities. Are technological advances in surveillance, biometrics, and other forms of identity management outpacing tradecraft or are they creating as many opportunities as they are barriers?

Michael Ross: While I believe that there is more to the al-Mahbouh assassination than meets the public eye, there is no doubt that it was a wake-up call for anyone conducting covert operations in these sensitive milieus. Clearly there was a gross underestimation of the willingness of the authorities in Dubai to pursue this case. The overlooked and unreported irony in the whole story is that al-Mahbouh was traveling on alias identities, was known to the Dubai security services, and was conducting clandestine meetings with Iranian officials concerning advanced weapons systems for HAMAS. These activities apparently failed to arouse the interest of the Dubai authorities which in itself says a lot.

Biometrics and advanced surveillance/security systems pose real challenges for covert operations and will affect intelligence service’s overseas clandestine activity on just about every level. This is especially problematic now that European companies like Germany’s Trovicor and Italy’s SpA have been selling and implementing cutting edge hi-tech intelligence platforms aimed at providing rogue regimes with communications interception and monitoring capabilities. Much of this technology has been used in Syria and Iran against dissidents and it’s entirely possible that this technology was used by the regime in Syria to locate foreign journalists in Syria by locating their satellite phone signals. Once you have this geo-location technology, it’s a simple matter to transfer that information to an artillery battery or when spy-catching, to a team of Mukhbarat thugs.

Having said that, one of the Mossad’s great strengths is its incredible ability to innovate and adapt to new obstacles be they technological or otherwise and even more importantly, to engage in a lessons learned process and improve its capabilities. Dubai notwithstanding, the Mossad is also adept at tackling hurdles in advance of the emerging technology. I saw some inventions in the Mossad’s Science and Technology Division that would make anyone in the private sector go very green with envy.

John Little: There were online communities when you were active but I assume they weren’t pervasive enough to require much thought except in very specific cases. Now virtually everyone in the developed world, and many beyond, has a social presence online. Have you thought much about the impact that social media is having on intelligence? The upside from a mass collection / data mining perspective is pretty obvious but it is also presents intelligence professionals with a unique operating environment in its own right doesn’t it?

Michael Ross: Social media and the possibilities for open source intelligence collection have expanded exponentially with the advent of all the various social media platforms available online. It also opens up a whole world of operational cover and networking possibilities that in the past involved a lot of leg-work when I was in harness.

Social media has both strong offensive and defensive elements in its makeup. For a “poacher” like myself, I can mine a considerable amount of data on a potential target for recruitment (including vulnerabilities or avenues for exploitation) long before I even come into any contact with the target. For my “gamekeeper” colleagues in the counterintelligence realm, it offers a number of possibilities in determining potential for attack and what the “poachers” are targeting.

Social media and the internet are a double-edged sword also because they are open to abuse by outfits like Stratfor that sell jargon, open-source information, and fabrication as a finished intelligence product for corporate and government consumers. The other edge of the sword is that people like myself and others can access social media and set the record straight.

The most interesting aspect for me however, is that I can interface with someone in say, Beirut and find out in real time what’s happening in the southern suburbs of that city while I sit at my table Laphroaig at elbow. Now that’s social media.

John Little: The Mossad brand is a powerful force multiplier. It is a relatively small force but its enemies see it lurking everywhere. It has maintained this fearsome image though its share of embarrassing episodes and high profile failures. The organization seems to shrug off mistakes and boldly plow forward. How does the Mossad deal with failure and how much brand self-awareness is there in the senior leadership’s decision making processes? Is there tension between the need to work covertly while still making their presence felt or reinforcing their public image?

Michael Ross: The Mossad brand is very powerful and I have to admit that I am quite surprised by this simply because to me it’s comprised of a small number of human faces that I worked with. Admittedly these are very talented and dedicated people, but people all the same.

Outsiders tend to disproportionately concentrate on the sensationalized subject of assassinations. This comprises probably 0.01% of the Mossad’s activities as an intelligence service. When you put it into perspective, the majority of the Mossad’s time is spent determining and analyzing the intentions of Israel’s enemies using the full suite of collection platforms available – much in the same way as the CIA or MI6. I think people would be surprised by the similarities between top tier intelligence services at the operational level. Much of the tradecraft is similar among these services and it’s a little-known fact but the Mossad was actually based on post-war MI6. If I was to single out the one aspect of the Mossad that remains misunderstood by the public, the media, and other intelligence services, it’s that the Mossad is operating like the OSS or MI6 during the Second World War. Sometimes my colleagues in Washington DC tend to think of Tehran, Damascus, Amman, Cairo and Beirut as distant exotic locales reached after a long jet-lag inducing flight. For the Mossad, they’re next door neighbors in a very unstable and threatening neighbourhhood.

When you are a very active intelligence service operating 24/7 365 days a year then mistakes are going to happen. Some of them have been significant mistakes but the Mossad is a learning organization with a culture of integrating lessons learned. At the completion of every operation, regardless of size and scope, there are sessions where everyone sits down and asks, “How we could we have done that better?” It’s not a punitive process but rather a necessary element to maintaining the upper hand through continual improvement. The Mossad makes mistakes but you never hear of the incredible successes – and they are legion.

The Mossad does not think about or concern itself with image. It never enters into the equation. We know we have a fierce reputation but nobody really thinks or talks about it. The fearsome reputation has been an unintentional consequence of the Mossad simply getting the job done.

John Little: You titled your book “The Volunteer”. What advice do would you give to other volunteers following in your footsteps at the Mossad or other intelligence services? They’re choosing a difficult path aren’t they?

Michael Ross: I don’t think my particular path of recruitment could easily be re-created or is in anyway typical but then I believe that in the Mossad’s case, no two recruitments are ever alike. I know the CIA likes to troll the Ivy League schools but the Mossad is looking for qualities that don’t exclusively involve academic scholarship. I didn’t get to university until later in my career. If you are smart, can think on your feet, cope with uncertainty, and above all maintain a sense of humor in all situations, then you have the prerequisites.Some of the funniest people I know are spies because like good comedians, they have a nose for the absurd and are very keen observers of human nature. Mossad selection is very rigorous but anyone interested should go to their website. Likewise for the CIA and MI6. My only advice is that being a spy is anything but glamorous. A lot of it involves meetings in dingy hotels in third world hell-holes trying to convince some person – often afflicted with only a passing acquaintance with personal hygiene -that they should sell their country’s secrets. Honestly, does it get any more fun than that?

The pro-Pollard buzz that was building in the Israeli press, blogs, and social media channels throughout last year has culminated in an official plea from Netanyahu:

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the people of Israel, I am writing to you to request clemency for Jonathan Pollard.

At the time of his arrest, Jonathan Pollard was acting as an agent of the Israeli government. Even though Israel was in no way directing its intelligence efforts against the United States, its actions were wrong and wholly unacceptable. Both Mr. Pollard and the Government of Israel have repeatedly expressed remorse for these actions, and Israel will continue to abide by its commitment that such wrongful actions will never be repeated.

As you know, Mr. President, I have raised the question of Jonathan Pollard’s release numerous times in discussions with your administration and with previous U.S. administrations. Previous Israeli Prime Ministers and Presidents have also requested clemency for Mr. Pollard from your predecessors.

Since Jonathan Pollard has now spent 25 years in prison, I believe that a new request for clemency is highly appropriate. I know that this view is also shared by former senior American officials with knowledge of the case as well as by numerous Members of Congress.

Jonathan Pollard has reportedly served longer in prison than any person convicted of similar crimes, and longer than the period requested by the prosecutors at the time of his plea bargain agreement. Jonathan has suffered greatly for his actions and his health has deteriorated considerably.

I know that the United States is a country based on fairness, justice and mercy. For all these reasons, I respectfully ask that you favorably consider this request for clemency. The people of Israel will be eternally grateful.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Netanyahu

Fairness, justice and mercy. These are precisely the reasons why Jonathan Pollard should not see the light of day.

Fairness

The intelligence community, the one which Jonathan Pollard betrayed, is overwhelmingly composed of patriots. Most of them quietly shoulder the burden of secrecy. They do this, not for personal gain, but because it is a requirement of their service. They tolerate the rules, regulations, and the invasions of privacy. They may struggle with strained relationships, long hours, and sometimes even great personal risk. They do this quietly and at a government pay grade because they are patriots.

Pollard, on the other hand, acted without honor. He is not an American patriot. At the time of his arrest he was, by most accounts, a greedy, cocaine-snorting, narcissist:

For about a year after the time Pollard met Avi Sella, he gathered computer printouts, satellite photographs, and classified documents from his department three times a week and brought them to various Washington apartments. There, they were copied and returned to Pollard, who restored them to the Navy the following day. In exchange for his services Pollard received, in addition to the agreed salary, a lavish collection of gifts for himself and his wife, including a honeymoon in a private compartment aboard the Orient Express.

Pollard did not sacrifice for his country. He traded it for diamond rings, bundles of cash, and expensive vacations. He betrayed every American and every patriot who served with or before him. So yes, fairness is important. How could releasing Pollard to a hero’s welcome in Israel be in any way fair to the countless Americans and patriots he betrayed? Fairness demands some measure of…

Justice

Pollard’s apologists have conjured up so many silly arguments over the past two plus decades that (and this is part of their strategy) casual observers may understimate the impact of his betrayal:

Joseph DiGenova, the former U.S. attorney who prosecuted the case, said Tuesday that Pollard was a spy who was paid and who tried to entice others to join his operation.

Mr. DiGenova said Pollard received about $500,000 a year plus expenses for giving intelligence documents to Israeli agents.

“By the time he was caught, he caused enough damage to U.S. intelligence that, according to the Defense Department, it cost between $3 billion and $5 billion to fix because of what he compromised,” Mr. DiGenova said. “That the country he spied for is seeking clemency is not only unprecedented, it is a joke.”

The bits and pieces of the Pollard damage assessment that have leaked out over the years are shocking. It’s easy to understand why the U.S. intelligence community continues to oppose his release:

THE men and women of the National Security Agency live in a world of chaotic bleeps, buzzes, and whistles, and talk to each other about frequencies, spectrums, modulation, and bandwidth — the stuff of Tom Clancy novels. They often deal with signals intelligence, or SIGINT, and their world is kept in order by an in-house manual known as the RASIN an acronym for radio-signal notations. The manual, which is classified “top-secret Umbra,” fills ten volumes, is constantly updated, and lists the physical parameters of every known signal. Pollard took it all. “It’s the Bible,” one former communications-intelligence officer told me. “It tells how we collect signals anywhere in the world.” The site, frequency, and significant features of Israeli communications — those that were known and targeted by the N.S.A. — were in the RASIN; so were all the known communications links used by the Soviet Union.

The loss of the RASIN was especially embarrassing to the Navy, I was told by the retired admiral, because the copy that Pollard photocopied belonged to the Office of Naval Intelligence. “He went into our library, found we had an out-of-date version, requested a new one, and passed it on,” the officer said. “I was surprised we even had it.”

The RASIN theft was one of the specifics cited in Defense Secretary Weinberger’s still secret declaration to the court before Pollard’s sentencing hearing. In fact, the hearing’s most dramatic moment came when Pollard’s attorney, Richard A. Hibey, readily acknowledged his client’s guilt but argued that the extent of the damage to American national security did not call for the imposition of a maximum sentence. “I would ask you to think about the Secretary of Defense’s affidavit, as it related to only one thing,” Judge Robinson interjected, “with reference to one particular category of publication, and I fail to see how you can make that argument.” He invited Hibey to approach the bench, along with the Justice Department attorneys, and the group spent a few moments reviewing what government officials told me was Weinberger’s account of the importance of the RAISIN. One Justice Department official, recalling those moments with obvious pleasure, said that the RASIN was the ninth item on the Weinberger damage-assessment list.

The compromise of RASIN alone would justify life in prison but the piece goes on to detail the compromise of the Rota reports, DIAL-COINS, and the National SIGINT Requirements List. Pollard compromised not only individual intelligence systems and methods. He compromised the security of every single American citizen. So please Mr. Netanyahu don’t talk to us about justice. Justice was served and it was served with…

Mercy

Jonathan Pollard is alive. He is alive after betraying the patriots at his side. He is alive after betraying the government which trusted him. He is alive after betraying those who fought and died, sometimes quietly and without public acknowledgment, for this country. He is alive after betraying every single American man, woman, and child. Jonathan Pollard is alive and he is treated humanely. He is a living testimony to our mercy.

As I have said before, I support Israel as an ally. I even respect Mr. Netanyahu’s (now) persistent support of the spy Israel once betrayed. However, Jonathan Pollard was never a harmlessly naive ideologue. His betrayal was cold, calculated, and immensely damaging. May he stay in prison indefinitely where he can reflect on America’s fairness, justice, and mercy.

I will leave you with video of Jonathan Pollard in action:

Forums, Twitter, and blogs are have been buzzing over this “new” Chinese jet for days. The quality of the jet is uncertain but props to the Chinese for excellent execution of a stealth marketing campaign – complete with the sort of grainy spy shots usually reserved for car launches.

I’ve rounded up some resources for those of you who want to keep tabs on this but first a couple of questions:

Raymond Pritchett believes that this news raises interesting (but likely to go unanswered) questions about our understanding of Chinese military development:

In less than one week we have:

1. Confirmation new PLAN aircraft carrier is under construction
2. PACOM confirming DF-21D is now at IOC.
3. 4/5 Generation Stealth technology demonstrators on the runway

All of which is either well ahead of projected schedules or was never before thought to exist, at least publicly? Perhaps it is time the Secretary of Defense answers a few tough questions, like why the DoD appears to be caught with their pants around their ankles when it comes to major PLA developments.

There’s plenty of OSINT on the J-20. It has been the subject of speculation on forums and blogs for years so it’s unlikely that anyone was caught off-guard by this one. Well, let’s hope not anyway. What do we know beyond OSINT? I’d like to know but that’s the unanswerable question. Still, the concern is valid and shared by many.

More important, perhaps, is the question of Chinese espionage. Debate over whether penetration of U.S. Defense contractors assisted China with the development of the J-20 seem almost unnecessary. Chinese determination, Russian engineering assistance and lazy American security practices are a pretty potent combination. China will continue to close gaps and will do so with increasing efficiency as long as this dynamic exists.

What about the military significance of this jet? As a near term military threat to the United States it doesn’t mean much. Deploying these as a viable platform on a large scale just isn’t in the cards and won’t be for quite some time. Building the airframe, even a fairly complex one, is only the first and easiest step. Additional hardware capabilities have to be developed, systems integration is highly complex, massive logistical issues have to be sorted out for production to occur on a large scale, and then there’s actual deployment. Let’s not forget that you need highly skilled personnel to support and man these things in battle.

There is no doubt that China is capable of closing the gap, even innovating, but by the time they get these issues sorted out (another 20-30 years or so at best) I expect the game will have changed considerably. That sort of dominance probably isn’t even the primary motivation at the moment as RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik points out:

Given its traditional policy of aircraft manufacturing, China will most likely create a functional analogue of foreign-made 5G planes that will cost 50% to 80% less than Russian and U.S. models. China will most likely sell the plane in Central Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia, as well as to the richest African countries.

The export models of the J-20 and the planes of that series made for the Chinese Air Force will have foreign, including Russian, equipment and weapons. Moreover, in the next 20 to 30 years China will have to continue to import modern aircraft technology. Despite the strides made by China’s aircraft designers in the last 20 years, China has only slightly narrowed the technological gap dividing it from the global leaders.

So the J-20 has nice lines, will integrate a lot of outdated hardware, and will be obtainable by any petty dictator with a few extra dollars in the bank. It’s looking more like a Volkswagen Jetta than a game changer.

As promised, here are a few resources:

Forum Threads:
AsiaWind
SinoDefenseForum
MilitaryPhotos.net
Defense Forum of India
The Aviation Forum
Tiexue.net

Blogs:
Top81 – Chinese Military Aviation (Scroll to the bottom for tech specs)
China Defense (possible cockpit mockup)
Information Dissemination
War is Boring
The DEW Line

Twitter:
The #J20 Hashtag
Kursed
TheDEWLine
Galrahn
and of course BlogsofWar

New rule: every time you enable or make excuses for Iran you should be lashed, one for every post-graduate degree you have.

Is that anti-intellectual? No…that’s anti-you. They don’t want to negotiate with us and never will. Period. There’s nothing to talk about.

Does that mean send Fifth Fleet and a bunch of AC-130s and B2s to level Iran? No. It means keep making scientists assume room temperature.

It means the head of the IRGCs drone program mysteriously disappearing from his balcony. And motorcycle-borne assassinations.

In sum, Iran doesn’t want an actual military faceoff and neither do we. Instead of negotiating endlessly, let’s be as ruthless as them.

Iran’s relationship with the United States, and Western world in general, has been defined by the assumption that they are untouchable. Analysts are quick to point out that intense Iranian nationalism is a barrier to any attempts at deconstruction/reconstruction of their political system. Invaders, even those with good intentions, are not welcome. Counterterrorism types are quick to point to Iran’s feared global network of terror facilitators and proxies who will respond to any conventional military attack with wave after wave of terrorist attacks on every corner of the globe. This is Iran’s version of mutually assured destruction and it has served them well.

Our own capabilities have served us well too. The Iranian political class does not want a what is assuredly an unsurvivable conventional war. Their strategy, executed quite well I think, has been to challenge the West on multiple fronts but pull back short of the line. If conventional war does come they fully expect it to come from the air and have prepared accordingly. This balance, if you can call it that, has worked because of an underlying assumption on the part of the Iranians. They believe that they can play dirty while the West is shackled by a number of self-imposed restraints and ultimately a (justifiable) fear of putting boots on the ground.

By identifying and targeting those who actively work to support Iran’s most evil intentions (nuclear scientists for example) we can send a different message: you are not safe. In fact, you are not safe anywhere. You are not safe when you travel and, more importantly, you are not safe in your own home. We will, if you persist, kill you during your morning commute. Do not sleep too soundly in that five star hotel because we just might smother your ass with a pillow.

Individual specificity is the future of war. It is brutal and ugly but it is less brutal and ugly than the alternative. By definition some tactics (the high casualty innocent civilian targeting terrorism favored by our enemies) are still off limits. In a war against individuals innocents are spared and justice is served. The illusion of safety for bad actors who support hostile regimes is shattered. Apply these tactics on a larger scale and over time, indefinitely, and these regimes will likely find it increasingly difficult to place intelligent people in supporting roles. The message to scientists, agents, oppressors, even “religious” leaders is clear: you are not just a small irrelevant cog in a larger machine, you are not lost in the crowd, YOU are the enemy and we will kill you.

There are definitely signs that this is happening, both in the struggle against Iran and in the greater war on terror. But is it happening on the scale needed to change some of these long standing assumptions? This is largely a covert effort (which it should be) so evaluation is difficult. Observers can only point to Iran’s behavior as an indicator. My gut feeling is that our capabilities in this area are increasing (just wait until we get indoor nano-scale lethal UASs) as is our comfort level with the approach but we’re not quite there. Iran continues to move aggressively froward on a dangerous track. Ironically, our greatest hope in preventing a devastating war is in taking off the gloves and getting dirty. We have to be “as ruthless as them”.

The U.S. armed services are issuing internal messages to all personnel barring them from visiting the WikiLeaks website, which recently posted 77,000 classified diplomatic and military messages on the long war in Afghanistan.

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman confirmed Thursday for The Washington Times that all four services “have put out such messages” after The Times had obtained copies of Navy and Marine Corps messages banning troops from accessing WikiLeaks.

Mr. Whitman later told The Times that the Army and Air Force had not yet issued such statements.

I certainly wouldn’t want my IP address showing up in their logs if I had a security clearance.

“If they won’t charge him with treason, they ought to charge him with murder,” Mr Rogers said.

Asked if treason during wartime was a capital offence punishable by death, he said: “Yes and I would support it 100 per cent.”

“The death penalty clearly should be considered here,” he said. “[Pte Manning] clearly aided the enemy to what may result in the death of US soldiers or those cooperating. If that is not a capital offence, I don’t know what is.

“We know for a fact that people will likely be killed because of this information being disclosed. That’s pretty serious.”

Heroic sources, even our own troops, are more likely to die as a result of this incident than Bradley Manning. The more realistic possibility for Manning is decades behind bars.

Wikileaks is an especially powerful concept that resonates with the especially naive but this project subverts democratic institutions, ignores the rule of law, and exposes heroic sources to imprisonment, torture, even death. If Americans want greater transparency, or other policy changes, they have democratic processes at their disposal. Creating that change, through those processes, is the only legitimate way for Wikileaks supporters and free culture types to achieve their goals.

Apply these tools to people who have no absolutely voice, no recourse, no hope and you might have a leg to stand on but no rational person can argue that U.S. citizens fit that profile. As it stands now these people are enemies of this state, enemies of legitimate freedom, and enemies of democracy.

This is the kind of communication that doesn’t really appeal to anyone except the people who created it. It certainly won’t win any converts. This highlights what has always been a challenge for the IC – balancing effective public relations and secrecy. My problem with that is that not only should it be a priority for them but they should have mastered it by now. In fact, they should be better at it than anyone else – period.

Perhaps this mess will highlight the need for the IC to aggressively move beyond damage control as a PR strategy. It’s time to kill the lame brochureware web sites, limit the dry memos to internal use or policy wonks, and engage the American people.

An estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances. – Top Secret America, Washington Post

Everyone seems to up in arms about this figure. It’s seen as confirmation that we have too many spies, too many analysts, and generally too much of everything associated with top secret work. While that may be true this number isn’t quite the slam dunk many think it is because encapsulates countless people who are only indirectly involved in the handling of intelligence or classified material.

To understand what this number means you have to first have some appreciation of what is involved in staffing and supporting a secured project or facility. The nature of the work often requires that administrative and facilities staff, down to the janitor level for example, be cleared at some level. White it’s undoubtedly true that some of this work is inappropriately classified the process of compartmentalizing access (think need to know) actually works pretty well most of the time.

A good place to get a feel for what these projects look like, and how they’re staffed is my former employer’s career site. SAIC has countless Top Secret, Top Secret SCI, and other cleared jobs in their database. A quick scan reveals the following:

Supply and Material Manager – Top Secret
JOB DESCRIPTION: Provide logistics and supply expertise in support of the JDICE team at Nellis AFB, NV.

Candidate will perform material and equipment acquisition for in-house and project related material and supply requirements, identify vendors capable of providing material, equipment, and supplies for specific requirements, issue requests for quotes to qualified vendors, evaluate vendor quotes for specific components and determine the best value approach for fulfilling material requirements, develop purchase orders for specific requirements for Air Force and OSD equipment, ensure compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Department of Defense Acquisition Regulations for material acquisition, utilize spreadsheets and hand receipts for developing, issuing, and tracking material. Candidate will monitor, store and issue government furnished equipment and material for regular office and test specific use, and act as the organization’s alternate Telephone Control Officer, equipment custodian and supply liaison. Additionally, candidate will also provide logistical support, equipment, supplies and personnel to facilitate effective and efficient execution of JDICE activities. Must be willing to travel (approximately 10%).

Not exactly James Bond is it? In your company you probably refer to this as the “wharehouse guy.”

Accounting Specialist – Top Secret SCI
JOB DESCRIPTION: Provide logistics and supply expertise in support of the JDICE team at Nellis AFB, NV.

Candidate will perform material and equipment acquisition for in-house and project related material and supply requirements, identify vendors capable of providing material, equipment, and supplies for specific requirements, issue requests for quotes to qualified vendors, evaluate vendor quotes for specific components and determine the best value approach for fulfilling material requirements, develop purchase orders for specific requirements for Air Force and OSD equipment, ensure compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Department of Defense Acquisition Regulations for material acquisition, utilize spreadsheets and hand receipts for developing, issuing, and tracking material. Candidate will monitor, store and issue government furnished equipment and material for regular office and test specific use, and act as the organization’s alternate Telephone Control Officer, equipment custodian and supply liaison. Additionally, candidate will also provide logistical support, equipment, supplies and personnel to facilitate effective and efficient execution of JDICE activities. Must be willing to travel (approximately 10%).

Boooring. Again, this person is not complicating the gathering, analysis, and distribution of the nation’s intelligence. They’re just working the periphery.

Help Desk Support Specialist IV – Top Secret

The Enterprise Support Technician will be a member of a larger EST staff providing help desk functions to the Theater Command, Control, Communications, Computer & Intelligence (C4I) Support Center (TSCS) – Belvoir Operations Center. EST personnel will be the entry point of all calls to TCSC-Belvoir Operations Center and will coordinate TCSC network information and updates to the TCSC COMSTAT Report with the USSOUTHCOM TNCC. Enterprise Support Technician will analyze the TNCC-published TCSC COMSTAT networks service call report and make recommendations to reduce the number of TCSC-related future calls by responding to key problems. EST candidate will refine user training, develop online help screens, and provide input to TNCC. EST may be required to remotely monitor Network monitoring consoles after normal duty hours. EST will provide preliminary screening of problems and requests and forward those issues that cannot be resolved by the EST to the appropriate TCSC section, team, or staff member for action. Additional duties include creating user accounts, performing routine scheduled enterprise maintenance and daily back-ups of servers, as well as administering the Blackberry Enterprise Services for TCSC-SOUTHCOM customers. May be required to work a rotating shift.

A Top Secret Help Desk guy is, at the end of the day, still just a help desk guy.

These are just a few examples but countless non-cleared positions in the workforce have their cleared counterpart performing equally boring work off somewhere else – hopefully quietly. It’s usually not as exciting as it would appear. In fact it’s usually quite tedious and boring in the way that only government or government contractor work can be. So, the spies, analysts, and super-genius scientists who reverse engineer UFOs, are out there but they’re a fraction of the 854,000 figure that everyone is throwing around in disgust at the moment.

The great majority of the 854,000 people with top secret security clearances thrive within expensive offices located in the United States. The number of heroes protecting Americans by gathering intelligence in foreign countries is tiny. – Ishmael Jones, The Corner

On the Web:
Frontline: Top Secret America
Washington Post: Top Secret America

“The first story in this series generally tells us a lot of what was already known—the national security bureaucracy is large, redundant and lacks the nimbleness to respond to threats posed to our nation. The first installment somewhat overstates the problem of intelligence growth by conflating intelligence and defense activities, but it supports my long-held belief that the answer to addressing threats to American security won’t come in the form of a larger intelligence bureaucracy. It will come from building a streamlined and integrated national security community that is capable of quickly responding to current and emerging threats.

“In 2006, as chairman of this committee, we examined this issue and issued a report that found problems with bureaucratic growth at the top and a lack of urgency and direction within the intelligence community. It is frustrating that years later, others are looking at this issue and finding the exact same problems.

“Congressional Republicans have pushed for years to address these issues, by seeking to limit bureaucratic growth at our intelligence agencies and focusing scarce national security dollars towards operations and away from agency headquarters. Republicans also have fought successfully to cut pork-barrel spending in the annual intelligence bill by eliminating the earmarks that fuel some of the unnecessary growth and don’t offer the American people the transparency they need or deserve for directed spending.

“Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee will continue to push to get resources and funding to our intelligence professionals in the field and out of Washington. As we have in the past, we will continue efforts to limit bureaucratic growth, redundancy and earmarks in future intelligence bills to get money where it is needed most—providing for the security and protection of our nation.”

We accept that we operate in an environment that limits the amount of information we can share. However, the fact is, the men and women of the Intelligence Community have improved our operations, thwarted attacks, and are achieving untold successes every day.

In recent years, we have reformed the IC in ways that have improved the quality, quantity, regularity, and speed of our support to policymakers, warfighters, and homeland defenders, and we will continue our reform efforts. We provide oversight, while also encouraging initiative. We work constantly to reduce inefficiencies and redundancies, while preserving a degree of intentional overlap among agencies to strengthen analysis, challenge conventional thinking, and eliminate single points of failure. We are mindful of the size of our contractor ranks, but greatly value the critical flexibility and specialized skills they contribute to our mission.

The challenges that lie ahead are difficult and complex. We will continue to scrutinize our own operations, seek ways to improve and adapt, and work with Congress on its crucial oversight and reform efforts. We can always do better, and we will. And the importance of our mission and our commitment to keeping America safe will remain steadfast, whether they are reflected in the day’s news or not.

David C. Gompert

Via DNI.gov (PDF)

The project in their own words:

“Top Secret America” is a project nearly two years in the making that describes the huge national security buildup in the United States after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

When it comes to national security, all too often no expense is spared and few questions are asked – with the result an enterprise so massive that nobody in government has a full understanding of it. It is, as Dana Priest and William M. Arkin have found, ubiquitous, often inefficient and mostly invisible to the people it is meant to protect and who fund it.

The articles in this series and an online database at topsecretamerica.com depict the scope and complexity of the government’s national security program through interactive maps and other graphics. Every data point on the Web site is substantiated by at least two public records.

Because of the nature of this project, we allowed government officials to see the Web site several months ago and asked them to tell us of any specific concerns. They offered none at that time. As the project evolved, we shared the Web site’s revised capabilities. Again, we asked for specific concerns. One government body objected to certain data points on the site and explained why; we removed those items. Another agency objected that the entire Web site could pose a national security risk but declined to offer specific comments.

I suspect the hype around a bunch of open source intelligence framed in spooky videos and flashy graphics is a little overblown. I’ve had little success digging through the site on my own (more on that below) so it’s difficult to say. I’ll be surprised if any significant new information flows from this but the scope of this work and level of contractor involvement may surprise many people and therein lies the risk. The direct national security threat is minimal but the public relations impact is already significant.

I tried to look up my former employer, SAIC, and explore their “top secret relationships” but found only database errors. I’m sure whatever bug or bandwidth issues the site is facing will be resolved soon though. I doubt SAIC is rooting for the Washington Post web team:

Major companies like Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) are said to be worried about a database that Washington Post researchers have compiled linking contractors to the location and function of their contracts. That’s because SAIC performs many classified functions for the government, and at least one intelligence agency occasionally uses SAIC facilities as cover for its own operations. That’s how intermingled the worlds have become.

This intermingling isn’t new, and isn’t just a post 9/11 phenomenon, but that event did (not surprisingly) trigger exponential growth in all directions. Managing this growth is a herculean task but declaring it unmanageable and unworkable is a bit of a stretch. The system presents countless opportunities for reform and improvement but it largely works. It’s easy for critics to point to events like the Times Square bombing attempt but how do they account for what is essentially a tranquil homeland in the face of so many threats?

In a perfect world this would spark productive discussion about how the intelligence community is resourced and managed. What we’ll get though is political grandstanding, conspiracy theories, and potentially another layer of bureaucracy. Of course, another other story could always blow up and shift the public’s attention before this one takes root. Lindsay Lohan, the DNI is counting on you.

Update:
The Atlantic Wire has a roundup.

Ten individuals have been arrested in the United States on charges of being Russian agents, the Justice Department announced Monday.

The 10 were “trained Russian intelligence operatives,” a Justice Department spokesman said.

All were charged with acting as agents of a foreign government, and nine also were charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering.

I can’t remember the last time we rolled up this many deep-cover agents at the same time. I wonder how the Russians will retaliate?

You can read the Justice Department’s criminal complaints here.

Update:
This AP article mentions a bit of tradecraft involving laptops and wireless connections. Interesting but not very surprising given the advantages offered and relative ease in making the connection and transfer.

Some of you may already be familiar with The Complex Terrain Laboratory (CTlab) and its blog, Current Intelligence (http://www.terraplexic.org). That blog has now moved to its own accommodations (http://www.currentintelligence.net) and evolved into Current Intelligence Magazine.

Check it out, bookmark it, blogroll it.

The Cyber Loop is a group of carefully selected strategists who have banded together to further the development of strategic thought in the cyberspace domain. The Cyber Loop is not chartered by the government, military or any private organization.

The genesis for the Loop project was the realization that compared to other domains (land, sea, air and space) , not enough strategic thought is being applied to cyberspace, the newest domain of where conflict may arise, other than by a relatively small group of individuals. Much of the discussions about cyberspace still revolve around tactical and operational-level issues.

The goal of the Loop is to develop a community of high-caliber thinkers to further the development of strategic thought on the cyberspace domain. Several General Officers, Ambassadors, senior Federal government officials, members of academia and members of industry are active members of the Loop.

Check it out.

“We’re excited to be able to use the latest information technology to ‘virtually’ reach out to talented applicants across the Nation and let them know about the exciting career opportunities here at NSA and across the IC,” said NSA Human Resources director Kathy Hutson.

The IC, an integrated network of agencies that work together to protect our Nation’s security, is seeking a culturally diverse, technically savvy workforce for exciting careers in a number of fields. The virtual career fair will highlight hundreds of career opportunities available nationwide in a wide array of disciplines to include cybersecurity/information assurance, intelligence analysis, business management, engineering, and foreign languages.

Attendees will also be able to live-chat with recruiters, learn about and apply to open positions, watch video presentations, participate in live questions and answer sessions, upload/manage documents in their virtual briefcase, and create avatars of themselves – all in a 3-D environment.

Other participating agencies include: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security, Navy Intelligence, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Interested individuals can register now online at www.ICVirtualFair.com. After March 16, the IC Virtual Career Fair will be accessible on demand for 90 days (until June 14, 2010) without chat capabilities. Online registration will be open until the close of the 90-day on-demand period.

NSA PRESS RELEASE
25 Jan 2010
For further information contact:
NSA Public and Media Affairs, 301-688-6524

It was around 1:00 Monday afternoon when a bomb threat was called in for McCain Auditorium, the site where Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair was to give a Landon Lecture at 1:30.

Monday’s K-State Landon Lecture with the Director of National Intelligence was moved because of a bomb threat. 49 News Manhattan Bureau Reporter Lindsey Elliott explains where the lecture was moved to and how K-Staters handled the threat.

K-State Media Relations say the building had already been checked by dogs, but the location was moved to be safe.

While the new location was being checked by K-State Police and Kansas State Troopers, hundreds wanting to hear Blair’s speech waited outside of Forum Hall. One of those waiting was Topekan Olive Ubel who says she didn’t mind the safety precaution.

“It was handled very well, very smoothly,” Ubel said. “I was very proud of the way K-State did it.”

The lecture proceeded after a short delay:

Quoting Governor Alf Landon, Blair said, “We must face the challenges of new realities of international life today.”

He spoke about three major shifts, or hinge points, that have affected all national security organizations, have been especially important to the Intelligence Community and have created the current reality of international life.

First, the end of the Cold War changed everything, said Blair. For example, in Latin America the focus was previously on what the Soviets were doing there. Now the Intelligence Community must focus on each country in Latin America individually. Colombia, being the primary source for cocaine in the United States, is a focus for the Intelligence Community as they investigate and analyze drug organizations, the government, armed forces in the country and Columbia’s relations with its neighboring countries.

The second hinge point, Blair said, was the information revolution. Internet, e-mail, audio and video, all of it became readily available for use and changed the way the intelligence community operates.

“We can leverage virtual teams of intelligence officers linked together around the world,” said Blair. “The term ‘connect the dots’ is overused, often misused, but it has a large grain of truth.”

More on ODNI:
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Wikipedia entry

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and Georgetown University will host a major speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen titled ““NATO: Delivering Real Security in an Age of Uncertainty” on the challenges and opportunities – including operations in Afghanistan – for the over 60-year-old Alliance.

Secretary General Rasmussen – who has been called “NATO’s reformer” by TIME Magazine – is responsible for steering the decision-making and implementation process within the Alliance. His public service career has spanned decades and has included top leadership and foreign policy positions within the Danish government, including Prime Minister, which he served from 2005 to 2009.

You can register here.

Taliban’s Most Senior Military Commander Captured by the CIA in Pakistan Raid
Baradar heads the Taliban’s military council and was elevated in the body after the 2006 death of military chief Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Usmani. He is known to coordinate the movement’s military operations throughout the south and southwest of Afghanistan. His area of direct responsibility stretches over Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Zabul and Uruzgan provinces.

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar: Are other Taliban leaders hiding in Karachi?
According to a police investigator with the Special Investigation Unit, tasked with counterterrorism operations, not only leaders but also other militants are present in Karachi. “There is a network of [Pakistani] Taliban fighters scattered across the city,” the SIU officer says, speaking on the condition of anonymity. He estimates that about 150 Taliban militants from the tribal region reside in Karachi. They include recruiters and financiers, who coordinate with local criminal gangs and sectarian groups to smuggle arms to the tribal areas and arrange funding, he says.

Secret Joint Raid Captures Taliban’s Top Commander
The New York Times learned of the operation on Thursday, but delayed reporting it at the request of White House officials, who contended that making it public would end a hugely successful intelligence-gathering effort. The officials said that the group’s leaders had been unaware of Mullah Baradar’s capture and that if it became public they might cover their tracks and become more careful about communicating with each other.

Implications Of Arrest Of Taliban Leader Mulla Baradar
One question is, nevertheless, whether this arrest will disrupt and weaken the Taleban’s ability to act in the long term. Without question, it is a serious blow to the Taleban. But on the other hand, neither the arrest of Obaidullah nor the killings of leading commanders like Mulla Dadullah, Akhtar Usmani and others have done so. The Taleban movement has been growing from year to year, not abruptly in 2005 or 2006 as many claim but rather continuously after their regime’s downfall. And it was apparently able to fill in vacant command posts with ease and without much loss of effectiveness.

Interview Met Mullah Beradar, de #2 Van de Taliban
Text of interview of the esteemed Mullah Beradar Akhund, Deputy Ameerul Mo’mineen of The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan With the “ SARK ” magazine.

Why Taliban Leader’s Arrest Matters
“This is a significant blow to the Taliban. In the past they have been able to replace leaders, and no doubt they will replace him, but there are not many members of the Quetta Shura who can step into his role,” Mir told CBS News producer Ben Plesser in Kabul, referring to the Afghan Taliban by its traditional name.

Baradar Arrested at Roadside Checkpoint
“At times, it was difficult to hunt him because we had reports of his movement, but no confirmation if the figure riding in one of the vehicles among a few was in fact Mullah Baradar,” said a second senior Pakistani security official. “We had trailed him closely, but our priority was hunting him alive. It was easy enough to start a bloodbath but with no assurance of catching him alive”.

Sr. Official: Top Taliban Operative Captured, Providing Intel
A senior official tells ABC News that “several days” ago U.S. and Pakistani intelligence captured the Taliban’s Number 2, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and he is providing intelligence. “This operation was an enormous success,” the official told ABC News. “It is a very big deal.”

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar
Mullah Baradar may know where Osama bin Laden is or at least have information that could help find him. (I’m assuming the Pakistanis don’t know already — not sure that’s true. I don’t think Osama is living in a cave. I think he’s in a quite comfortable villa.

Taliban Military Commander Captured; will it Impact Reconciliation Talks?
I’m similarly unconvinced that the manner in which Baradar is questioned will have any impact on reconciliation efforts. The U.S. shouldn’t torture him, because torture is morally and legally abhorrent. But I don’t think there are too many Taliban commanders in Quetta who will read the papers and say, hey, Mullah Abdul was treated nicely! We should turn ourselves in, too.

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Captured as Pakistan’s ISI Change Tack: Analysis
The biggest significance of the joint raid by US and Pakistani agents lies in what it may say about the changing position of Pakistan’s powerful ISI military intelligence service.

ISI Leads the Way?
Today, Pakistani and US folks captured Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, apparently the most senior military commander of the Taliban. And the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service led the way. I am confused since the ISI has long been an obstacle to any success against the Taliban. So, does this mean the ISI is now fighting the Taliban? Does it mean that Baradar has simply outlived his usefulness to the ISI? Is there a split in the ISI? I have no clue as I am not an expert on Pakistan, but I doubt that these folks have a strong grasp on this either.

Are Pakistan’s Top Spooks Finally Playing Ball?
“If the arrest of Mullah Baradar heralds a change in the ISI position towards its former protégés rather than being a one off, it will be a landmark event in the counter insurgency,” he writes. “It follows the ISI’s declaration earlier this month that it wished to play a significant role in Hamid Karzai’s attempts to reconcile with senior insurgent leaders.”

Worth Watching: themajlisblog

Details on the passing of a patriot via the Washington Post

Wilson died Wednesday at Memorial Medical Center-Lufkin after he started having difficulty breathing while attending a meeting in the eastern Texas town where he lived, said hospital spokeswoman Yana Ogletree. Wilson was pronounced dead on arrival, and the preliminary cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest, she said.

His story is well known but you can find more background on “Good Time Charlie” here.

Join us for a live webcast featuring the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

In September 2008, the federal government introduced secure social networking capabilities to the US intelligence community to share insights, debate, and communicate. Called “A-Space” (Analyst Space), the initiative’s goal — like intelligence analysis in general — is to protect the US by assessing all the information available across the Department of Defense’s spy agencies.

DIA Program Manager Ahmad Ishaq will discuss the impetus behind A-Space and social software across an organization specifically trained not to share information, how A-Space was launched, the successes to date, future plans, as well as share best practices that are applicable to any industry or private company. He’ll also share how this secure community has helped unify a community to take advantage of intelligence, ideas, and innovations across multiple, globally distributed agencies.

Learn how to:

• Create low barriers to entry and improve adoption rates of Enterprise 2.0 initiatives
• Enable a governance model that works in the new social collaboration paradigm
• Align Enterprise 2.0 tools to speak the language of business
• Study community patterns and don’t be afraid to restart pieces that fail

Visit Jive Software for speaker bios and event registration.

The arrest of an alleged al-Qaeda gang in Manchester and Liverpool said to be planning an Easter bombing campaign earlier this year led investigators to Najibullah Zazi in New York, sources say.

It is claimed he was part of a gang set to attack the New York subway using truck bombs or suicide bombers with the same explosives used on July 21 in London.

They had bought the ingredients for his bombs and he had allegedly filmed Grand Central Station on his mobile phone.

Security sources have told the Daily Telegraph that Zazi and the men arrested in Manchester were part of a complex network directed from Pakistan.

They are reticent on how Zazi was identified but admit it was through an “intercepted communication.”

The network was uncovered following the arrest of a US national, Bryant Neal Vinas, in Pakistan last November.

Now if we could just increase the level of cooperation and communication domestically.

U.S. intelligence agencies were aware months ago that Army Major Nidal Hasan was attempting to make contact with people associated with al Qaeda, two American officials briefed on classified material in the case told ABC News.

I don’t think we can assume that the ball was dropped just yet – there’s certainly more to this case. However, there is a disturbing pattern to these revelations.

NSA has its problems, like any other large organization; problems with management, problems with bureaucracy, problems with change of any kind. But you know what it also has? A brilliant and dedicated work force that would work 24 hours a day, seven days a week if needed in a crisis. A work force that provides much of our country’s “actionable” intelligence and does it with the utmost respect for the privacy of Americans. I was there. I know.

However, the world yawns at that ever-so-honorable pursuit. And if the world yawns, books don’t sell, bloggers panic, newspapers fold and jobs are lost. It’s much better, or at least much easier and more profitable, to twist, spin and distort the truth into a hodgepodge of conflicting motives and methods and hint at the beginning of tyranny and slip in enough fear of privacy concerns to bring the reader back for more.

Utah isn’t so sure.

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder appears poised to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate CIA interrogation abuses, a step that would bring unprecedented scrutiny to cases that ended in the alleged torture and death of detainees, current and former U.S. government officials said.

But a probe of even the most egregious abuses is unlikely to lead to criminal convictions because of an array of evidentiary and legal obstacles, according to current and former CIA and Justice Department officials who have firsthand knowledge of the details of the interrogation files.

Criminal convictions aren’t really the goal here. This is political warfare and a Carter-esque attempt to damage the CIA’s mission.